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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The U.S.-China rapprochement of 1972 is regarded as one of the most important events 
of the Cold War. In a self-congratulatory tone, Richard Nixon claims that it was “the most 
dramatic geopolitical event since World War II.” Historians like Chen Jian and David Wilson 
consider it, along with the Sino-Soviet border clashes, as “two of the most important events in 
the international history of the Cold War.” 1  Thus far, scholars of the Sino-American 
rapprochement have examined the Cold War international setting, domestic politics, and the 
policy-making of the two governments. With most of the works focusing on the political aspect, 
we know more and more about diplomacy and triangulation. However, we still know very little 
about how people in the two countries came to learn about the change in relations and how each 
nation prepared its people for the dramatic rapprochement.  
Historiographical Survey  
During the first decade after Nixon’s visit to China, American scholars who studied the 
Sino-American rapprochement generally employed the “realistic approach” that emphasized the 
balance of power among Washington, Moscow, and Beijing. These scholars explained the Sino-
American thaw in light of the change in the international environment such as the Soviet 
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the eruption of Sino-Soviet border clashes in 1969 in 
particular. They argued that Beijing’s fear of becoming the “next Czechoslovakia” compelled it 
to seek reconciliation with Washington as a way to counterbalance the Soviet threat.2 Due to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Richard Nixon, The Real War (New York: Warner Books, 1980), 134; Chen Jian, Introduction to “All 
under Heaven Is Great Chaos: Beijing, the Sino-Soviet Border Clashes, and the Turn toward Sino-American 
Rapprochement, 1968-69,” ed. Chen Jian and David Wilson, Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), 
Working Paper No.11 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1998), 155. 
2 Harold C. Hinton, Peking-Washington: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United States (Beverly Hills, CA: 
Sage, 1976), 28; A. Doak Barnett, China Policy: Old Problems and New Challenge (Washington, D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 1977), 2-3; Allen S. Whiting, China and the United States, What Next? (New York: Foreign 
Policy Association, 1976); John King Fairbank, The United States and China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1983), 457. 
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their lack of first-hand sources, especially those from China, these scholars used inferential 
reasoning in explaining policy-making in both governments. Their speculations about policy-
making in China were based on the American perspective. 
In the 1980s, under the influence of Warren Cohen, a reformist movement occurred in the 
study of China in the United States. Younger scholars began to criticize Sinologists of the first 
generation, such as Barnett and Fairbank, for being Western-centric and proposed the “Sino-
centric approach.” Cohen’s America’s Response to China was a direct counter-approach to 
Fairbank’s “impact-response” theory, which argued that the modern history of China was a 
response to Western impact.3 As a typical example of the Sino-centric approach, John Garver 
evaluates the Sino-American rapprochement in terms of the “subtle political considerations” of 
Chinese leaders. Pointing out that China was different from Eastern Europe, he especially attacks 
the “next Czechoslovakia” thesis. He questions the importance of military deterrence and claims 
that Mao and Zhou “looked to China itself to provide its main strategic deterrent,” calling it 
“flattering” for Americans to imagine that Beijing “looked to Soviet apprehensions of American 
disapproval to prevent a Soviet attack against China.”4 
In the 1990s, many Chinese official documents were declassified, such as the manuscripts 
of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, their writings on foreign policies, and their detailed 
chronological records.5 These newly available materials have shed new light on the decision-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Warren Cohen, America’s Response to China: An Interpretative History of Sino-American Relations 
(New York: Wiley, 1971). For more about the impact-response theory and its critics, see Paul A. Cohen, 
Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1984). 
4 John W. Garver, China’s Decision for Rapprochement with the United States, 1968-1971 (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1982), 1, 149-55. 
5 Document Research Office of the CCP Central Committee, ed., Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao 
[Manuscripts of Mao Zedong since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China]. vol. 13 (Beijing: Zhongyang 
wenxian chubanshe, 1998); Li Ping and Ma Zhisun, eds., Zhou Enlai nianpu, 1898-1976 [a Chronological Record of 
Zhou Enlai, 1898-1976] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1997); Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
People’s Republic of China and Document Research Office of the CCP Central Committee, eds., Mao Zedong 
 !
3!
making in Beijing. Chinese scholars, with Party historians included, elaborated on how sagacious 
Mao and Zhou were in their reading of international affairs, how adroitly they handled the 
signals from the Nixon administration, and how they responded with subtlety. They gave the 
impression that the Americans were more anxious than the Chinese in seeking rapprochement.6  
After the formal normalization of Sino-American relations in 1979, several Chinese 
students entered American universities for doctoral studies. Because of their bilingual capability, 
they were able to read both American and Chinese declassified documents as well as the 
memoirs of important participants in Sino-American rapprochement. Zhai Qiang examines 
China’s involvement in the Vietnam War. Xia Yafeng reveals the importance of Sino-American 
ambassadorial talks in communicating their genuine intentions to avoid dramatic confrontations. 
In his study of Mao’s impact on China’s Cold War experience, Chen Jian argues that geopolitical 
reasons were not sufficient to explain the complicated reasons for Mao’s decision to reconcile 
with Washington. Emphasizing Mao’s ideology of “continuous revolution,” Chen argues that 
Mao initiated a major breakthrough in China’s foreign relations to serve his domestic needs of 
“boosting his declining reputation while enhancing the Chinese support for Mao’s communist 
state.” Chen does not explain how Mao reconciled his “continuous revolution” ideology with the 
decision to accommodate with the “most dangerous enemy of world revolution.” 7 These scholars !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
waijiao wenxuan [Selected Works of Mao Zedong on Diplomacy] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe and 
shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1994); Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China and Document 
Research Office of the CCP Central Committee, eds., Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan [Selected Works of Zhou Enlai 
on Diplomacy] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1990). 
6 Gong Li, Kuayue honggou: 1969-1979 nian zhongmei guanxi de yanbian [Bridging the Chasm: The 
Evolution of Sino-American Relations, 1969-1979] (Zhengzhou, China: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1992); Qian 
Jiang, Pingpong waijiao muhou [Behind Ping-Pong Diplomacy] (Beijing: Dongfang chubanshe, 1997); and Yang 
Kuisong, “The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapprochement,” Cold 
War History vol.1, no.1 (August 2000); Gong Li, “Chinese Decision Making and the Thawing of U.S.-China 
Relations,” and Zhang Baijia, “The Changing International Scene and Chinese Policy toward the United States, 
1954-1970,” in Re-examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973, eds. Robert Ross and Jiang 
Changbin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001). 
7 Zhai Qiang, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2000); Xia Yafeng, Negotiating with the Enemy: U.S.-China Talks during the Cold War, 1949-1972 (Bloomington: 
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have only briefly mentioned how Beijing prepared for Nixon’s visit in the official circle, but they 
fail to consider how the Chinese government educated the general public through the media. 
Among the more recent works on Sino-American rapprochement, Michael Lumbers has 
done an extraordinary study on the bridge-building efforts of the Johnson administration. He 
argues that a large part of the foundation for Nixon to start the China initiatives had been laid 
during the administration of Lyndon Johnson, whose inactivity during the Cultural Revolution 
even had merits because it did not push Sino-American relations to a worse situation. Margaret 
MacMillan’s Nixon and Mao recounts the interactions between leaders of the two countries and 
does a particularly nice job on the public-relations aspect of the Nixon trip. But her narrative is 
limited to 1971-1972 with scant attention to the evolution of Sino-American relations in the 
1960s. Taking advantage of the Nixon tapes, Chris Tudda reveals more insights about decision-
making in the White House. He finds that Nixon and Kissinger, instead of employing “linkage 
diplomacy,” “compartmentalized” Vietnam and China policies and delinked them from each 
other. However, his argument that the Nixon administration did not intentionally play the China 
card against the Soviet Union until after Kissinger’s secret trip to Beijing in 1971 is open to 
debate.8 Nixon and Kissinger would probably not agree with him. 
The change in U.S. domestic politics is another important theme in the study of Sino-
American rapprochement. Rosemary Foot, for example, focuses on the establishment of 
“domestic consensus” of the 1960s based on a broad understanding that China could not be 
ignored and would be better dealt with directly because it was no longer as menacing as had been !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Indiana University Press, 2006); Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2001), 239, 270-1. 
8 Michael Lumbers, Piercing the Bamboo Curtain: Tentative Bridge-Building to China During the Johnson 
Years (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2008), 202, and Lumbers, “‘Staying out of This Chinese 
Muddle’: The Johnson Administration’s Response to the Cultural Revolution.” Diplomatic History vol. 31, no. 2 
(April 2007): 259-94; Margaret MacMillan, Nixon and Mao: the Week that Changed the World  (New York: 
Random House, 2007), 150-2; Chris Tudda, A Cold War Turning Point: Nixon and China, 1969-1972 (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 2012), 206-7. 
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thought to be the case in the 1950s. She deals with the persistent efforts of several officials in 
pushing for a reconsideration of the China policy, such as James Thomson Jr., Roger Hilsman, 
Robert Komer, Edward Rice, Chester Bowles, and Edwin Reischauer, who were mostly senior-
level bureaucrats specialized in China, along with legislators such as the Kennedys and Mike 
Mansfield (D-MN).9 
Evelyn Goh, Foot’s student at Oxford, uses “discursive analysis” to look at the 
rapprochement through the evolving but at the same time competing images of China in the 
official as well as academic discourses, which shifted China from a “red menace” to “troubled 
modernizer and resurgent power” to a “tacit ally.” Similar to Foot, she argues that “the 1960s 
revisionist discourse constituted an important legacy for the Nixon administration’s eventual 
rapprochement with China and they helped to forge a significant internal official consensus on, 
and to prepare public opinion for, the need to improve relations with China.”10 One problem with 
Goh is that she pays little attention to the media, which constituted very important carriers of 
those discourses. 
The domestic consensus concerns not only domestic politics, but also public opinion. 
Based on the analysis of public polls, Leonard A. Kusnitz does not accept the concept of a 
“Nixon Turnaround.” In his opinion, the “mind blowing” statement by the Washington Post in 
response to Nixon’s announcement of his China trip simply “shows a neglect of the very real 
prior moves the president had made toward China and the way opinion reacted to these 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power: US Relations with China since 1949 (Oxford, UK: Clarendon 
Press, 1995), 18. See also Foot, “Redefinitions: The Domestic Context of America’s China Policy in the 1960s,” in 
Ross and Jiang, eds., Re-examining the Cold War, 264-75. For Congress and Sino-American relations, see Xu 
Guangqiu, Congress and the U.S.-China Relationship, 1949-1979 (Akron, OH: University of Akron Press, 2007). 
10 Evelyn Goh, Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974: From “Red Menace” to 
“Tacit Ally” (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 11-13, 262. 
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actions.”11 Steven Mosher also argues that American academics provided Nixon with a “ready-
made image of the New China, stamped with the scholarly seal of approval, which he in turn 
could sell to the American people.”12  
Examinations of domestic politics and public opinion have enabled scholars to see the 
Sino-American thaw as a result of gradual change and to trace its foundation to a much earlier 
period. Nonetheless, as important influencers of public opinion, the media in both countries have 
not been systematically studied. Chang Tsan-Kuo, a student of communication, does look at the 
relationship between the press and America’s China policy by using statistics and polls, which 
demonstrates how the image of China and Sino-American relations evolved between 1949 and 
1984. However, I do not agree with his argument that the press was only a “surrogate” for policy 
makers rather than independent voices for alternative views.13 I believe that the U.S. media did 
make an independent contribution to the reconciliation between the two countries. His work 
lacks a historical context, and more importantly, a perspective from the Chinese media.  
Between what happens in the political world and people’s formation of their views there 
is a link to which few scholars pay attention. That is, how people learned about the developments 
of Sino-American relations through the media, or how the media transmitted the political 
information to the public. Harold Lasswell describes media transmission as a process involving 
“who says what to whom through which medium with what effects.”14 The media effects 
concern not only the incident and the audiences, but also what happened in the transmission 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Leonard A. Kusnitz, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: America’s China Policy, 1949-1979 (Westport, 
CT: Greenwood, 1984), 132-7. 
12 Steven W. Mosher, China Misperceived: American Illusion and Chinese Reality (New York: BasicBooks, 
1990), 139. 
13 Chang Tsan-Kuo, The Press and China Policy: The Illusion of Sino-American Relations, 1950-1984 
(Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1993), 247. 
14 Harold D. Lasswell, “The Structure and Function of Communication in Society,” in The Process and 
Effects of Mass Communication, ed. Wilbur Schramm and Donald F. Roberts (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois 
Press, 1971), 84. 
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process. Therefore, what people know about an incident does not necessarily mirror what 
actually happened. I am interested in how the media in both countries covered Sino-American 
relations at different time periods. While most other scholars use the media as tools or purveyors 
of government policies in studying the Sino-American rapprochement, I take the media 
themselves as my objects of study. My focus is not so much on “why” Sino-American 
rapprochement could happen, but on “how” it came about in the media. 
Significance & Research Questions 
The media are important for studying U.S.-China reconciliation for several reasons. As 
the chief means by which the public gathers information about current issues, the media had a 
large impact on the public. Here “the public” refers to those who demonstrate an interest in a 
particular issue or in politics in general.15 Instead of reporting the information “objectively,” 
media transmit information to the public through a subjective process of selectivity, placement, 
images, and opinions. They can prioritize issues that the editors or publishers think are more 
important and suppress stories or opinions that they do not like. In their coverage, they may use 
symbols or images that have particular effects. Even for the same political event, different media 
may pick different emphases and come up with dramatically different interpretations. Therefore, 
the media’s representation of events relating to the two countries influenced their audiences’ 
perception of Sino-American relations. 
Media affected public officials “indirectly,” through their impact on opinion registered in 
polls, and indirectly, through official media monitor’s “impressionistic evaluations” of a story or 
a newscast.16 Their influence on public opinion is best reflected in their ability to set the agenda. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Melvin Small, Covering Dissent: The Media and the Anti-Vietnam War Movement (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Rutgers University Press, 1994), 7. See also John C. Pierce, Kathleen M. Beatty, and Paul R. Hagner, The Dynamics 
of American Public Opinion: Patterns and Processes (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, 1982), 97, 13. 
16 Small, Covering Dissent, 10. 
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Bernard Cohen, one of the earliest scholars who study the relationship between the press and 
U.S. foreign policy, claims that the press is not only a “purveyor of information and opinion,” 
but also has agenda-setting functions. As he argues, the press may not be successful in telling 
people “what to think,” but it is generally successful in telling the audience “what to think 
about.”17  
Cohen made the claim at a time when newspapers were the dominant channel through 
which people learned about current issues. Since the 1960s, television has replaced newspapers 
as the dominant medium. The development of television consolidated the media’s power to set 
agendas for political issues. In terms of foreign policy, media could place an issue or region on 
the U.S. foreign policy agenda that was not already there or move an issue or country presently 
on the agenda to a higher level of policy consideration. As Jimmy Carter once said, sometimes a 
particular event “may not warrant preeminent consideration, but because of the high publicity 
assigned to it, the government officials, including the President, are almost forced to deal with it 
in preference to other items that might warrant more attention.”18 In another example, as the 
Johnson administration faced increasing criticisms for its rigid China policy, Secretary of State 
Dean Rusk grudgingly complained about how the media kept focusing on the question of 
China’s admission to the UN while not giving, in his words, “adequate reproaches” to its policies 
in Southeast Asia.19 
Media could also function as cultural institutions that reflect and influence the political 
culture of a certain period. As David L. Altheide argues, “history speaks through the media in 
use. And conversely, the media in use during a historical epoch help shape that epoch.” !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Bernard C. Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), 5, 13, 
259. 
18 Patrick O’Heffernan, Mass Media and American Foreign Policy: Inside Perspectives on Global 
Journalism and the Foreign Policy Process (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1991), 45-46. 
19 Lumbers, Piercing the Bamboo Curtain, 67. 
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According to him, besides the traditional approach of finding evidence of “political/ideological 
infusion into the media process,” we can also look at the media as “cultural items” that 
contributed to the “values, beliefs, meanings, and symbols that define our social world.”20 The 
linguistic as well as visual symbols and the discourse in the media created a unique culture that 
reflected and influenced Sino-American relations. When relations between Beijing and 
Washington were frozen, the U.S. media insisted on using “Red China” or “Communist China” 
in referring to the regime on the mainland. With the thaw in relations, they dropped “Red” and 
“Communist” and even started using the People’s Republic of China. In the Chinese media on 
the other hand, the rhetoric that the American “imperialists” were the “most dangerous enemy to 
people all over the world” also gradually gave way to “heroic” or “friendly” Americans.  
My study is important because it deals with a monumental geopolitical event during a 
crucial period when the two countries were going through great transformations in their domestic 
politics and foreign policies. By using a multinational perspective that involves not only China 
and the United States, but also the Soviet Union and Vietnam, it enriches the study of Sino-
American rapprochement through the lenses of the media, an understudied but vital institution 
that reflected and influenced the two publics’ perception of the relations. It not only readdresses 
the issue of the government-media relationship in the United States, but also maps out the 
development of Beijing’s approach to the United States and reveals how it communicated its 
foreign policy to its own people.  
This dissertation seeks answers to the following questions: How did the media in both 
countries cover the events that showed change in relations? What role(s) did the media in both 
countries play in the Sino-American rapprochement? In other words, I want to see how the media 
in both countries dealt with the prospect of a thaw in relations. Did the U.S. media pick up the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 David L. Altheide, Media Power (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1985), 13-27. 
 !
10!
clues in the various events? Could a reader of the Chinese press see the revolutionary change in 
relations coming, especially in the late sixties as the Soviet Union replaced the United States as 
public enemy number one?  
Differences between the U.S. and Chinese Media 
This is a study of “what” was in the media to evaluate their possible influence on public 
opinion. Before I explain the research method, it is important to note the differences between the 
American media and the Chinese media. First, the U.S. government does not have much direct 
control over the media, except that radio and TV stations are federally licensed. Under the 
protection of the First Amendment, the media have a relatively freer hand in news reporting and 
editing. Also, the influence between the American media and foreign policy makers is mutual, 
which means whereas the government may try to affect the media through public announcements 
and selective leaking, the media’s prioritized coverage of certain news and their editorial 
positions might force the government to respond and address those issues.21  
In China, on the other hand, to serve its “totalitarian ideology,” the Communist Party 
controls the media through its Propaganda Department and uses them to make known its policy 
direction and to manipulate public opinion.22 This influence is one-way from the government to 
the media. Directors of the Xinhua News Agency and chief editors of the People’s Daily enjoyed 
high status within the Party and were heavily involved in its policy-making. A typical example is 
Wu Lenxi, who headed both Xinhua and the People’s Daily from 1957 to 1966 and regularly 
attended the meetings of the Politburo even though he was not a member.23 Moreover, Mao kept 
a tight control of the propaganda machines by appointing people he trusted to lead them. Besides !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Small, Covering Dissent, 17, 13. 
22 Yu Xinlu, “The Role of Chinese Media During the Cultural Revolution (1965-1969).” (Ph.D. Diss.: Ohio 
University, 2001), 28-31. 
23 Wu Lengxi, Shinian lunzhan: 1956-1966 zhongsu guanxi huiyilu [Ten Years of Polemics: A Memoir of 
Sino-Soviet Relations, 1956-1966] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1999), 236. 
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Wu, Hu Qiaomu, who headed Xinhua in 1949, and Chen Boda, who controlled the People’s 
Daily and Red Flag during the Cultural Revolution, had all been loyal to Mao because of their 
previous service as his personal secretaries.24 
Mao’s control of the Propaganda Department and the media in Beijing faltered after he 
stepped back to the “second line” in late 1960 due to the disastrous Great Leap Forward (GLF) 
and left State Chairman Liu Shaoqi, Premier Zhou Enlai, and Party Secretary Deng Xiaoping in 
charge of the policies of the CCP.25 The situation was especially true in 1965, when Mao failed 
to have the People’s Daily and other major Chinese newspapers reprint an article in the 
Shanghai-based Wenhui Bao (Wenhui Daily) that attacked Hai Rui Dismissed from Office, a 
historical play authored by Wu Han, the deputy mayor of Beijing. It was the article that sparked 
the Cultural Revolution.26 
Despite the divisions within the Party in the early 1960s, there were no great differences 
on foreign policy, particularly on U.S. policy, among Chinese leaders. The divisions were mostly 
confined in domestic policy, such as how to evaluate the GLF and how to fix the problems it 
caused.27 Moreover, when the Cultural Revolution started in May 1966, one of the first things 
Mao did was to seize control of the People’s Daily and replace Wu Lengxi with Chen Boda.28 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Alastair Johnston and Robert Ross, New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 127; Daniel Leese, Mao Cult: Rhetoric and Ritual in China’s Cultural 
Revolution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 31. 
25 Won Ho Chang, Mass Media in China: the History and the Future (Ames, IA: Iowa State University 
Press, 1989), 40-41.  
26 Though the People’s Daily reprinted the article later, it placed it in a column “academic debate” and later 
published several editorials repudiating Yao’s article. See People’s Daily (Beijing: Xinhua News Agency, 1965-
1966) (hereafter as PD), November 30, 1965, 5; December 15, 1965, 5; December 25, 1965, 5; January 19, 1966, 5. 
27 Harry Harding, “The Chinese State in Crisis,” in The Cambridge History of China, vol. 15: The People’s 
Republic, Part 2: Revolutions within the Chinese Revolution 1966-1982, eds. Roderick MacFarquhar and John K. 
Fairbank (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 113. 
28 Ma Jisen, Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 
2004), 15.  
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Therefore, we can assume that, during most of the time under study, the Chinese media spoke for 
the Party, the government, and the country.29 
Another difference is that information in the American media is more explicit because 
this country’s political and journalist culture requires open and straightforward articulation. In 
China, by contrast, the government might deliver political or diplomatic messages with extreme 
subtlety. For example, when Zhou Enlai arranged for Edgar Snow to stand next to Mao on the 
Tiananmen balcony on the October Day national celebration in 1970 and had their photo 
published later, U.S. officials as well as journalists did not realize that it was a message from 
Beijing that it wanted to do business with Washington. Moreover, in an authoritarian state like 
China, the government often makes propagandistic statements in the media that did not reflect its 
actual policy. Mao and Zhou Enlai admitted that they usually “fire empty cannons.”30 Therefore, 
it is more difficult to understand the implications between the lines reading the Chinese media. I 
would be reading the tea leaves so to speak. 
Print Media Versus Electronic Media  
It is worthwhile to note that different forms of media have their own strengths in news 
reporting. During the time under study, U.S. newspapers and magazines reach far fewer 
audiences than the nightly newscasts, had much more space to elaborate a story, relied more on 
words and language than pictures, and offered far more opinions through editorials and 
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29 Yu, “The Role of Chinese Media During the Cultural Revolution,” 30. 
30 In his interview with Snow on January 9, 1965, Mao told Snow, “Wherever there is revolution, we issue 
a statement and hold rallies to show support…We like to fire empty cannons, but we don’t send troops.” See Mao 
Zedong waijiao wenxuan, 558. During his second trip to Beijing in October 1971, Kissinger noticed several anti-
American slogans on the city walls. When he asked Zhou Enlai about those slogans, Zhou said that was just “firing 
empty cannon.” See FRUS 1969–1976 Volume XVII, China, 1969–1972 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1971), Document 163: “Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs 
(Kissinger) to President Nixon,” October 29, 1971. All documents from the U.S. Department of State’s FRUS series 
are henceforth cited in the format Title and Document number. All are accessible at 
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments. 
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columns.31 As a visual medium, television is better at presenting events that are “accessible to 
camera and action.” Like radio, it is an “instant” source that reduces the audiences’ chance to 
“check and edit information” before it goes on the air and increases the risk of error or 
misinterpretation.32 
Although television networks are potentially more powerful than newspapers in 
influencing the ordinary people, students of journalism generally agreed on the importance of 
elite newspapers in setting the agenda. Most newspaper editors and television producers relied 
heavily on the Times and the Post, the wire services, a few morning columnists, and more 
generally, the covers of Time and Newsweek to decide what was newsworthy. That is why Russ 
Braley argues that television seldom “discovers” or “initiates” news; it “magnifies” news that 
others have discovered. Later on, even though television networks became independent gatherers 
of news, they were limited by time constraints that left them with only about 90 seconds for each 
story in a 22-minute “news hole” on their 30-minute nightly programs.33 They did not have 
enough space to elaborate on the background, significance and response relevant to a certain 
story. For this reason, some correspondents called nightly news a “headline service” that 
provided an outline of the day’s events. From these “headlines,” one could pick and choose and 
follow his interests for more information in the newspapers. According to Philip L. Geyelin, the 
editorial page editor of the Washington Post from 1968 to 1979, while television news 
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31 Small, Covering Dissent, 16. 
32 Altheide, Media Power, 19; David Broder, Behind the Front Page: A Candid Look at How the News Is 
Made (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), 144-5. 
33 Small, Covering Dissent, 16-7; Russ Braley, Bad News: The Foreign Policy of The “New York Times” 
(Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1984), 570; Clarence Jones, Winning with the News Media: A Self-Defense Manual 
When You’re the Story (Tampa, FL: Video Consultants, 1996), 340-1; John Vivian, The Media of Mass 
Communication (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 2001), 242. 
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“bombards” viewers with a “shifting series of illusions and deceptive appearances,” newspapers 
tidy things up, examine them so that the stories could make sense.34 
Moreover, the most influential members of the public including policy makers relied 
more on the prestige newspapers for serious news than on television, which presented short 
stories in “sensational packages that lacked context.” Therefore, the importance of television in 
influencing public opinion might be exaggerated. What makes the relationship more complicated 
is the fact that most officials think that television is more important than print media in affecting 
the public.35 
Due to the “inherent mechanical need” of television to have images, their reporters had 
been accused of being especially “susceptible to being used” by news sources. Because most 
stories of foreign affairs concerned the White House, and it was more difficult to get decision 
makers to talk on camera, stories of this kind were mostly “talking heads” and “standuppers”--
the White House correspondent, with the White House in the background, talking his story into 
the camera or even the anchor reading the stories in the studio.36 This was even truer when it 
came to stories about China due to the lack of images.  
Comments on Sources: Media under Study 
As Melvin Small points out in Covering Dissent, there are numerous difficulties in 
analyzing the media’s coverage of a historical process: the determination of the media to be 
examined, the identification of important events, and the sampling method.37 I select some of the 
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34 Robert M. Batscha, Foreign Affairs News and the Broadcast Journalist (New York: Praeger, 1975), 50; 
Philip Geyelin, “The Editorial Page,” in The Editorial Page, ed. Laura Longley Babb (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1977), 18. 
35 Small, Covering Dissent, 16-17. 
36 Batscha, Foreign Affairs News and the Broadcast Journalist, 32, 142. 
37 Small, Covering Dissent, 3. 
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most influential media in both countries and examine how they covered the important events that 
affected Sino-American relations.  
For sources of U.S. media, I look at newspapers, magazines, and television news 
programs. Among newspapers, the New York Times and the Washington Post were the most 
influential in this period because other major newspapers, magazines, and television networks, 
often accepted their definition of “what was ‘news.’” The New York Times is especially 
important because of the prominence it had gained since the 1940s when it invested heavily in 
foreign affairs reporting, a neglected field of journalism at the time. Since then, the Times had 
the largest, if not the best, staff of foreign correspondents. The importance of the Times can also 
be shown that several scholars use it as the major source to represent the American media when 
they study the foreign policy reporting.38 In addition, Time and Newsweek, among magazines, 
and the evening newscasts of the three national networks, CBS, ABC, and NBC, were also 
important sources for Americans. Students of American journalism would agree with Johnson 
and Nixon who believed that these seven media institutions were the most important in the 
United States.39  
Among sources of the Chinese media, I mainly use Renmin Ribao, or the People’s Daily, 
and Cankao Xiaoxi, or the Reference News, because they represented the two levels of the 
Chinese communication system, one in the form of mass media, the other the internal channel.40 
Hong Qi (the Red Flag magazine), the “ideological journal” of the CCP,41 appear in my narrative 
occasionally when it published joint editorials with the People’s Daily. My original plan was to 
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38 See Braley, Bad News, 568-9. See also Nicholas O. Berry, Foreign Policy and the Press: An Analysis of 
the New York Times’ Coverage of U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990). 
39 Small, Covering Dissent, 3. 
40 Michel Oksenberg, “Methods of Communication within the Chinese Bureaucracy,” The China Quarterly, 
no. 57 (January-March 1974), 1. 
41 NYT, March 22, 1964, 13.  
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examine the People’s Liberation Army Daily (the PLA Daily) as well. However, after checking a 
number of key events, such as Beijing’s 1968 statement offering the renewal of the Warsaw 
Talks and Mao’s photo with Snow in 1970, I find that its articles were identical to those in the 
People’s Daily. So I decided not to single it out for analysis.  
 I do not use Chinese electronic media for several reasons. First, TV programs were not 
transmitted on a regular basis and the number of sets available to the Chinese public was quite 
limited in the 1960s. The second reason is that archives of telecasts and radio programs in China 
are not easy to access. The third and most important reason is that the centralized nature of the 
Chinese media--their common ownership by the state-owned Xinhua News Agency--decides that 
voices of all media forms in China should be generally identical. Important news and 
commentaries in TV and radio appeared in the People’s Daily as well.  
As the official publication of Central Committee of the CCP, the People’s Daily was the 
most important newspaper in China and scholars often use it for studying the Chinese media. 
Each edition had a wide readership when it was circulated in many work units or put in bulletin 
boards in public areas. Under the direct control of the Central Propaganda Department, it was 
tasked with disseminating the Party line and policies to the people. People’s Daily published 
commentaries in the following forms: editorials, which were the most commonly used; short 
general commentaries and articles by the paper’s own commentators, which were very brief and 
usually more locally oriented; articles by the paper’s editorial department, reserved for more 
abstract subjects; articles by political observers dealing with foreign issues; and articles by 
various dignitaries representing the voice of the CCP. Despite the variety in their names, they 
generally reflected the position of the CCP or the Chinese government. Editorials in this 
newspaper were of great importance and its level of authority ranked just under directives, Party 
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resolutions, and Mao’s words. News stories were secondary to editorials in the newspaper. In a 
highly politicized culture, it was a common practice among local party branches of the CCP or 
various small work units consisting of adults to hold regular meetings to study the editorials of 
the People’s Daily.42 
The Reference News was an internal newspaper few scholars have used in studying Sino-
American relations. Founded in 1931, it was originally a classified internal publication read only 
by top CCP leaders and military commanders with a circulation of around fifty in the 1930s and 
two thousand after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. In 1957, 
Mao decided to turn it into an internal newspaper with its readership expanded to Communist 
cadres above the county-level and a limited number of non-communist intellectuals who worked 
with the CCP. By running news stories that were not fit to publish in the open media, Mao 
wanted the newspaper to function as a tool to inform the Chinese cadres about world affairs and 
world opinions about China, both positive and negative. In his words, “by letting the cadres 
know about how our enemies criticize us, Reference News would function as a vaccination that 
promoted their immune system and judgment.” Its circulation was 200,000 in 1957 and 400,000 
in 1964. When China was moving toward the United States, Reference News became even more 
important in preparing the Chinese cadres for the possible new relationship. On July 5, 1970, the 
Central Committee of the CCP issued a notice, which dramatically increased its circulation to 
around five million.43 
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As David Bonavia of the New York Times wrote in July 1975, Reference News carried 
“accurate though often abridged” translations of reports from the main world news agencies to 
keep readers informed of trends in foreign public opinion rather than to propagate the news of 
the Chinese leadership, although he admits the existence of a “slant.” He put it in sharp contrast 
to the Soviet equivalent, a weekly publication that presented only foreign materials favorable to 
Moscow’s propaganda line, and that regularly distorted or misinterpreted the contents of the 
originals for political purposes.44  
Due to its internal nature, the subscriptions of the Reference News had to be approved by 
the Party and foreigners were not allowed to access it up to the late 1970s. At one time, the 
ability to read this newspaper had been regarded as a privilege or a sign of social status in China. 
Its header used to have a notice “neibu kanwu, zhuyi baocun,” which means “internal circulation, 
please handle with discretion.” Even its used copies had to be recycled to prevent it from flowing 
to the public. After the Reference News became a newspaper, people gave it a nickname known 
as xiao cankao (Small Reference) to differentiate it from the daily internal publication called 
Reference Materials, or da cankao (Big Reference), which published about a hundred pages with 
a morning issue and an afternoon issue. As its nickname da cankao suggests, the Reference 
Materials was read only by the “big shots”--officials of the CCP at very high level.45  
The two U.S. newspapers during the period under study are available in the online 
database of ProQuest. The two magazines can be found on microfilm. Many universities in the 
United States have access to the People’s Daily database. The Havard-Yenching library has the 
paper copies of the Red Flag magazine and the two Chinese newspapers under study on disks. It 
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44 Rudolph, Cankao-Xiaoxi: Foreign News in the Propaganda System of the People’s Republic of China, 6-
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45 Ibid. See also Wei, “Mao Zedong dingzhu,” 44-6; Zhang, “Cankao xiaoxi: cong neibu kanwu dao 
gongkai faxing,” 5; Li, “Cankao xiaoxi ruhe jiemi,” 76. 
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also has the People’s Daily on microfilm. Now many newspapers, both American and Chinese, 
have been digitalized into searchable items via key words and dates. One problem is that the 
number of entries turned out by the search engine might be hugely different depending on what 
criteria the researcher uses. Another problem with digitalized newspapers articles is that they 
have been singled out as separate entries, usually with pictures and cartoons omitted because of 
property right issues. Therefore, reading the digitalized article is vastly different from reading the 
actual newspaper on the microfilm, which tells more about the context of that article. One of the 
ways to compensate for these problems is to use the New York Times index, which gives a 
complete picture about what entries and how many there are in each newspaper. Besides 
showing the location of each news entry, the number of entries in the index also shows the 
amount of attention given and how long it remained in the spotlight.  
The political narrative requires the actual policy inputs of both countries. On the 
American side, I use the series of Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) and the 
Department of State Bulletin published by the Department of State, the Congressional Record, in 
addition to the Public Papers of the Presidents of the United State. Chinese primary sources 
include works of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai on diplomacy, the Chronological Record of Zhou 
Enlai, and the multi-volumes of the Manuscripts of Mao Zedong, all published by the Central 
Party Literature Press of China. Moreover, many of the conversations between Chinese leaders 
and foreign leaders concerning the Indochina Wars and Sino-Soviet conflicts had been 
declassified and compiled into working papers in the Bulletins of the Cold War International 
History Project by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. In addition, I have 
read the memoirs of senior officials, diplomats, and prominent journalists in both countries. 
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Sampling Method: How to Read the Media 
After the selection of the media to examine, I set up the chronological boundary, which 
covers the administration of Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon’s first term. It starts with 
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Roger Hilsman’s major policy speech in 
1963, which signified a new U.S. posture toward China, and ends with Nixon’s visit in 1972. 
Over this ten-year period, I select a number of key events that affected Sino-American relations 
and examine how they were covered by the mainstream media in their respective countries. The 
identification of these key events can be subjective. However, I try to pick those whose 
importance has been agreed upon by most historians. These events are: the Hilsman Speech in 
1963; the French Recognition of China, the escalation of the Vietnam War, and China’s nuclear 
test in 1964; the Fulbright Hearings and the start of the Cultural Revolution in 1966; the Soviet 
invasion of Czechoslovakia, the beginning of the Paris talks, and the Chinese offer to resume the 
Sino-American Ambassadorial Talks in Warsaw (known as the Warsaw Talks) in 1968; the 
Sino-Soviet border clashes and U.S. overtures to China in 1969; the resumption of the Warsaw 
Talks and Edgar Snow’s visit to China in 1970; Ping-Pong Diplomacy and Henry Kissinger’s 
secret trip to China in 1971, and finally Nixon’s trip in 1972.  
For each event, I briefly describe its development on the basis of secondary accounts and 
memoirs. It should be noted that several of the events did not happen on a single day, but 
consisted of events that occurred over a long period of time, for example, the Cultural 
Revolution, the Sino-Soviet conflict, and the Sino-Vietnam split. For these events, I devote more 
space to their historical background.  
After the narration of the event, I examine how the elite U.S. media covered it in terms of 
headlines, placement, opinions, and the general evaluation of the significance. If there were 
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photos or political cartoons attached, I describe them and interpret their implications, evaluating 
their possible influence on the audience. If one event that I think is important was not covered by 
a certain source, it is always worthwhile to explain the reason for the silence. To locate articles 
from the ProQuest database, I use the search engine on the basis of the date and key words. From 
the larger sample of articles, I mainly focus on front-page stories, editorials, and columns, 
eliminating when possible duplicate ideas and arguments. The selection process also involves 
placement, relevancy, and the reputation of the columnists.  
In his study of the media coverage of the antiwar movement, Melvin Small does not look 
at editorials because he argues that for print media, headlines, lead paragraphs, and pictures on 
the front pages are more important in influencing the public than editorials or columns that are 
usually buried deep. He also believes that editorials of elite newspapers tend to be more 
conservative than their more objective news articles. Richard Nixon also holds that editorial 
pages of the newspapers “tilt right,” while their reports from the Washington bureau generally 
“tilt left.”46 
Small’s argument is true indeed, but the importance of news articles, especially front-
page stories, does not necessarily mean that editorials and columns are not important. According 
to a report based on a research by Belden Associates, on a Newspaper Association of American 
Report detailing a national survey of newspaper readership, on a 1993 study of media and their 
markets by Simmons Market Research Bureau, and on a review of academic research into 
readership patterns, editorial readership is next only to general news for adult readers at every 
level of education and ranks ahead of categories that include sports, business, entertainment, 
food, and home. Similar studies in 1994 show that 79 percent of adult readers who read !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 Small, Covering Dissent, 4, 13; Richard Nixon, In the Arena: A Memoir of Victory, Defeat, and Renewal 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 254. 
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newspapers daily read or look at the editorial page. More importantly, these studies show that 
editorial page readers tend to be “older, more affluent, and better educated,” which means their 
readers are more likely to “hold sway” in public affairs.47 Moreover, even Small agrees that 
editorials and opinions in newspapers had more influence on the presidents than news stories 
because they were given special importance in the news summaries of the Johnson and Nixon 
administrations. They seemed to think that “publicly expressed opinions” were more important 
in influencing Americans than front-page news stories.48 
Time and Newsweek are available on microfilm. In order to locate relevant articles on an 
event, I use Readers’ Guide to Periodical Literature in combination with the magazines’ own 
indices. As magazines were published once a week, timeliness was obviously not their strength, 
which lay in the large amount of pictures, political cartoons, and in-depth analysis. Magazines 
could also prioritize a topic by putting it on their covers.  
Then I turn to television programs. During most of the time under study, the U.S. 
television networks did not have many images from China due to their lack of access to the 
country and the extremely rare interactions between Chinese and Americans. Moreover, the 
Vanderbilt University Television News Archives’ videotape collection in Nashville extends back 
only to 1968. Of the three networks, only CBS maintains an archive for pre-1968 broadcasts. But 
they are not open to public use.49 Therefore, I use more sources in the print media, especially the 
two elite newspapers, than television footage in studying the period between 1963 and 1967. 
Even though U.S. telecasts become part of my narrative from 1968, it was not until Ping-Pong 
Diplomacy in April 1971 that they began to play a substantially more prominent role in Sino-
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48 Small, Covering Dissent, 28. 
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American relations. In watching television footage, I mainly look at the direction of the camera, 
symbols in the picture, activities and expressions of people featured in the video because these 
elements could potentially influence the audience’s perception of the event. For “talking heads” 
in the studio, I examine the expression, tone, and arguments of the anchors. 
Because of the differences between the media in the two countries, I have come upon 
different issues in looking at them. In studying the U.S. media, I address the issue of their 
relationship with the government to see if they played an independent role in America’s China 
policy. When it comes to the Chinese side, evaluation of the media enables me to obtain hints 
about Beijing’s attitude because of their close relationship with the Party and the government. 
When reading the People’s Daily, I pay attention to the placement, the headlines, and the 
format of an article. Usually, editorials appearing jointly with Red Flag and the PLA Daily are 
more important than articles in other formats. For a specific article, I examine how it 
characterized the United States, sometimes in comparison to the Soviet Union, to find clues 
about official attitudes toward them. From the propaganda or the “empty cannon,” I try to find 
nuances such as the demonstration of commitment. With regard to the Reference News, I mainly 
focus on the placement of the story and especially how it dealt with the signals from the United 
States in order to see what kind of information Beijing released to the cadres.  
In a more general sense, I look at the differences among the media and try to explain 
why. For example, the differences between the New York Times and the Washington Post in their 
reporting of China might reflect the opinions of different groups. On the other hand, the different 
attitude to the United States in the People’s Daily and the Reference News reflected how Beijing 
communicated its foreign policies to people at different positions of the political hierarchy. I am 
also interested in how the media in both countries responded to each other because usually the 
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reporting of the media in one country would attract the attention of the other. The interpretation 
of news reporting from the other side could potentially affect the domestic audience. Moreover, I 
look at the relationship between the actual governmental policy and the media representation. 
Usually the discrepancy between governmental “words” and “deeds” on certain issues had 
implications. It is my job to explain the causes of the differences.   
The dissertation is divided into five chapters. Chapter one covers the period from 
Hilsman’s speech in late 1963 to the Fulbright Hearings in spring 1966. By working with the 
critics from academic and congressional circles, the U.S. media contributed to the 
“depoliticization” of the China issue in the public arena.50 The Chinese media’s attitude toward 
the United States, on the other hand, changed from moderately hostile to radically hostile during 
this period. They responded to the new developments in the United States with mockery and 
vigilance, describing them as “hoax” and “tools of peaceful transformation.” 
The second chapter deals with the high point of the Cultural Revolution between 1966 
and 1968, during which the Chinese media promoted Beijing’s image as a fighter against both 
“American imperialists” and “Soviet revisionists” in order to inspire the struggle against Mao’s 
political enemies. While the voices calling for a more flexible China policy in the U.S. media 
were overwhelmed by stories of recurrent violence in China, their coverage of its troubles with 
Moscow and Hanoi presented a disorganized and greatly weakened China that had become less 
of a threat to the United States. 
Chapter three examines 1969, when the eruption of Sino-Soviet border clashes brought 
Beijing and Washington closer. Whereas Washington assumed a public posture of detachment, 
the U.S. media openly elaborated on the benefits of closer ties with Beijing. When Beijing 
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showed a genuine concern for a Soviet surprise attack in its media, the Reference News started to 
report on U.S. overtures despite the rigid rhetoric in the People’s Daily. 
Chapter four looks at the “intricate minuet” between Beijing and Washington from the 
renewal of the Warsaw talks in early 1970 to Kissinger’s secret trip to Beijing in July 1971. 
During this period, Beijing became a much more active player in promoting Sino-American 
rapprochement, especially through the media. The U.S. media’s positive reports of China, 
especially during Ping-Pong Diplomacy, helped to change its image into a rational country 
possible to deal with.  
The last chapter looks at the period between Kissinger’s secret visit to Nixon’s trip to 
China in 1972. While Nixon started his media campaign to prepare for the show in Beijing, the 
Chinese government used its media to prepare its people for the dramatic change in relations 
with its former number-one enemy. The China visit turned into a “TV spectacle” when massive 
media coverage contributed to and became part of this success story of public relations. 
! 26!
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Chapter 2: The Depoliticization of the China Issue: 1963-1966 
The period between late 1963 and spring 1966 witnessed the gradual “depoliticization” of 
the China issue in the United States.1 The speech of Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern 
Affairs Roger Hilsman in December 1963 was received favorably as a change in U.S. posture 
toward China. In 1964 China established diplomatic relations with France and successfully 
exploded its first atomic bomb. These two events dramatically elevated Beijing’s international 
position and posed new challenges to the China policy of the Johnson administration, which 
faced increasing pressure to include China into the international community. 
The U.S. escalation in Vietnam, especially the introduction of ground-combat troops in 
1965, caused great concern in the United States about the danger of military confrontations with 
China. This concern provided a strong logic for a reappraisal of U.S. policy toward China. 
During the highly publicized Fulbright Hearings in spring 1966, the “containment without 
isolation” thesis proposed by the academics received overwhelmingly favorable responses in 
journalistic as well as official circles. The media’s coverage of the hearings was important in 
“legitimizing” the airing of views that would have been considered dangerous in the 1950s.2  
By looking at the media coverage of the events from Hilsman’s speech through the 
French recognition, the Chinese nuclear test, and U.S. escalation in Vietnam to the Fulbright 
Hearings, this chapter examines how influential U.S. media acted as vocal critics of the Johnson 
administration’s rigid policy toward China and how they contributed to the “depoliticization” of 
the China issue. It also examines how Chinese media responded to the new developments in the 
United States. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Michael Lumbers, “‘Staying out of This Chinese Muddle’: The Johnson Administration’s Response to the 
Cultural Revolution,” Diplomatic History vol. 31, no. 2 (April 2007), 285. 
2 See New York Times (hereafter as NYT), March 9, 1966, 1; Washington Post (hereafter as WP), March 9, 
1966, 1; Michael Lumbers, Piercing the Bamboo Curtain: Tentative Bridge-Building to China During the Johnson 
Years (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2008), 155.  
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U.S.-China relations to 1963 
In 1949, the relationship between the United States and the newly established People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) was shaped by the larger Cold War context. Before the establishment 
of the PRC, Mao Zedong had declared openly that China would “lean to one side” and join the 
socialist camp led by the Soviet Union. Not in a hurry to extend recognition to China, the 
Truman administration adopted Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s policy to “wait until the dust 
settles.”3 The breakout of the Korean War in 1950, the American effort to stop the Chinese 
Communists from taking over Taiwan, and the fight between the two countries on the Korean 
peninsula shattered the last hope of a better relationship.  
The policy of “containment and isolation” set up by the Truman administration became 
the foundation of America’s China policy over the next two decades. Under this policy, the 
United States refused to recognize the newly established People’s Republic and blocked its 
admission to the United Nations. Moreover, it placed an economic embargo on China and 
formed military alliances with South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and South Vietnam to contain its 
“expansion.” Due to the McCarthy witch hunt in the early 1950s and the powerful influence of 
the China Lobby, an interest group consisting of “zealous protagonists” of the Nationalist 
government on Taiwan,4 any talk about changing this policy became risky politically. 
The Republican administration of Dwight Eisenhower did not show any interest in 
improving relations with China. It pursued a “wedge strategy” designed to split China from the 
Soviet Union by placing “diplomatic, economic, and military pressure” on Beijing that Moscow 
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would be unable or unwilling to relieve.5 As the primary architect of this policy, Secretary of 
State John Foster Dulles believed that it would eventually produce the “desired rupture” between 
them.6 This policy also froze U.S.-China relations between 1953 and 1960 in a state of high 
tension, which was well reflected in the two Taiwan Strait Crises in 1954 and 1958. 
The tension between China and the United States lessened a little under the presidency of 
John F. Kennedy. When he was a senator, Kennedy had criticized the rigid China policy of the 
Republican administration in a Foreign Affairs article in 1957.7 In one of his television debates 
with Richard Nixon during the 1960 campaign, Kennedy advocated forsaking the offshore 
islands of Quemoy and Matsu, which lied within the canon range Chinese forces, to avoid 
military confrontations with China. This position nearly cost his election and he had to change 
his position later.8 When Kennedy entered the White House, China was ending its disastrous 
Great Leap Forward. Millions of Chinese lives had perished due to the famine it caused. 
Kennedy flirted with the idea of shipping famine-relieving wheat to China, but on the condition 
that Beijing requested it first. When the Nationalists planned to invade China in 1962, U.S. 
representatives told the Chinese at the ambassadorial talks in Warsaw that Washington would not 
support their war effort. Xia Yafeng argues that the pro-Taiwan sentiment in the United States, 
Beijing’s militancy during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and its attempt to acquire a nuclear 
capability, dissuaded Kennedy from ending the policy of containment and isolation.9  
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Hilsman’s Speech 
Though Sino-American relations did not improve much during the Kennedy 
administration, there had been a reformist sentiment among higher-level officials dealing with 
the China policy.10 Roger Hilsman claims that even the president himself authorized an attempt 
to open the door to a normalization of relations with China not long after the Cuban Missile 
Crisis and the signing of the limited nuclear test-ban treaty in 1963.11 Kennedy lost the chance to 
do more with his assassination on November 22, 1963. 
On December 13, three weeks after Kennedy’s death, Hilsman made a major speech on 
China policy in his address to the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco. In this speech he stated 
that the United States would like to “keep the door open” to negotiations with Communist China 
if the Chinese leaders forsake their “venomous hatred” of the United States. Acknowledging that 
the Communist regime was not likely to be overthrown, Hilsman expressed hope that Chinese 
leaders “at the second echelon” would take a realistic approach and that they would realize that 
the Great Leap Forward reflected “a stubborn addiction to theories which did not work in 
modern world.”12 Six years earlier, also in San Francisco, John Foster Dulles had reiterated the 
American policy of “no recognition, no U.N. seat and no trade and cultural interchanges” with 
China. He had confidently assumed that Communist rule in China was a “passing and not a 
perpetual phase.”13   
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The New York Times placed the Hilsman speech on its front page with “KEY POLICY 
STATEMENT” in the headline. Calling the speech “a new exposition of policy toward China--
the first such major statement from either the Kennedy or Johnson administration,” it pointed out 
that it had been “cleared through higher levels of the administration” and the text of the speech 
had been distributed by the State Department. In a column “Looking Toward Peking: 
Washington Shows New Frankness on Policies Long under Discussion,” Max Frankel, chief of 
the Times’ Washington Bureau and its major China watcher, claimed that the most important 
thing about the speech was that “it was made at all.” While calling Kennedy’s China advisers 
timid because of the offensives of Joseph McCarthy (R-WI) and the China Lobby during the 
1950s, he described the Chinese leaders as “prudent and sensible.” Frankel also appealed to 
readers by saying that the statement was “aimed at Americans” and that it was a call for their 
“realism and moderation” in dealing with Beijing.14 
The Washington Post did not give the speech as much prominence as the Times, placing 
it on page five. Even though it called China the “most populous and most embittered” nation in 
the world, the article favorably reviewed Hilsman’s “dispassionate” speech, putting it in contrast 
to Dulles’ statement six years earlier, which it described as having been “couched in tones of 
outrage and indignation.” In its editorial, the Post again pointed out that while Dulles’ statement 
had “a certain fatalism,” Hilsman’s version saw “a certain prospect for change.” It criticized the 
absence of fresh policy on China by asking a question, “After six years, has the United States 
nothing more to say than that if China changes, the situation might improve? Not even a trial 
balloon?”15 
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Newsweek described Hilsman’s speech as the administration’s “tentative, probing move 
designed to test the reaction--both at home and in Peking--to a subtle change in its attitude 
toward China.”16 Interestingly, Time was silent on Hilsman’s speech. Instead, it followed 
Chinese Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai’s six-week trip to Africa. Referring to Zhou as 
“the grandest panjandrum from Peking ever” to visit that continent, Time claimed that China 
obviously wanted to establish “the yellow man’s burden” even if it “could not afford to pick it 
up.” Here the word “panjandrum” sounds much more evil than “leader,” and “the yellow man’s 
burden” compared the Chinese diplomatic activities in African to Western colonial conquest of 
this region in the past. When Hilsman resigned from office in early 1964, Time described him as 
an “aggressive and abrasive” man hindering the teamwork necessary for coordinating policy. It 
even quoted a State Department official who said Hilsman’s resignation was just a “two-day 
deal” and they did not mind.17 
The hostility of Time to China was closely related to its owner Henry Luce, the son of 
missionary parents who had worked in China before 1949. Luce liked to tell friends that the only 
ambassadorship he would take was to a “restored democracy in China.” His championing of the 
Nationalists was so much that by the time they were driven out of the mainland, Chiang Kai-shek 
had appeared on the cover of Time more often than anyone else--even more frequently than 
Roosevelt or Churchill or Hitler.18 Luce was a leading member of the China Lobby, in which the 
most important nation-wide bipartisan organization was called the Committee of One Million, 
founded in 1953 to mobilize sentiment against any “appeasement of Communist China.” Two 
weeks after Hilsman’s speech, the Times reported that the committee attacked him for “departing 
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from” official U.S. policy by promoting a “two-China” solution. However, it buried the story 
deep,19 and the Post ignored the story. Overall, positive responses to Hilsman’s speech far 
outweighed criticisms in the U.S. media under examination. 
In his memoir, Hilsman describes the birth of his speech as more like a reformist 
movement from below rather than one initiated from above. According to him, James C. 
Thomson, Jr. the Special Assistant in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs; Lindsey Grant, Officer 
in charge of Mainland China Affairs; Allen S. Whiting, Director of the Office of Research for 
Far Eastern Affairs; Joseph W. Neubert, also a special assistant in Far Eastern Affairs; and 
Abram Manell, Public Affairs Adviser for Far Eastern Affairs, were all involved in drafting the 
speech. In order to make sure the American people understood its significance, he pointed out, 
Allen Whiting had briefed the press, the two wire services, the two local Washington papers and 
especially the New York Times, telling them the speech signified a “departure of historical 
significance,” especially from Dulles’ China policy statement of 1957. As a former professor and 
a graduate of West Point with ten years of service in the Army, Hilsman believed he could 
“blunt” the criticism from the far left as well as the far right.20 
As Hilsman stated, the speech was cleared by the Defense Department, various branches 
of the State Department and the White House staff. However, it was George Ball who read and 
approved the speech as the Acting Secretary because Dean Rusk was away for weekend.21 
Actually, Rusk was shocked by the Hilsman speech and expressed reservations about it in 
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private.22 Moreover, President Johnson did not read and comment on the speech because by 
being “not too closely and personally identified with the decision to make it,” he could avoid 
taking responsibility if it backfired.23 Hilsman’s resignation in February 1964, to some extent, 
suggests that his China approach was not widely shared by the major policy makers of the 
Johnson team. It does not matter whether the speech was Hilsman’s own initiative or it had been 
approved by the White House. What matters is that the audience got the impression that the 
Johnson administration was considering a new posture towards China. Here the impression 
created by the media is more important than the actual positions of policy-makers. 
Hilsman’s speech, as he said, served as a “test balloon” of public reaction at very little 
risk to the Johnson administration’s future choice about the issue.24 Media’s positive response, as 
James Thomson observed in his recommendations to National Security Advisor McGeorge 
Bundy, suggested “a dramatic ebbing of passions on the China issue over the past decade.”25 The 
ebbing of passion opened the door for more reasonable talk about a flexible China policy. 
The Chinese media response to Hilsman’s speech was mild at the beginning. The 
People’s Daily ran an article entitled “Hilsman Whining, Trapped in the Dead Alley of Anti-
China, the U.S. is Attempting to Play Double Sides to Avoid Defeat.” Interestingly, other than 
the sarcastic title, the article was moderate in tone as it fairly covered the main ideas of 
Hilsman’s speech: the United States had to acknowledge the Communist government was here to 
stay and expanding its influence; the United States was not ignoring the seven hundred million 
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Chinese but trying to talk to them through channels like Warsaw; the two-Chinas policy; an 
“open door” policy to push China give up its rigid policy and accept a diversified world.26 There 
was neither a vicious attack on the American policy nor any commitment of official position.  
Two months later, the People’s Daily published a much longer editorial with severe 
attacks on U.S. officials’ recent talks about a possible “open door to China.” It reiterated the 
Chinese support for the national liberation struggles in Asia, Africa as well as Latin America, 
and warned the United States to give up hope that the Chinese leaders of the second echelon 
would surrender their rigid values of class struggle. It even drew a parallel to 1949 when the 
United States should not have had hope for the lovers of individual freedom and democracy in 
China. At last, it argued that the change in U.S. policy served as a good “counter-example” that 
would only “reinforce the confidence and determination” of the Chinese and Asian people in 
their fighting against American imperialists.27 Later on, even the Times noted the CCP’s 
theoretical journal Red Flag’s concern that its young members might be subverted by Western 
influences when it urged older party members to educate future leaders in revolutionary 
traditions. Without any interest in reconciliation with Washington, Beijing viewed its flexibility 
as a tool of “peaceful transformation” that might dampen the revolutionary spirit of the Chinese 
people.28 It ridiculed Washington’s new posture in order to frustrate any hope of better relations 
between the two countries. 
The Chinese media response was in line with the guideline set by a Standing Committee 
meeting of the CCP’s politburo held from January 7 to 17, 1960 and chaired by Mao. The 
guideline suggested that China should “fully expose the imperialistic nature” of the United States 
and stress that it was still the “root of war, the enemy to world peace, to the national liberation !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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movement and world socialism,” and that it was trying to destroy world revolution with methods 
including subversion and deception. With regard to the ambassadorial talks in Warsaw, it 
advocated a policy of “talk without breaking, talk but not in haste,” which meant that China 
would keep negotiating with Washington, but it would not establish diplomatic relations in haste. 
The idea was that delaying a few more years was good for China.29 After the Sino-Soviet split 
became public in July 1963, when the Soviet Union signed the test-ban treaty with Great Britain 
and the United States, Chinese attitude toward the United States became even more militant. In 
competing with Moscow over who had more revolutionary credentials, Beijing did not want to 
be viewed as “being soft” on the “imperialists.”  
The French Recognition of China 
When 1963 approached its end, the Times carried an editorial “An Atmosphere of 
Détente” to describe the world situation. Among the evidence for optimism, it listed the 
statements of President Johnson, West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, Soviet Premier 
Nikita Khrushchev’s “gratification” at Johnson’s call for an end to the cold war, and Zhou 
Enlai’s remark that China was seeking “peaceful coexistence with all nations.”30 Zhou made the 
remark in a televised interview with the French state television during a visit to Morocco. While 
the Post placed Zhou’s interview on page six, focusing on Zhou’s remark about peaceful 
existence, the Times placed the story on its front page, focusing on his remark that he hoped for a 
“normalization” of relations between France and China.31 By that time, France and China were 
indeed close to establishing diplomatic relations. 
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On January 7, 1964, the French government informed U.S. Ambassador Charles Bohlen 
that it had decided to extend recognition to the People’s Republic of China.32 Before the official 
announcements from Beijing and Paris, the White House chose to leak the information to the 
media, as could be seen in the “authoritative sources” in the Times and “informed sources 
confirmed” in the Post in their front-page stories. The Post interpreted it as an “official 
reluctance to acknowledge the development.”33 In a phone conversation with his “mentor” 
Senator Richard Russell (D-GA),34 President Johnson said he would send a low-key protest for 
the record. When Russell said, “the time’s going to come when we’re going to have to recognize 
them,” Johnson admitted, “Yeah, I think so--don’t think there’s any question about it.” Russell 
pointed out that it was “poison” politically at the time.35 Russell was right, American public 
opinion was not ready for a change in China policy in 1964. A January Gallop Poll showed that 
71 percent of the respondents thought that Beijing should not be admitted to the UN.36   
As the Times reported, the Committee of One Million published an advertisement with 
the signature of 72 sponsors in the International Herald Tribune, appealing to the people of 
France to oppose President Charles de Gaulle’s decision. Le Monde refused to publish the 
advertisement without giving a reason. The Times also refused to carry it on the account that the 
committee could not certify that it had obtained the consent of all persons named as sponsors for 
using their names.37  
When Johnson was asked to comment on the French intention to recognize China in a 
press conference on January 25, he simply said, “we gave them our views and the general effect !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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it would have on the alliance and on the free world, and it is a matter for them to decide.” When 
Paris and Beijing finally made the joint announcement two days later, the State Department 
called the French move “an unfortunate step when the Chinese Communists were actively 
promoting aggression and subversion in Southeast Asia and elsewhere.”38 The U.S. government 
kept a low profile probably because of the frustration after repeated attempts to stop the French 
move had failed. 
The French recognition of China did not come as a surprise to the American audience. 
Rumors of a Sino-French understanding had been spread since June 1963 when both countries 
rejected the Limited Test Ban Treaty agreed on by the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet 
Union.39 The Times, for example, reported frequent diplomatic and economic exchanges between 
China and France between October and December in 1963. Among them were visits to Beijing 
by prominent French businessmen and high-level official such as Senator Edgar Faure, a former 
premier close to de Gaulle. In mid-December 1963, de Gaulle reportedly reassured Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk that he had no intention to recognize China in the near future.40 As a man of 
vision, Charles de Gaulle was convinced that sooner or later China would become a major power 
with its reserves of manpower and resources.41 He thought it was wise to deal with the nation 
before being forced to do so when it grew. De Gaulle may have been the first Western statesman 
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to appreciate the importance of the Sino-Soviet split and decided to take advantage of it.42 This 
grand design strategy is one of the reasons why Richard Nixon admired him. Things developed 
faster than the U.S. government was willing to see. Within a month of his meeting with Rusk, de 
Gaulle announced his decision that was disappointing to the secretary and embarrassing to the 
recently inaugurated Lyndon Johnson. 
If the official attitude toward the French recognition of China can be described as 
unhappy if acquiesced, U.S. media showed more passion over the issue. The Times front-page 
article described the French move as a “personal policy of General de Gaulle” and a “defiant 
challenge” to the United States and that Washington was “informed,” not “consulted.” It argued 
that the “reaffirmation” of France’s role as a “great independent world power” was the motive 
behind the move. C. L. Sulzberger, the foreign affairs correspondent of the Times and part of the 
family that owned the newspaper, in his column “Foreign Affairs,” claimed that de Gaulle 
“jabbed” the United States at a time of “maximum inconvenience.” In his column “Washington,” 
James Reston, the associate editor of the Times, maintained that the “weakness and the 
greatness” of Charles de Gaulle was that “he is so sure that he is right.” He called the general a 
“trouble least sensitive to the personal feelings of other men.”43 The Post editorial argued that de 
Gaulle’s reputation made people suspect that he approached China not for any legitimate goal or 
because of any serious calculation, but merely to “play out his private dream for France and to 
irk the United States en route.”44 
Different from newspapers, magazines used more dramatic language in order to attract 
readers’ attention. Time claimed de Gaulle had “detonated a political bomb that scattered fallout !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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from the Formosa Strait to Washington’s Foggy Bottom.” In its summary of the world response, 
the newsweekly paid more attention to negative ones from West Germany, some African 
countries, and especially the Chinese Nationalists who referred to the situation as a “state of 
war,” predicting that a “showdown was not far off.” Its political cartoons pictured de Gaulle as 
“a buzzing gadfly, a silly rake wooing an Oriental tart, a kook cutting loose a dangerous 
dragon.”45 In contrast to the general hostility of Time, the response of Newsweek was milder. It 
called the French decision as “troublesome” as America’s enemies. Its political cartoon featured 
an arrogant de Gaulle riding a horse side by side with a silly-looking Mao on a small donkey, 
with a subtitle “Don Charles and Sancho Mao: Who is leading whom?”46 It was more of a 
mockery of de Gaulle’s decision rather than a demonization. 
Despite their attack on de Gaulle’s personal style and the “timing and manners” by which 
he made the announcement, journalists did not simply follow the official line that blamed 
China’s “subversion and aggression in Southeast Asia and elsewhere.” Several of them dwelled 
upon the possible benefits to the United States. For example, a Times editorial argued that the 
Paris-Beijing agreement was a blow to American “national pride” rather than “national 
interests.” While blaming de Gaulle as “substantially, but not entirely” responsible for the 
deterioration of Franco-American relations, it argued that American policy toward China was 
“equally in need of reappraisal” since forty-nine countries had recognized the Communist 
regime. It maintained that UN membership might be a “restraining influence” and that a 
negotiation including China might help solve the problem in South Vietnam.47 
The Post editorial argued that the United States would benefit from the French move in 
the long run because it would sustain the Sino-Soviet quarrel and test the “taming effects of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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diplomacy and commerce” on China. In his Pulitzer Prize-winning column “Today and 
Tomorrow” in the Post, Walter Lippmann claimed that the French recognition was a good thing 
because it “opens the door, or at least unlocks the door” that the government of Beijing was in 
fact the government of China. As he claimed, even though the U.S. government would go 
through the “formality” of protesting the French move, Americans should be grateful because “it 
takes the situation off the dead center.”48 
In another Newsweek political cartoon, de Gaulle bends over to poke at the body of a fat 
Mao while an angry Johnson in a cowboy dress stood afar yelling, “…I say he doesn’t exist.” 
The article underneath the cartoon argued, “though officials in the U.S. pretend Communist 
China doesn’t exist, it has long been recognized that eventual admission of Peking into the world 
community was inevitable.” 49 What they targeted at was the U.S. policy of deliberately ignoring 
the existence of China. 
The issue of French recognition remained in the spotlight for a much longer period than 
Hilsman’s speech. An important reason was the media’s obsession with the prospect of China’s 
UN membership caused by the French move, which the Johnson administration was unwilling to 
talk too much about. The United States hoped that Taiwan would not be too hasty to cut off 
relations with France so that it would reduce the accomplishment of the Chinese government on 
the mainland. On the day when the French government informed the United States of its decision 
to recognize China, McGeorge Bundy suggested to President Johnson if Taiwan did not break 
relations with France, it would “put the monkey right back on Peking’s back.”50 
U.S. media wanted to see how the idea of “two Chinas” would play out because it would 
open a door to solve the problem of China’s membership in the UN without sacrificing Taiwan. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Noting that Beijing did not ask Paris to break off relations with Taiwan as a precondition for 
recognition, the Times called it a “Communist concession,” which it regarded as the reason why 
France moved so rapidly. Similarly, the Post called attention to the fact that the French 
government used the word “establishing” instead of “re-establishing” relations in the 
communiqué. It interpreted this nuance as a sign that Paris was leaving the possibility open that 
Taiwan could retain ties with Paris. Its news analysis argued that the French recognition might 
lead to similar moves by other nations, as the “tactical concession” of Beijing could enable it to 
pick up more recognitions and get closer to UN membership.51 
The U.S. media’s hope for “two Chinas” turned out to be wishful thinking. In an editorial 
celebrating the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France, the People’s 
Daily especially attacked U.S. media’s speculation that China had become “soft” on the “two-
China” policy and reiterated Beijing’s determination to “liberate Taiwan.”52 On February 10, 
1964, when the French Foreign Ministry announced that its government no longer regarded the 
Nationalists as representing China in Paris, Taiwan announced its break of relations with France. 
As the Times said on its front page, this break not only saved the difficulty of de Gaulle, but also 
ended the possibility of “two Chinas.”53  
France was the first major Western power that extended full diplomatic recognition to 
China since the Korean War. As a Times headline described, it was the “first Western break from 
U.S. aim of isolating China in fourteen years.”54 Though the media under study generally did not 
like de Gaulle’s personality and the way he embarrassed President Johnson, they voiced criticism 
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of the administration’s rigid policy of isolating or simply ignoring China. Their voices 
constituted a challenge to the Johnson administration. 
Chinese Nuclear Test 
On October 16, 1964, one day after Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s fall from 
power, China successfully exploded its first nuclear bomb. In its official declaration, Beijing 
celebrated it as a “great contribution to safeguarding world peace.” Labeling the test-ban treaty a 
“fraud” intending to keep the three powers’ “nuclear monopoly,” it proposed a world summit 
conference to discuss the “total banning” and “complete destruction” of nuclear weapons.55 
The official U.S. reaction was to discount the military significance of the Chinese 
explosion and to reassure the American public that Washington was prepared for it. In a 
television address, President Johnson said that China still needed many years to build a stockpile 
of reliable weapons with effective delivery means and the “free world nuclear strength will 
continue to be greater.” He also stated that the bomb was a “tragedy” for the Chinese people 
because the government used its scarce sources, which might be useful improving their lives, to 
build a “crude nuclear device” which would only “increase the sense of insecurity of the Chinese 
people.”56 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara said at a news conference that the “long-
anticipated” explosion of a “primitive nuclear device” in China did not require any change in 
U.S. strategic plans.57 As to the Chinese call for world summit conference banning nuclear 
weapons, the State Department called it “neither serious nor constructive.” Dean Rusk dismissed 
it as a propaganda “smokescreen.”58  
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Despite the reassurance of the government, U.S. media showed two major concerns in 
their evaluation of the significance of the Chinese bomb: the threat caused by the Chinese bomb 
and the pressure to include China in the international community due to the danger of nuclear 
diffusion. In its editorial response, the Times argued that the successful nuclear test by an 
“industrially underdeveloped” country like China raised the specter of nuclear proliferation 
because other countries might follow suit quickly. It urged older nuclear powers, including the 
United States, to talk directly with China in order to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.59 The 
Post, in contrast, advocated a tougher policy. Claiming that China’s bomb would enhance its 
power image that it was “desperately trying to project in Southeast Asia, at Moscow and around 
the world,” it called on Washington to display its “resolve to uphold American responsibilities in 
Asia.”60 Newsweek had a cartoon with a dragon looking at itself in the mirror with a new tooth, 
the nuclear device.61 Time called the Chinese nuclear test a “fateful firecracker,” for which Mao 
had genuine reason to “triumph.” It argued that the United States and Russia “share one 
dilemma” that they would have to “do something about the China problem” sooner or later.62 
The comments of Time seemed to suggest a closer relationship between the United States and the 
Soviet Union vis-à-vis China.  
As the prevention of nuclear proliferation required the participation of all countries, how 
to include China became an issue for the United States because it was the only nuclear power 
that had no diplomatic relations with China and denied its entrance into the UN. On October 17, 
Senator John Pastore (D-RI), chairman of the Joint Congressional Atomic Energy Committee, 
was reported as saying that the Chinese nuclear test meant “the necessity of including Red China 
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in any and every inspection condition attached to any nuclear agreement America might take.”63 
On October 18, Johnson again went on TV to comment on the recent ouster of Khrushchev and 
the U.S. position on the Chinese nuclear bomb. Among the basics of U.S. policy, he stated that 
China should join the non-proliferation agreement in the framework of the test-ban treaty and he 
reiterated the U.S. commitment to support any country against “nuclear blackmail.”64 In covering 
Johnson’s speech, the Times headline was “President Terms Strength of U.S. the Key to Peace”, 
the Post headline was “Johnson Warns Peking on Nuclear Blackmail,”65 again demonstrating its 
support for a tough policy toward China.   
The Johnson administration was further put in a “defensive propaganda position” on 
October 23 when the Times and the Post reported on their front pages UN Secretary General U 
Thant’s proposal that the five nuclear powers, including China, meet in 1965 to discuss a ban on 
nuclear tests and measures to prevent nuclear proliferation.66 The Times also reported on its 
front-page that Patrick Gordon Walker, the foreign minister of the newly elected Labor Party 
administration, declared after a meeting with U Thant that his government supported Thant’s 
proposal and Britain would vote to seat China in the United Nations at the 1964 session of the 
General Assembly.67 
Washington did not respond enthusiastically to the proposal of the Secretary General. 
State Department officials said that new international talks were unnecessary because there were 
already many channels through which Beijing could communicate with the other four nuclear 
powers, including the United States. As to the disarmament talks in Geneva, the spokesman 
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conceded that “at some stage” China would participate in arms-control agreements. The two 
newspapers interpreted this official gesture as “firm but negative.”68 
The Times considered Thant’s proposal a sign of  “China’s increased prestige,” arguing 
that China’s admission in the nuclear club had enhanced its chances for UN membership because 
many neutral states in Asia and Africa would call to include China in international agreements 
stopping nuclear tests. As it suggested, if a five-power agreement could be reached, it might 
mark “a first step in bringing Peking out of its isolation.” It urged Washington that “the moment 
is now” as far as nuclear proliferation was concerned.69 The Post also advocated giving Thant’s 
proposal “the widest and broadest consideration” because a flexible U.S. policy would keep the 
world attention focused on China. It also criticized a recent U.S. underground explosion in 
Mississippi as “ill-timed” because it had taken the mind of the world off the Chinese blast. 
Similar to the Times, it urged the Johnson administration that “the months and years immediately 
ahead” might be the “very last chance” to prevent nuclear proliferation and nuclear tests.70 
If the recognition by a major Western power in early 1964 greatly elevated China’s 
international position, its entry into the nuclear club in October constituted another reason that it 
could not be simply ignored. U.S. media’s review of the Chinese nuclear bomb had two effects.  
On one hand, their prominent coverage built up the image of China threat. On the other, they 
constituted a vocal critic of the rigid policy of the administration. By elaborating on the urgency 
of preventing nuclear spread, they pushed the idea that the inclusion of China in the international 
community was no longer an option, but a necessity. 
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U.S. Escalation in Vietnam 
Before the Chinese nuclear test, the United States had dramatically escalated its 
involvement in the Vietnam War with the response to the Gulf of Tonkin Incidents on August 2 
and 4, 1964. On August 5, President Johnson authorized retaliatory bombing of patrol-boat bases 
and a supporting oil complex in North Vietnam. On August 7, Congress passed the Gulf of 
Tonkin Resolution, granting the president vast power in using American military forces to “head 
off aggression.” From August 8, 1964 to Johnson’s inauguration on January 27, 1965, the 
military and political situations in South Vietnam deteriorated rapidly and the United States had 
to decide between direct military involvement and the loss of South Vietnam. In February 1965, 
Johnson initiated the massive bombing campaign Operation Roller Thunder and sent the first 
detachment of ground-combat troops--two battalions of marines--to Da Nang. By July 28, 1965, 
U.S. troops in the theatre had risen to 175,000.71 
The escalation in Vietnam dramatically changed Beijing’s posture to the United States in 
its official media. In the first half of 1964, Zhou Enlai and Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi on 
several occasions had expressed Beijing’s willingness to reduce tension with the United States 
and blamed Washington for refusing to sign two agreements with China. One was the “peaceful 
coexistence based on the “five principles.” The other was the U.S. promise to withdraw all its 
forces from the “Chinese province of Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait.”72 Also during this period, 
the People’s Daily presented several neutral entries about the United States, such as the structure 
of the Department of State, and the national conventions of the Democratic and Republican 
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parties, in a special “World Knowledge” column.73 This was the time when moderates like State 
Chairman Liu Shaoqi, Premier Zhou Enlai, and Party Secretary Deng Xiaoping were in charge of 
the policies of the CCP.74 After the Gulf of Tonkin incidents, the People’s Daily completely 
stopped using “peaceful coexistence” in its comments on the United States.75  
Through the People’s Daily, Beijing issued warnings to Washington to show its support 
for Hanoi. An article on August 6 threatened that the “invasion of the DRV is an invasion of 
China” and that “the Chinese people will not sit still.” After Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution, the Chinese government reportedly mobilized twenty million people in mass 
demonstrations. The People’s Daily coverage of the mobilization highlighted how the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) was prepared “to defend China.” What was noticeable in the editorial 
was that it sent a message to those who wanted better relations with the United States: “The 
malicious aggression of the United States in Vietnam again reminded the Chinese people that 
they should not cherish any illusion about the imperialists.” Ironically, on the same front page 
covering the mass protest, there was a story about Mao watching a Beijing opera with other 
leaders of the CCP.76 His activity shows that the Chinese government was not too worried about 
the U.S. threat at this point. 
With the U.S. deployment of ground-combat troops in South Vietnam, the Chinese 
government increased the seriousness of its warnings and especially its commitment to support 
the Vietnamese. On March 25, 1965, the People’s Daily published on its front-page a statement 
from the National Liberation Front (NLF) and followed it with an editorial pledging that the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Chinese people would “try all their means to provide necessary material support, including 
weapons and all war materials, to the heroic people in South Vietnam.”77 Under a headline 
“Peking Says It will Send Men to Vietcong if Asked,” the Times interpreted this statement as the 
“most direct commitment” of Chinese intervention.78 
Beijing also took military steps to deter the United States from expanding the war to the 
Chinese border. On August 13, 1964, Mao told visiting North Vietnamese leaders that China had 
deployed several air force and antiaircraft artillery divisions to provinces bordering Vietnam and 
was planning to construct new airfields in this area. Mao specifically said, “We will not make 
this a secret but will make this open.”79 In April 1965, Mao rescinded the “Six-Point Directive” 
passed by the CCP Central Military Commission in January that instructed the Chinese military 
not to attack U.S. aircrafts that entered Chinese airspace, and ordered them to “resolutely strike 
American aircrafts that overfly Hainan Island.” On April 14, the CCP Central Committee 
distributed the document throughout the party structure above the county level, alerting the 
cadres to the grave danger posed by the American escalation of the war in Vietnam and stressed 
the urgency of war preparations.80 
The Chinese government sent serious warnings to the United States not only through 
deterrent measures and its propaganda machine, but also through private channels. During his 
visit to Karachi in April 1965, Zhou Enlai asked Pakistani President Mohammad Ayub Khan to 
convey three points to Washington: “1. China would not take the initiative to provoke a war 
against the United States; 2. China meant what it said. 3. China was prepared.”81 In messages !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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through Indonesia’s first prime minister Subandrio and the British chargé d'affaires Donald 
Charles Hopson in May, Beijing added the fourth point: “If the United States bombs China, that 
would mean bringing the war to China and there would be no boundary to the war.”82 
Though Zhou’s “four points” were made in the form of a warning, they also indicated 
Beijing’s desire to avoid direct confrontation with Washington. Mao expressed it clearly in his 
interview with leftist American journalist Edgar Snow on January 9, 1965. When Snow said that 
there would not be war between China and the United States, Mao agreed and said that China 
would only fight when U.S. forces invaded China. Mao was probably expecting the journalist to 
take the message to Johnson because Snow told him that he would meet with the President after 
his return home. Mao also told Snow, “Wherever there is revolution, we issue a statement and 
hold rallies to show support…We like to fire empty cannons, but we don’t send troops.”83 
While escalating in Vietnam, President Johnson also displayed his openness to peace 
negotiations. In a speech at Johns Hopkins University on April 7, 1965, he pledged that his 
administration would keep the conflict from spreading and remain ready for “unconditional 
discussions.” He even offered “billion-dollar American investment” in Vietnam after peaceful 
settlement was under way.84 Johnson’s speech was well received in the media. The Times 
editorial praised him for opening a “hopeful phase” of the conflict and winning a “moral battle” 
over China and the Soviet Union that, as it pointed out, either rejected or omitted Johnson’s 
peace proposal in their propaganda machines. 85  The Post editorial warned Chinese and 
Vietnamese Communists to take “sword and olive branch” in the speech very seriously because !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the American military power had shown just the “thinnest edge” and “there was more where the 
power came from.”86 
The editorial page of the Post strongly supported President Johnson’s Vietnam policy in 
such articles as “Why we are in Viet-Name…in Defense of Self-determination” and one that 
went as far as “Viet-Nam Policy: Critics Unwanted.”87Johnson once expressed his appreciation 
to Editor Russell Wiggin’s support, saying that the Post’s editorials were worth “two divisions” 
to him. Many reporters and their wives thought the paper’s editorial support for the war was 
“morally wrong.” When Ben Bradlee returned to the Post as the Managing Editor in 1965, its 
editorial page became less conservative as he hired several first-rate journalists including David 
Broder of the New York Times, Don Oberdorfer, a foreign affairs expert, and Stanley Karnow, 
who would become the Post’s chief China watcher and the head of its Hong Kong Bureau. The 
change was complete in 1968 when Bradlee replaced Wiggins as its Executive Editor.88 
With the escalation in Vietnam, administration officials constantly evoked the specter of 
the “China threat” in their justification for Vietnam policy. In his Johns Hopkins speech, for 
example, President Johnson referred to the conflict in Vietnam as “the new face of an old 
enemy…the deepening shadow of Communist China,” which he described as “helping the forces 
of violence all over the world.”89 Another good example was their response to a long article 
entitled “Long Live the Victory of People’s War” published by Chinese Minister of Defense 
Marshall Lin Biao in the People’s Daily on September 3 1965, in commemoration of the 
twentieth anniversary of the victory over Japan in WWII. With a focus on the “People’s War,” 
the article talked about the importance of “self-reliance” and condemned Khrushchevists in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Kremlin as “betrayers” of the people’s war. In lauding the contribution of Mao Zedong’s thought 
to world revolution, Lin claimed that Mao’s theory of the countryside defeating the cities 
through besieging them could be applied to world revolution because North America and 
Western Europe were the “cities” and the developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America were the “countryside.”90  
The Times gave high prominence to Lin’s speech. In a single issue, it not only covered 
the story on the front page, but also followed it with excerpts of the article, whose English 
version was circulated by the Chinese official press, and an editorial that called the speech Mao’s 
“nightmare blueprint for world’s future.”91 Though the Post gave the article a lower prominence, 
wrapping it in a page-four story about PLA Chief of Staff Luo Ruiqing’s speech, Walter 
Lippmann, in his Post column, compared the certainty of its revolutionary propaganda to the way 
Hitler announced that his Reich “would last for a thousand years.” From the emphasis on “self-
reliance” in the speech though, Lippmann claimed that Beijing wanted the war in Vietnam to 
continue, but it was unwilling to intervene.92 
Lin Biao’s article was soon taken up by administration officials to condemn China. In his 
speech to block China’s UN membership, Ambassador Arthur Goldberg used it as evidence of its 
attempt to “change world order by violence.” Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, and his deputy 
Cyrus Vance compared Lin’s article to Hitler’s Mein Kampf and used it as evidence of Chinese 
expansion.93 McNamara explicitly said that the speech signified a program of “aggression” and 
that the United States should “take the Chinese Communists at their word and develop improved 
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means of coping with their threat.”94 People may wonder whether McNamara was sincere in his 
claim about the nature of the China threat because as the secretary of defense, he was well aware 
of the Chinese capability to project its power beyond its border. McNamara, along with many 
Johnson aides, seemed to be deliberately calling attention to the Chinese words rather than 
deeds.95 In 1965 when the United States was substantially expanding the war in Vietnam, 
China’s bellicose rhetoric became useful political assets for administration officials who were 
eager to exaggerate the “China threat” to justify American policy in Indochina. 
Between 1963 and 1965, U.S. media’s call for China policy reform did not turn into 
“widespread clamoring for change” because it had not been elevated to a pressing issue on the 
American political agenda. There were strong anti-reform elements in the Johnson 
administration. Since his assumption of office in late 1963, Lyndon Johnson depended heavily 
on Dean Rusk, McGeorge Bundy, and Robert McNamara on foreign policies. These three 
advisers, particularly Rusk, were opposed to any modification of China policy. Rusk wondered at 
one time why “the question of Peking’s admission to the United Nations had been renewed 
without adequate reproaches being made over their polices in South East Asia.”96  
Moreover, Johnson faced severe restraints from Congress as well as public opinion. On 
April 19, 1965, the Committee of One Million made a declaration opposing any concessions to 
China, including opposition to recognition, its admission into the UN, and trade relations with it. 
The declaration received the endorsement of 321 congressmen--fifty-one Senators and 270 
members of the House.97 That was more than half of Congress. What contributed to the negative 
attitude toward China included its bellicose rhetoric, its support for the Vietcong, and the threat !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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caused by its possession of nuclear bombs. During this period, Americans opposed to the 
recognition of China and its entry into the UN in public surveys consistently exceeded half of the 
total. As a cautious politician, Johnson decided to “stay the course” in his China policy.98  
Fulbright Hearings 
Since President Johnson’s escalation in Vietnam, J. William Fulbright (D-AK), chairman 
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was one of the most eloquent critics of his Vietnam 
policy. On January 26, 1966, Fulbright’s committee began a routine hearing on a supplemental 
aid bill for South Vietnam. He shrewdly transformed the sessions into an inquiry on U.S. policy 
in Southeast Asia. When General Maxwell Taylor and Dean Rusk “clashed dramatically” with 
General James M. Gavin, a parachute hero during WWII, and George F. Kennan, the father of 
the “containment” policy, over war strategy in Vietnam, the media’s attention was attracted, in 
particular the television networks, which began to report the sessions alive. Johnson became so 
worried that he hastily held a conference with American military commanders and leaders of 
South Vietnam in Honolulu to divert the media attention away from the hearings. But it did not 
work very well. Between late January and March 1966, the hearings remained in the headlines.99  
In his criticism of Johnson’s Vietnam policy, Fulbright repeatedly evoked the danger of 
war with China if the conflicts in Vietnam escalated. Contending that reconciliation with China 
was necessary if the United States wanted to find a solution in Vietnam, he proposed at the 
hearings that Washington should reach “a general neutralization agreement for Southeast Asia” 
with Beijing. 100  Beginning in March, he called a review of America’s China policy for 
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“education” reasons, asking China experts, including A. Doak Barnett from Columbia, John 
King Fairbank from Harvard and several others, to testify.  
A few months earlier, more than 1000 students and several hundred faculty members of 
Yale had published a full-page advertisement in the Times on December 10, 1965, calling for a 
“nationwide reappraisal” of American policy in the Far East. This advertisement was sponsored 
by a group called Americans for Reappraisal of Far Eastern Policy, which was started by Yale 
students. According to the Times, the organization sponsored seminars on more than 20 
campuses throughout the country on October 24 to discuss U.S. policy in Asia. An active 
participant in those meetings, Fairbank also signed the advertisement. The effort by the group 
probably could not attract much attention because the Times placed the news article on page 
twenty-one and the advertisement on fifty-three. 
The prominent media attention to the Fulbright Hearings provided the academics with a 
much better forum to present their views. At the hearings, Barnett put forward his famous idea of 
“containment without isolation,” which meant the United States should continue to contain the 
expansion of China, but adopt measures to end its isolation from the world community. Fairbank 
criticized U.S. officials who compared Lin Biao’s speech to a blueprint of world conquest or a 
“Mein Kampf” type of outline, arguing that the statement was simply “a reassertion of faith” that 
the “parochial example of rural-based revolution” in China was a model for underdeveloped 
countries.101 As Newsweek reported, Senators Fulbright and Wayne Morse (D-OR) tried to push 
Barnett and Fairbank to support their challenge to Johnson’s Vietnam policy at the hearings, but 
they both refused. Even though they were concerned about a clash with China, the two 
professors supported Johnson’s Vietnam policy and the containment of China, of which the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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commitment in South Vietnam was an important part.102 In the media the two professors 
appeared as moderate advice givers, which was in sharp contrast to radical leftists in the streets. 
Their expertise and moderation made it reasonably easier for the public and those in Washington 
to consider.  
Overall, the elite media in the United States covered the Fulbright hearings prominently, 
completely and favorably.103 Fulbright and the China experts were given prominence when they 
made the front pages six times in the Times and five times in the Post in March.104 Among those 
who were opposed to the “containment without isolation” policy, George Taylor and David 
Nelson Rowe, professors from University of Washington and Yale University, and Walter Judd, 
former Republican Representative from Minnesota and a prominent figure in the China Lobby, 
were called to testify when the hearings were close to the end. They made the front pages of the 
two elite newspapers only once without any editorial comment.105 The Times placed the 
testimony of former Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter S. Robertson at 
the House Foreign Affairs Committee in the last three paragraphs of the jump page of an article, 
probably because he was an advocate of hard-line policy toward China.106 
In their editorial pages, both the Times and the Post gave favorable reviews of the China 
debate, especially Barnett’s “containment without isolation” thesis. The Post praised the hearings 
for “contributing to public understanding” and particularly endorsed the distinction between 
“containing” and “isolating” China. The most important factor that led “urgency” to Barnett’s 
argument, as it pointed out, was the danger of U.S. defeat in the UN on the issue of Chinese 
admission. While acknowledging the difficulty of ending the isolation of China, it argued that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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American thought had been turned toward that direction through the “ventilation” of those 
ideas.107  
The Times argued that the Fulbright hearings had validated its long-held view that “the 
country was far ahead of the Administration” in openness to new approaches. Citing the fact that 
a statement calling for a more flexible China policy had recently been supported by 198 scholars 
and opposed by only nineteen members of the Association for Asian Studies, it tried to show 
where the weight of “informed American opinion” was. It criticized Rusk and McNamara for 
drawing “fallacious parallels” between China and Hitler’s Germany because they might close off 
a “reappraisal of China policy” for many years. Similar to the Post, it showed concern for the 
“urgency” of the UN issue. As it maintained, America’s open attitude would not only send 
positive signals to new generation of China leaders, but also attract more international support 
for American policy in Asia and reduce the danger of military confrontation with China.108  
In an article named “Reading the Dragon’s Mind,” Time argued that the hearings were 
“all right” for their educational purpose. Newsweek regarded the China debate as a subject that 
permitted legislators a “remarkable degree of rational discussion and agreement.”109 
As James Reston argued in his Times column, Fulbright’s official “teach-in” in front of 
TV cameras was the “first serious open debate” on the problems of American foreign policy in 
years, and the combination of Congress with TV cameras would be a “powerful influence for 
understanding and change.”110 By the time the hearings ended, 71 percent of Americans polled 
had heard about them, and almost 60 percent had seen some parts on television. Newsweek 
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described them as the “most searching public review of U.S. wartime policy” since the 
MacArthur hearings of 1951.111  
Even though the China policy review was secondary to the discussions on Vietnam 
policy at the hearings, the administration was happy about it because many critics of America’s 
China policy supported the Vietnam policy. The consensus on a more open policy toward China 
looked better than the division over Vietnam. In his appearance on NBC on March 13, Vice 
President Hubert Humphrey echoed Barnett, saying that the U.S. policy toward China should be 
one of “containment without necessarily isolation.” He mentioned that the administration had 
decided recently to allow scholars and writers to travel to China, which he described as the 
“beginning of a much better relationship.”112 Senator Stuart Symington (D-MO), an ardent 
supporter of the official policy in Vietnam, said, “I do not see anything that I do not agree with.” 
A White House aide also claimed that the President was pleased with the transcripts of the 
week’s hearings. 113  
With the media’s coverage, the China policy review served as a test balloon for the 
government. It had the effect of explaining what the government had been doing but otherwise 
was hesitant to state explicitly. Ultimately, the China debate at the Fulbright Hearings, as 
Michael Lumbers argues, marked “something of a watershed.” Because of the media’s prominent 
and favorable coverage, they “legitimized” the airing of views that would have been considered 
“heresy” in the 1950s and “emboldened” those advocates of China policy reform inside and 
outside the government to push that agenda.114 
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The media’s intensive and favorable review of the China debate at the Fulbright Hearings 
played an important role in educating the public about America’s China policy. In December 
1965, a Gallup Poll indicated that the ratio between those who supported China’s UN 
membership and those opposed was 22 per cent to 67 percent with ten per cent having no 
opinion. In March 1966, the ratio changed to 25 per cent to 55 percent with 20 per cent having 
no opinion. When asked if China’s UN membership would improve relations with the United 
States, the ratio between “yes” and “no” became 56 percent and 28 per cent.115 Similarly, as 
reported in the Post, a Harris survey in June showed that 57 per cent of the respondents favored 
U.S. recognition of China and 55 per cent supported Chinese entry into the U.N. so long as 
Taiwan was not expelled.116 The polling results showed a growing openness to a more flexible 
China policy after the Fulbright Hearings. 
The Fulbright Hearing might also have led to the decline of the Committee of One 
Million. When Marvin Liebman, the committee’s secretary, learned of the hearings, he 
complained that he had not been given advance notice and that those scheduled to testify 
represented viewpoints “contrary to the Committee and to the majority of Americans, including 
Congress.”117 Indeed, in a Gallup Poll in September 1966, those who were opposed to China’s 
admission into the UN still accounted for 56 percent of the total.118 Moreover, the Committee 
still managed to obtain the endorsement of 325 members of Congress in October when it 
published in a Times display ad its opposition to China’s UN membership. While publishing its 
ad, the Times carried an editorial repudiating the committee. As it argued, “It is the opinion of 
this newspaper that a majority of those Americans” concerned with the question “either favor !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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inviting Peking into the United Nations or would at least “have no serious objections.”119 When 
Senator Jacob K. Javits (R-NY), who had appeared on the front page of the Times during the 
Fulbright Hearings due to his support for ending the isolation of China, announced his decision 
to withdraw from the committee, the Times placed his story on the front page, arguing that the 
China hearings was a factor for his move. The Times also reported a memorandum sent by 
Liebman to all Congressional members declaring that the committee would not use their names 
on letterheads and publication. It interpreted the memorandum as a sign that members of 
Congress had begun to have doubts about the committee’s policy.120 The Times story left an 
impression that the Committee of One Million was declining.  
The People’s Daily responded to the China policy review at the Fulbright Hearings with 
mockery. It labeled the speakers as “clowns” and the hearings as a “farce of illusion” when the 
Johnson administration was “at its wit’s end” in dealing with China. When Humphrey displayed 
“unusual friendliness” to China, the official organ attacked his remarks as “dream talking” and 
the “kiss of Judas.” Viewing the “containment without isolation” policy as an American effort to 
subvert the Chinese revolution through “peaceful transformation,” it pledged that the Chinese 
people would become more vigilant of the “trickery of the American imperialists.”121 
A Lost Chance in 1966?  
By early 1966, Beijing and Washington seemed to have reached a tacit agreement about 
no direct confrontation with each other in Vietnam. Washington took measures to reassure China 
that it neither wanted to attack China or destroy the Hanoi regime. In a memorandum to Under 
Secretary of State George Ball, William Bundy, who took over Roger Hilsman’s position, 
recommended clarifying the U.S. intention to avoid direct confrontation with China at the next !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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120 Ibid., December 18, 1966, 1. 
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Warsaw meeting on December 15, 1965.122 On May 10, 1966, the People’s Daily published 
Zhou Enlai’s four points to the United States for the first time.123  
On May 12, 1966, when the U.S. Air Force reportedly shot down a Chinese aircraft close 
to the Vietnamese-Chinese border,124 Beijing’s response was quite restrained. In its “strong 
protest,” the Chinese Defense Department declared that the Chinese people “are not easy to trifle 
with” and that “blood would be repaid with blood.” Interestingly, it reiterated Washington of 
Zhou’s “four points.”125 North Vietnamese Defense Minister General Vo Nguyen Giap later 
complained that Zhou’s remark “stabbed the Vietnamese in the back” because it was a signal to 
the United States that “it could bomb Vietnam at will, as long as there was no threat to the 
Chinese border.”126 
Considering the favorable American public opinion after the Fulbright Hearings and the 
two governments’ tacit agreement on Vietnam, Xu Guangqiu, in his book about the relationship 
between Congress and China policy, claims that “a chance to improve Sino-American 
relationships was lost” in the 1960s. He cites the memoir of Wang Guoquan, the Chinese 
Ambassador to Poland who represented China in the Warsaw talks with the United States 
between July 1964 and March 1967. Wang wrote, “If the Cultural Revolution had not happened 
in 1966, the Beijing government might have modified its U.S. policy in that year, and U.S.-China 
normalization might have started in 1966 rather than in 1972.” As far as Xu understands, when 
Congressional leaders called for a change in China policy in the 1960s, the White House 
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escalated the Vietnam War. Therefore, Beijing “suspected” the real intentions of the legislators 
and “misunderstood” congressional suggestions about a flexible China policy.127 
Xu and Wang are probably too optimistic about the status of Sino-American relations in 
the 1960s, or early 1966. Though the Johnson administration was moving toward a more flexible 
policy, the flexibility was rather limited and was far short of reconciliation with China. On the 
part of Beijing, its actions to avoid confrontation with the United States were for its own interests 
and they did not mean that Chinese leaders wanted better relations. Beijing did not need to 
misunderstand the real intentions of either the congressional legislators or the academics. In the 
first half of 1966, the People’s Daily still frequently referred to the United States the “most 
dangerous” or the “worst enemy” to people all over the world.128 For a leadership bent on 
revolution, “olive branches” from Washington looked even more dangerous because of their 
potential ability to “soften” the revolutionary spirit of the Chinese people. 
In reality, Chinese foreign policy witnessed a radical turn after the Tenth Plenary of the 
Eight Congress in August 1962, when Mao criticized Wang Jiaxiang, the head of the 
International Liaison Department of the CCP, for advocating a policy of “san he yi shao” (three 
moderations and one reduction), which meant moderation of struggles against imperialists, 
revisionists, and reactionary forces (in Taiwan), and a reduction in Chinese support for 
revolutionary struggles in the third world.129 The radicalization accelerated with the deterioration 
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of Sino-Soviet conflict in 1963 and the escalation of American involvement in Vietnam in 1964. 
When Mao was considering the Cultural Revolution, the last thing he wanted was to reconcile 
with the American “imperialists.”  
Conclusion  
As this chapter shows, between 1963 and 1966, many U.S. journalists criticized the 
Johnson administration’s rigid China policy. Though Hilsman’s speech in late 1963 was not 
initiated by high-level policy makers in the Johnson team, it worked as a test balloon. The 
media’s positive review of the administration’s new posture toward China signified an ebbing of 
emotion over the issue and suggested an opening for reasonable talk about it. In the case of 
French recognition, while the elite media did not like the “timing and manner” of de Gaulle’s 
decision, they criticized the administration’s rigid posture and called for a move toward a “two 
China” solution before a U.S. defeat in the UN. When China joined the nuclear club, U.S. media 
elaborated on the dangers of nuclear proliferation and urged Washington to use creative means 
that could include China in international agreements on nuclear nonproliferation. In both cases, 
media called for China’s inclusion in the international community. When the United States 
expanded its military operations into North Vietnam, Congressional critics of Johnson’s war 
policy found themselves allied with academics and the media because of their common concern 
for military confrontation with China. Media discussions on these issues created forums for 
public deliberations on America’s China policy. 
By the end of 1966, more than half of the American population still opposed the 
recognition of China as well as its admission into the UN, and a majority in Congress endorsed !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the Committee of One Million’s China policy. However, influential U.S. media moved ahead of 
public opinion and pushed for a flexible China policy by prioritizing the critical voices from the 
academic community and Congress in their front pages and making their own critiques in 
editorials. Because of the media’s prominent and intensive coverage, critical voices at the 
Fulbright Hearings were legitimized and accepted more widely in the public sphere, which 
created a favorable environment for Johnson to ease the rigidity on China. Essentially, if the 
Hilsman speech set off the “depoliticization” of the China issue, the Fulbright Hearings 
symbolized the culmination of this process.  
Unfortunately, while U.S. journalists were pushing Washington for a more flexible China 
policy between 1963 and 1966, Chinese foreign policy turned increasingly radical. In this 
context, the rhetoric of the Chinese media toward the United States changed from moderately 
hostile to radically hostile. After the Gulf of Tonkin in August 1964, they dropped “peaceful 
existence” with the United States and increased invectives against Washington to show moral 
support for the Indochinese peoples. 
In the first half of the 1960s, Beijing had no desire to improve relations with Washington. 
It rejected talks about flexibility from U.S. officials and academics, attacking them as “hoax” and 
tools of peaceful transformation. When Mao mobilized the Chinese people for his “continuous 
revolution” and the ideological polemics with the Soviet Union, Washington became a 
convenient “whipping boy” in the Chinese media.130  
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Chapter 3: The Cultural Revolution as a Watershed: 1966-1968 
Between 1966 and 1968, the heyday of the Cultural Revolution coincided with the high 
point of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. Mao frequently described this period as “all 
under heaven is great chaos” when he talked about China’s domestic and international 
conditions.1 The Cultural Revolution turned out to be a “watershed” for Sino-American relations 
because several conditions for Nixon’s opening to China came into being during this chaotic 
period.2 Among these conditions were the reduction of tension between Beijing and Washington, 
the replacement of the United States by the Soviet Union as China’s primary enemy, and 
Beijing’s open rift with Hanoi. This chapter examines how these conditions played out in the 
media of both countries. It looks at U.S. media’s coverage of the factional struggles in China, the 
Sino-Soviet polemics, the Sino-Vietnamese discord, as well as the Chinese media’s handling of 
the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Vietnam War. 
U.S. media’s overwhelmingly favorable review of the Fulbright China Hearings in spring 
1966 not only signified the depoliticization of the China issue, but also greatly encouraged the 
Johnson administration to move toward a conciliatory posture toward China. On July 12, 1966, 
President Johnson made what the White House officials called his “first major statement” on 
China in his address to the annual conference of the American Alumni Council. Johnson called 
for the “reconciliation between nations that now call themselves enemies” and maintained that 
lasting peace in Asia could never come “as long as the 700 million people of mainland China are 
isolated by their rulers from the outside world.” He also mentioned the steps his government had 
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taken to permit American scholars and experts in medicine and public health to travel to China, 
and particularly a case where Washington issued a passport for a leading American businessman 
to exchange knowledge with the Chinese on the very day of his speech.3 Johnson’s statement 
was covered prominently and favorably by the Times and the Post. The editorial of the Times 
argued that it had laid a new basis for the “concrete measures” that would provide a solution to 
the problems in Asia. The Post claimed that the United States should bring down its barriers in 
order to “diminish the dangerous isolation” of China from the world.4 
In his State of the Union address on January 10, 1967, Johnson again stated that the 
United States would “continue to hope for a reconciliation between the people of mainland China 
and the world community” and that the United States would be “the first to welcome a China 
which decided to respect her neighbors’ rights.”5 This time, the two newspapers did not pay 
special attention to his remark about China. James Reston noted Johnson’s conciliatory tone in 
his column a few days later, but he did not assign it too much importance except arguing that it 
showed Johnson’s cautious attitude about the convulsions in China.6 By that time, Johnson’s 
conciliatory tone had seemed much less exciting to U.S. media than the extraordinary turmoil in 
China because of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.  
The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 
According to the Chinese official designation--“Resolution on Certain Questions in the 
History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China”--passed at the Sixth 
Plenum of the Eleventh Congress of the CCP on June 27, 1981, the Cultural Revolution lasted 
ten years and it went through three phases. Phase one started with the adoption of the “May 16 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Notification” at the enlarged meeting of the CCP’s Politburo in May 1966 and ended with the 
Ninth Congress in April 1969; Phase two went from the Ninth Congress to the Tenth Congress in 
August 1973; The last phase was between 1973 and 1976 with the death of Mao.7 In their 
analyses, many scholars, including this author, focus on phase one, which has been widely 
referred to as the “most radical” stage, or the “Red Guards phase,” of the Cultural Revolution.8  
As an important document of the Cultural Revolution, the “May 16 Notification” was 
categorized as “highly classified” at first and circulated only among high-level CCP officials.9 It 
went public on May 17, 1967, when the People’s Daily and Red Flag published a joint editorial 
celebrating the first anniversary of the movement. As they claimed, this document had “sounded 
the marching bugle” of the Cultural Revolution. The “notification” defined the purpose of the 
movement as an effort to remove “those representatives of the bourgeois who have sneaked into 
the Party, the government, the army and various cultural circles, and a bunch of counter-
revolutionary revisionists.”10 
As to the cause of the Cultural Revolution, Roderick MacFarquhar claims that what 
happened in the Soviet Union had a major impact on Mao, who wanted to make sure his country 
would not follow the Soviet path, which he believed had abandoned Marxist-Leninist revolution 
in pursuit of a “capitalist restoration.” As MacFarquhar maintains, after China recovered from 
the disastrous Great Leap Forward (GLF), Mao became worried about its future because he 
thought that his colleagues, especially State Chairman Liu Shaoqi and CCP Secretary General 
Deng Xiaoping, were no longer interested in his idea of “continuous revolution.” With the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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dismissal of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in 1964, Mao’s anxiety over Liu and Deng 
increased and he decided that if revolution from above were impossible, he would start it from 
below. If the party could not change society, he would “unleash society to change the party.”11  
Harry Harding argues that for Mao, the greatest danger to the success of socialist 
revolution was not the threat or attack from outside, but the restoration of capitalism at home. 
Odd Arne Westad takes the opposite view and emphasizes Mao’s perception of external threats 
in 1965, arguing that Mao always used “revolutionary housecleaning” as his “best form of 
defense” because of his obsession with “foreign subversion.”12 Despite their disagreements on 
the impacts of external threats and domestic concern on Mao, these scholars agree on Mao’s 
preoccupation with the domestic transformation. 
To start the Cultural Revolution, Mao first took steps to gain control of the propaganda 
machines by which he could mobilize the whole country to join the campaign. By targeting a 
historical play Hai Rui Dismissed from Office written by Wu Han, who was the editor-in-chief of 
Beijing’s party mouthpiece Beijing Daily and the vice-mayor of the city, Mao successfully 
purged Peng Zhen, Mayor of Beijing and a key member of the Politburo, Lu Dingyi, head of the 
Propaganda Department, and Wu Lengxi, editor-in-chief of the People’s Daily. In their places, 
Mao installed persons loyal to himself and set up a new Central Cultural Revolution Group 
(CCRG) under the Standing Committee of the Politburo.13  
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The main tool Mao employed in his attack on the Party establishment and his political 
enemies were the Red Guards, a movement first born on May 29, 1966 when a small group of 
students at one of Beijing’s elite high schools, attended mostly by the children of high-ranking 
officials, pledged to defend the Chairman and his thought and to struggle against revisionism. 
Mao gave his official endorsement to them when he attended a six-hour rally at Tiananmen 
Square on August 18.14 After the rally, the People’s Daily featured a headline “Workers, 
Peasants and Soldiers should Support the Revolutionary Students,” which called the Red Guards 
activities “revolutionary” and “legal” and deemed any action opposing them as “opposing 
Chairman Mao and the Party.”15  
In January 1967, Mao called on revolutionary people of all walks of life to overthrow the 
existing Party authority at different levels and “seize power” for their own. Red Guard attacks on 
Party establishments caused them to defend themselves by forming their own Red Guard 
organizations, which fell into factional struggles and turned into armed fighting, bringing China 
to what Mao later called an “all-round civil war.”16  
In what was considered the “most spectacular uprising against the Cultural Revolution” 
in Wuhan in July 1967, forces of the Wuhan Military Region mutinied and seized Minister of 
Public Security Xie Fuzhi and Wang Li, both prominent members of the Cultural Revolution 
Group. When Mao tried to mediate the situation in person, the mutiny went out of control and 
even threatened his life. Mao ended up being escorted to the airport at two in the morning. On 
another occasion, Red Guards broke into the British mission office in Beijing on August 22, 
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1967 and set it on fire after the British rejected a Chinese ultimatum demanding it to release 
Chinese agitators in Hong Kong and to lift the ban on two pro-Chinese newspapers.17 
To stop the chaos, in October 1967, the CCP ordered classes to be resumed immediately, 
but it had little effect. In the summer of 1968, Mao sent “Mao Zedong Thought Worker 
Propaganda Teams” to universities to restore order. At Qinghua University, the Red Guards 
greeted the worker teams with bullets and stones. After the incident, the central authority began 
to dismantle the Red Guards, whose glory days were soon over as millions of them were 
systemically sent to the countryside.18  
Two years after Mao’s first review of the Red Guards at Tiananmen Square, the People’s 
Daily published an editorial calling on the Red Guards to “cooperate with workers, peasants and 
soldiers.” The meeting of the Twelfth Plenum of the Eight Congress between October 13 and 31 
in 1968 meant that the CCP was ready to move on to the next stage. Its communiqué explicitly 
stated that worker teams would stay at schools and lead them “permanently,” which meant the 
Red Guards had been deprived of their leading role in the Cultural Revolution. Though Mao 
never officially declared its ending, it was generally believed that the Cultural Revolution, or its 
most radical stage, had come to an end with the convening of the Ninth Congress in April 1969, 
whose communiqué stated that the focus of the Party should be “summing up experiences” since 
the Cultural Revolution had achieved its “greatest and most decisive victory.”19  
During the Cultural Revolution, the People’s Daily played important roles in mobilizing 
the mass and causing chaos. On May 31, 1966, Mao’s former secretary Chen Boda, who was 
also the editor of Red Flag and the head of the CCRG, seized control of the People’s Daily. After 
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that point, the newspaper no longer reflected the views of the Central Committee of the CCP, but 
the ideas of Mao himself. According to Ma Jisen, an employee at the Chinese Foreign Ministry 
during the Cultural Revolution, when the Cultural Revolution started, acting Foreign Minister Ji 
Pengfei told his staff, “Now the newspapers lead the Cultural Revolution movement. The 
People’s Daily presents the guiding principle.” He told them to read it carefully when it came out 
because it would “give the tenor of the movement.” The newspaper, with its provocative 
language such as “sweeping away all Oxen, Ghosts, Snakes and Demons (OGSD),” “eliminating 
all class enemies,” and many others, had become “a source of turbulence.”20 
Due to Mao’s encouragement of big-character posters and the airing of views fully, the 
Cultural Revolution witnessed a period of freedom of speech in China. Before the movement, the 
CCP adopted a dual system of communication by which the latest Party directives were 
transmitted through the internal system and were released to the public later in an always revised 
version in order to cushion the possible negative impact. During the Cultural Revolution, this 
system broke down when Red Guard newspapers and wall posters openly carried fresh directives 
from the central authority. What was more, in some places the Red Guards broke into party 
archives and accessed classified documents in search for “black materials” that would go against 
the Party leaders. They would disclose the secrets, sometimes in “distorted” versions, through 
Red Guard newspapers and wall posters.21 These newspapers and posters became important 
sources for foreign correspondents in their reporting of the Cultural Revolution. 
During the Cultural Revolution, people could learn from the Reference News about the 
problems China had with several of its previously friendly neighbors because of Beijing’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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militant and chaotic foreign policies. In early 1967 for example, it covered the frequent 
exchanges and co-operation between Moscow and Pyongyang. There was even a report that 
Pyongyang “had warned Beijing not to take unfriendly actions toward North Korea” and another 
one explicitly stating that the recently concluded Soviet-North Korean Agreement showed that 
“Pyongyang had returned to the embrace of Moscow.”22 In another case, while the People’s 
Daily consistently praised Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia and the traditional friendship between 
the two countries,23 the Reference News covered many of his “unfriendly” remarks about China. 
In September 1967, for example, it featured a story that Sihanouk had asked two pro-Beijing 
cabinet members to resign and attacked China for “interfering with its internal affairs.” Sihanouk 
was also reported as having said that the clashes between “white Communists” and “yellow 
Communists” showed that the international Communist movement was “nothing but a farce.” It 
even published stories that Sihanouk had requested the United States not to leave Asia, or 
Cambodia would “fall into the hands of China.”24  
Response of the Johnson Administration to the Cultural Revolution 
When the Cultural Revolution broke out in the summer of 1966, Washington persisted in 
sending peace signals to Beijing. In January 1967, the State Department advised all U.S. 
diplomats and consular posts stationed abroad to emphasize the limited objectives of the United 
States in Vietnam and to “seek ways of recognizing the past and potential greatness of China and 
the history of friendly relations between the American and Chinese peoples.” When Romanian 
Premier Ion Gheorghe Maurer, who was on good terms with Chinese leaders, visited the United 
States in June 1967, Johnson asked him to convey his message to Beijing that the United States 
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did not want war with China or to change its system and that “all we want to do is to trade with 
China and get along with her to the extent that she will permit.”25 Johnson’s public conciliatory 
gesture toward China promoted the administration’s peace image to the “restless” and “war-
weary” American people and shifted the blame for the Sino-American deadlock to Beijing for 
“domestic and international consumption.”26 
In responding to the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, senior U.S. officials believed that 
the U.S. capability to shape events in China was limited and any hint of U.S. interference in 
Chinese politics might “unwittingly” undermine the position of pragmatic elements in Beijing. 
Therefore, they refrained from making comments on either China’s state of affairs or the 
administration’s preferred outcome. National Security Adviser Walter Rostow later recalled that 
Johnson deliberately refrained from condemning Mao in public. By refusing to publicly take 
sides in China’s internal struggle or to gloat over its troubles, the Johnson administration tried to 
reduce Chinese hostility as well as its “siege mentality.”27 As the main China hand in the NSC, 
Alfred Jenkins acknowledged the U.S. posture of “quiet reasonableness” and the “hope for 
ultimate reconciliation.” But he recommended postponing even “the minor policy changes” until 
Washington could “make a better judgment as to the course of events in China.”28  
While Jenkins was mainly concerned with the proper timing of China policy reform, 
Rusk consistently believed that the U.S. “firm posture in Asia” was crucial and that any 
significant “concessions” to Communist China would be “seriously misunderstood in key 
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quarters, not to mention the Congress.” Ultimately, due to Rusk’s opposition, in addition to the 
great domestic turmoil in 1968, Johnson’s search for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam, the 
distraction of the general election, and Beijing’s cold attitude, the Johnson administration did not 
make much progress in improving relations with China.29 
Beijing’s Attitude toward the United States 
During the Cultural Revolution, Beijing not only rejected the U.S. initiatives, but also 
reduced their contacts via the only communication channel in Warsaw. When the American 
representative at a Warsaw meeting talked about Washington’s offer of trade and travel 
relaxations, Chinese Ambassador to Poland Wang Guoquan turned them down, arguing that it 
was “absolutely impossible to improve Sino-American relations” if the Taiwan issue was not 
solved. Wang charged that the United States was trying to “deceive” the Chinese people and “lull 
their fighting spirit” with proposals for contacts so that it can “impose war on Chinese people at 
appropriate time.”30  
From 1966 to 1968, the Chinese side deliberately lengthened the gap between the 
meetings despite American requests to meet more frequently.31 While in both 1964 and 1965 the 
two sides met five times, the number of meetings decreased to three in 1966, two in 1967, and 
only one in 1968. Moreover, the contact was lowered to the level of second secretary between 
meetings. On May 18, 1968, the Chinese embassy sent a letter to the U.S. embassy saying that it 
wanted to postpone the 135th meeting to mid- or late- November because “there was nothing to 
discuss.” Though Rusk was worried at one time that China might break or suspend the meetings, 
U.S. representatives in Warsaw felt that Beijing wanted to retain the channel of 
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communication.32 The Chinese side was also deliberate in putting off the meetings as agreed 
upon by both sides. In 1967, the People’s Daily published three stories about the postponement 
of Sino-American meetings for “institutional” reasons. The 134th meeting, in particular, was put 
off by two months from November 8, 1967 to January 8, 1968.33 These gestures were Beijing’s 
deliberate efforts to show the world how it degraded the importance of the meetings and how it 
slighted Washington. 
Beijing’s reduction of contacts with Washington also reflected its effort to avoid the 
political embarrassment of dealing with American “imperialists” in secret when it attacked 
Moscow for “colluding” with Washington. Since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, 
Beijing’s official protests against U.S. military operations in Vietnam were usually accompanied 
by attacks on the Soviet Union. In response to the U.S. bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong in June 
1966, for example, while the People’s Daily labeled the American “imperialists” as the “most 
dangerous enemy” to people all over the world, it also charged the Soviet Union for acting as the 
“number-one accomplice of American imperialists.” Attacking the Soviet Union for “colluding” 
with the United States in sabotaging the struggle of the North Vietnamese through “peace ploy,” 
it called on the “oppressed” people of the world to “abandon any hope for the American 
imperialists and Soviet revisionists.”34 When People’s Daily charged the Americans with a “war 
provocation” by bombing Chinese civilian facilities close to the Vietnamese border, it blamed 
the Soviet Union for “cooperating with and instigating” the Americans in their plot to “spread 
the war to all of Indochina.”35 
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According to People’s Daily, the Soviet official organ Pravda in July 1966 insinuated a 
“Sino-American deal” by publishing American Ambassador to Poland Gronouski’s remarks 
about a Sino-American meeting in an interview. In order to show Beijing’s ideological 
orthodoxy, the People’s Daily published on its front page the full texts of Wang Guoquan’s 
opening statement and his remark to the media after the meeting. On both occasions he used 
strong words repudiating both the United States and the Soviet Union.36 Under the table, Wang 
complained several times to Gronouski about the leak of the meeting contents by the American 
side.37 
In January 1967, both the Times and the Post featured on their front pages a story by a 
French editor, who claimed that a Chinese diplomat in Paris a year earlier had asked the French 
Foreign Ministry to relay Beijing’s message that China would not enter the Vietnam conflict so 
long as the United States observed three conditions. Taking into account the performance of U.S. 
military operations in North Vietnam, both newspapers concluded that the two countries had 
reached an “accord” about no heads-on collision in Vietnam.38 The story was soon picked by the 
press of the Soviet Union and India. In response to “rumors” of “understanding” or “tacit 
agreement” between Beijing and Washington, the People’s Daily attacked the “slandering” of 
China by the Soviet and Indian press as the “enemies’ ploy” to “sabotage” the close friendship 
between the Chinese and Vietnamese people.39 As mentioned in the last chapter, up to May 
1966, when the U.S. Air Force downed a Chinese plane, the People’s Daily was still talking 
about Zhou Enlai’s “four points.” After that, the “four points” was no longer found in the CCP’s 
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official organ. The Chinese media eliminated any sign that could be interpreted as a 
“compromise” with the United States with the beginning of the Cultural Revolution.  
In order to consolidate Beijing’s revolutionary credentials, the Chinese media promoted 
conflicts between China and the United States. Between 1966 and 1968, the People’s Daily 
carried stories where Chinese fishermen were killed or the Chinese embassy in Hanoi was hit by 
U.S. bombs.40 More importantly, it reported several shooting incidents where the Chinese 
military downed U.S. aircrafts.41 On August 21, 1967, the Chinese Air Force shot down two U.S. 
navy jets straying into the Chinese air space and captured a pilot named Robert Flynn. The 
People’s Daily published the photos of Flynn as well as the plane wrecks, arguing that the PLA’s 
punishment of U.S. “aggressors” would inspire the Cultural Revolution at home.42 
At the Warsaw talks, when Gronouski proposed a joint investigation of the incidents, 
Wang rejected it as “unnecessary” and charged it as an American effort to “cover its crime” and 
“deceive the people.” In one incident where the U.S. military seemed to have rescued several 
Chinese fishermen in December 1966 on the basis of their testimonies in Saigon, Wang accused 
the U.S. side of “maltreating” them and attempting to “recruit them as spies or defectors to 
Taiwan.”43 On the front page of the People’s Daily, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a 
statement protesting the killing and injuries of Chinese fishermen because of U.S. bombing.44 
Beijing’s rejection of joint investigations suggested that it wanted to avoid dealing with the 
United States as much as possible. More importantly, whether those incidents actually happened 
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or how they were solved was much less important to the Chinese than their propaganda value 
showing Sino-American conflicts.  
While the front-pages of the People’s Daily highlighted the “conflicts” between China 
and the United States, its interior pages featured many stories of the domestic problems in the 
United States, such as the anti-war protests, race riots, and inflation. In its short comments on 
Johnson’s State of the Union Address in 1967, the People’s Daily omitted his message about 
China, describing him as being “engrossed in problems at home and abroad.”45 The Reference 
News reprinted a story from a Hong Kong newspaper that the American desire to build 
connections with China had been rejected by the CCP, but its abridged version of Johnson’s 
address kept the message about China.46 The Chinese media gave the impression that the United 
States was in a state of decline and that its offer of friendliness simply showed its weakness. 
U.S. Media on the Cultural Revolution 
When the Cultural Revolution broke out in China, U.S. media were confused and did not 
pay much attention to the “cultural” aspect in the Chinese official propaganda. However, the 
downfall of Peng Zhen, a key member in the Politburo and one whom they viewed as a possible 
successor to Mao, became a headline in the Post and the Times. Because Mao had disappeared 
from the public view since November 1965, they speculated that he had lost control of the 
situation.47 The Post published A. Doak Barnet’s speculation that Mao was probably dying and 
the current turmoil was a power struggle around his succession.48 The Times first learned of the 
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official name of the campaign--“Cultural Revolution”--on June 18 when Zhou Enlai informed 
leaders of Romania during his visit to that country.49   
After disappearing from the public view for several months, Mao swam in the Yangtze 
River on July 16, 1966. For some unknown reason, the Chinese media chose not to release the 
story of the swimming until July 25. With several pictures on its front page, the People’s Daily 
claimed that Mao had swum thirty li, approximately nine miles, within an hour.50 Mao’s sudden 
appearance drew the attention of the two key newspapers and magazines. While reprinting a 
photo of Mao’s swimming, they ridiculed the story as propaganda. The Post claimed that the 
mass swimming demonstrations at the bidding of Mao allegedly had caused mass drowning due 
to ill preparation. Time magazine ran an article entitled “The Great Splash Forward.” Since the 
disastrous Great Leap Forward, its variations had appeared frequently in U.S. media.51 The 
newsmagazine pointed out that Mao’s performance of swimming nine miles in one hour was four 
times the world record of marathon swimming, which was obviously impossible for a seventy-
two-year old. Newsweek used the title “No Ordinary Swim: New Light on the Great Purges as 
Chairman Mao Surfaces.” It showed skepticism by reprinting a London Daily Mirror 
commentary that suggested Mao might have been held up “by inscrutable Chinese frogmen.” As 
it correctly pointed out, Mao’s appearance showed that he was in good health and had been in 
full control of the Party and the purge from the beginning.52 
With the Cultural Revolution increasing in intensity, stories on the mass violence 
appeared frequently in U.S. media. This is not surprising because of the media’s “penchant for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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drama.” 53  U.S. media were deeply disturbed and horrified by the government-supported 
“xenophobic frenzy” in defiance of diplomatic norms when the Red Guards targeted Western life 
styles as well as foreign nationals in response to Mao’s call to “eliminate the bourgeois 
influence.” In August 1966, for example, the Times and the Post reported on their front pages 
how the Red Guards in Beijing attacked churches in Beijing. Western journalists received a rare 
first-hand experience of the Red Guards brutality when eight expelled nuns crossed the border 
into Hong Kong. As Newsweek described it, when an eighty-five year old nun fainted, she was 
“unceremoniously dumped faced down on a baggage cart” and wheeled across the border while 
scores of Red Guards stood nearby and jeered. Both Time and Newsweek presented a photo of 
the sister wheeled across the border. The story that the sister died in a Hong Kong hospital the 
next day added horror to the scenario.54 
To solve the problem of no direct access to China, U.S. media used the stories of 
Canadian, Japanese, Soviet, and Czechoslovak journalists based there. Often, journalists used 
wall posters or Red Guard newspapers for their source of information. One merit of these 
unofficial channels was that they provided news that would never appear in the Chinese official 
media, such as stories about the bloody fights and casualties, personal attacks on Mao’s wife 
Jiang Qing, Lin Biao, and even Mao himself. One big problem was that information in these 
posters could not be verified. For example, a Post front-page article reprinted dispatches from 
Japanese and Czechoslovak correspondents who employed wall posters claiming that fifty-four 
persons had been killed during the riots in Nanjing. As to the number of the injured, the Japanese 
report was 6,000 while the Czechs listed 60,000. The Czech news agency also quoted Red 
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Guards leaflets circulated in Beijing that described tortures of their own members by opposing 
factions: “Their fingers, noses, and ears were chopped off and their tongues were cut off.”  The 
Post admitted that there was no eyewitness to such events. 55  These leaflets might have 
deliberately exaggerated the atrocities of opposing factions in order to arouse anger and hatred. 
Even though some stories could not be confirmed, the audience got a sense of the extent of chaos 
in China.  
In covering the Cultural Revolution, the Post seemed to present more graphic and 
sensational pictures than the Times. While the Times used “red guards” or “Maoists,” the Post 
mostly used “mobs.” When reporting the Red Guard harassment of Soviet women and children 
at the Beijing airport, for example, the Times used a headline “Soviet Dependents Harassed in 
Peking.” It claimed that the Chinese demonstrators at the airport were “evidently under a 
measure of discipline” because Red Guards fists “stopped within inches of Russian face.” The 
Post, in contrast, used a headline “Soviet Wives Forced to Crawl in Peking,” describing how 
Soviet officials were pushed and manhandled when they tried to protect their women and 
children who “had to crawl” beneath the portrait of Mao.56 The Post also seemed to be more 
impressed by the provocative rhetoric of the Cultural Revolution that could be shown in 
headlines such as “Peking Declares War of Annihilation” and “Mao Urges Crushing of Foes.”57 
The Post’s reporting of the Cultural Revolution was in line with its somewhat tougher position 
on Beijing in general. 
For all the differences on their front pages, the Post and the Times both expressed disgust 
to the Red Guards in their editorials. The Times compared the “officially organized violence 
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against foreigners” in China to Empress Dowager’s endorsement of the Boxers in 1900.58 The 
Post argued that the image of China had become dominated by “a steadily darkening ugliness” 
and that the “young fogeys of Peking are frightening.”59  
Stories in U.S. media often misread Cultural Revolution propaganda when they took the 
Chinese papers at their face value. For example, in a story entitled “Lin Piao is Made Red 
Guards’ Head: Chou Enlai and Ho Lung Also Named to High Posts in Chinese Youth Unit,” the 
Times reprinted the Japanese monitoring of a Beijing broadcast that reported Zhou Enlai as 
having said, “I will join your picket corps and will serve as an adviser” when the Red Guards 
placed an armband on him. The radio also said Marshals He Long and Lin Biao had agreed to 
serve as chief of staff and commander in chief of the Red Guards when the youth asked them.60 
During the Cultural Revolution, there was never any official Red Guards organization with Lin 
as the commander-in-chief, Zhou as the adviser, and He Long as the chief of staff. What the 
Japanese picked up from the Chinese radio was nothing but propaganda aimed to show the 
endorsement of the Red Guards movement by the top leaders. Actually, in its coverage of the 
Red Guard rallies, the People’s Daily consistently called Mao the “paramount commander.” Mao 
and his wife had much more influence on the Red Guards than Lin, Zhou and He, who probably 
would have had reservations about their rampages.  
Because the Chinese media repeatedly attacked Liu Shaoqi as Mao’s chief opponent, 
U.S. media also described him as the “rallying point” of “Mao’s foes.” The Times considered Liu 
and Deng as either “fence-sitters” or “leaders of the reported opposition.”61 Time reprinted the 
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Chinese propaganda that “Liu’s faction” had tried to “vote Mao out of power.”62 Newsweek 
maintained that “pitched battles between the supporters of Mao and Liu” had become almost 
daily occurrence.”63 In the summer of 1967, when Deng Xiaoping came under attack, the Post 
speculated that he was “a major figure functioning behind the scenes to mobilize Mao’s 
adversaries.”64 In a typical example, Time listed pictures of Mao, Jiang Qing, and Lin Biao as 
“Heroes” on the left column, and those of Liu Shaoqi and his wife, Tao Zhu, Peng Zhen, Deng 
Xiaoping, Li Xuefeng, and Zhou Enlai as “Villains” on the right.65 The list revealed the 
American media’s tendency to oversimplify the struggle in China into one between Mao and his 
alleged “enemies,” or one between “good guys” and “bad guys.”  
The reality in China was much more complex because the factions fighting against each 
other all claimed to be followers of Mao. Those who were purged more recently might have been 
beneficiaries of previous purges. They were later purged merely because they were unfortunate 
to have fallen out of Mao’s favor or they might have stood in the way of his political 
maneuvering. In the above list of “villains,” Tao Zhu and Li Xufeng had been promoted to 
replace Peng Zhen and Wu Han who had been purged earlier. As for Zhou Enlai, even though 
the Red Guards attacked him for being “too soft on Mao’s foes,”66 he was not purged because 
Mao needed him to ensure the functioning of the country in the middle of the “civil war.” 
Another case was the PLA. While Mao wanted it to “support the left” and seize power from the 
Party establishment and organize revolutionary committees, local military forces did not 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
62 Time, July 7, 1967, 31. 
63 Newsweek, August 7, 1967, 46. 
64 WP, September 30, 1966, A1; July 26, 1967, A1. 
65 Time, January 13, 1967, 22-23. 
66 WP, January 11, 1967, 1.  
!!
83!
cooperate well with mass representatives supported by the radical Cultural Revolution Group 
even though they all claimed to be loyal to Mao.67 
When U.S. media linked all opponents to radicals together into a consolidated bloc that 
was anti-Mao in nature, the result was the exaggerated strength of “Mao’s opponents.” In an 
article “Some Doubt Survival of Present Peking Setup” published on the eve of the Chinese 
National Day in 1966, the Post speculated that Mao and Lin Biao could be overthrown by an 
opposition that had “grown significantly.” The Times editorial also maintained that the turmoil in 
China had raised questions about the “stability of the Peking regime” with signs denouncing 
Mao.68 On the cover of a January 1967 issue, Time magazine featured a large picture of Mao’s 
head wound up by a dragon of the Great Wall with a subtitle “China in Chaos.” The 
accompanying article described China as reaching the final stages of the “legendary dance of the 
scorpion--just before it stings itself to death.”69 The speculation about the downfall of Mao’s rule 
might have been wishful thinking. However, the troubles inside China, as James Reston argued, 
reduced the possibility of China’s military intervention in Vietnam.70 
U.S. media’s misunderstanding also included projecting U.S. values on Chinese realities. 
When the Cultural Revolution started, for example, a Post editorial speculated that the 
movement might signify another “Great Leap Forward” modernization.71 In March 1967, it 
claimed that Mao was retreating from his Cultural Revolution and the central issue now was 
“how to modernize China,” which needed help from the outside world. Therefore, it argued, 
Beijing in its weakness would be “receptive to arrangements with Washington.”72 The Post was !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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probably too optimistic about China’s need for modernization as a driving force for it to seek 
reconciliation. It well reflects the prejudices of the “modernization theory” at the time, which 
posited that every country would go through “development,” defined by “progress” in 
technology and economy among many other things.73 Being embroiled in power struggles, Mao 
was probably much more interested in revolution than “modernization.” Moreover, even if China 
needed modern technologies, it could have obtained them from other Western countries rather 
than the United States. Lastly, modernization counted little when Chinese leaders made the 
decision to reconcile with Washington later.  
Despite the chaos in China, U.S. newspeople persisted in criticizing the rigid China 
policy and pushed for more flexibility. The newspapers were more straightforward than the 
administration in expressing their preference. The Post argued that the United States had a 
“stake” in the outcome and a flexible American posture would give encouragement to moderate 
forces in China. The Times also maintained that it was in the interest of the United States to 
encourage the “rational” faction in China by “holding open the door wherever possible.”74  
In July 1967, those who disapproved of Johnson’s handling of the Vietnam War exceeded 
50 per cent for the first time in the Gallup Poll.75 In face of the rising criticisms of the Vietnam 
War, the Johnson administration mounted its offensive on the critics in fall 1967. Many 
administration officials responded to media interviews with “predominantly hawkish advice,”76 
and invoked the specter of the “China threat” in their defense of the administration’s Vietnam 
policy. A typical example was Dean Rusk at a press conference on October 12, 1967. When !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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asked to elaborate on why U.S. security was at stake in Vietnam, Rusk responded that in another 
ten or twenty years, “there will be a billion Chinese on the Mainland, armed with nuclear 
weapons, with no certainty about what their attitude toward the rest of Asia will be.”77 In their 
front-page stories reporting Rusk’s press conference, the two newspapers obviously did not 
support him. The Post mentioned Rusk’s “unwarranted obsession about Communist China.” The 
Times noted that his “usual calm tone was missing,” giving the impression that he was 
emotional. In a column, James Reston argued that Rusk’s remarks were “good theatre but bad 
policy” and that the reporters liked his “loyalty, optimism, and appealing conviction” but simply 
could not “believe he was right.”78 Rusk’s remarks caused more controversy when Senator 
Eugene McCarthy (D-MN) accused him of obscuring the issue by invoking the “yellow peril.” 
Even though Rusk denied it promptly, it became headlines in both the Times and the Post. In his 
Post column article entitled “Rusk’s Raising of Yellow Peril is Truly Dangerous Escalation,” 
Joseph Kraft argued that Rusk had put his country in a position that had “elements of 
madness.”79 
Dean Rusk was not the only administration official who used the “China peril” to defend 
the administration’s Vietnam policy. When speaking at the National Shrine of Our Lady of 
Czestochowa in Pennsylvania on October 15, Vice President Hubert Humphrey reasserted that 
the U.S. security was at stake in Vietnam and that the “current threat to world peace is militant, 
aggressive Asian communism, with its headquarters in Peking, China.” The Times seemed to be 
more critical of the “hawkish” remarks of administration officials than the Post. It placed 
Humphrey’s speech on its front page while the Post did not.80 Interviewing specialists on China 
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affairs and U.S. diplomacy, the Times published an article “Some Specialists Say U.S. Aides 
Exaggerate Peking Threat.”81  
As U.S. media watched the rise and fall of unrest in China, their call for better Sino-
American relations was soon swamped by new stories of Red Guard violence. In March 1967, 
both the Times and the Post claimed to have found signs that Mao’s Cultural Revolution was 
subsiding. A Post editorial was so optimistic that it claimed a “propitious moment” had come to 
“assay the small steps with which America’s eventual reconciliation with China must begin.”82 A 
month later, world famous violinist Ma Sicong and his family arrived in the United States 
seeking asylum after they fled China. Their arrival caused much interest because the Ma family 
was among the very few Chinese witnesses of the Cultural Revolution to set foot on American 
soil.83 After learning of Ma’s “mistreatment” by the Red Guards, an editorial in the Post 
condemned the Communist madness, predicting that such a system would not “persist long 
enough to imperil for generations the safety and security of millions of people.” 84 While both 
newspapers claimed to have noticed signs that the Cultural Revolution was coming to a close as 
early as October 1967, Time and Newsweek reported that bodies were still flowing down the 
Pearl River to Hong Kong and Macao in July 1968.85 With stories of recurrent violence, China 
seemed too unpredictable to work with diplomatically. For the American people, the media’s 
coverage of Red Guard brutalities, their violent xenophobia and fanaticism must have alienated 
them. 
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For all their misreading of the situation in China, U.S. media were right in perceiving 
from the struggles Mao’s weakness in keeping the country under control. Mao’s use of the 
military to deal with his opponents, as the Times saw it, was an “admission of weakness.”86 In 
response to the munity in Wuhan in July 1967, the Times argued that if Mao could not even 
“liquidate his opponents in so central an institution as the armed forces,” it only showed that he 
was not “fully the master in his own realm.” The Post also maintained that the incident suggested 
Mao was failing in his effort to impose the “discipline and purity of his Cultural Revolution 
across his distressed land.”87 The resistance and obstruction to Mao, although exaggerated by 
U.S. media, destroyed the myth of an “impenetrable” Chinese leadership. 88  The media’s 
coverage of the chaos indeed presented the irrational image of China. However, stories of chaos 
also created the impression that China was preoccupied with domestic troubles, which reduced 
the likelihood of an oversea adventure or overture.  
Escalation of Sino-Soviet Polemics in U.S. media 
During the Cultural Revolution, U.S. media were not only attracted by the struggles in 
China, they also watched closely its conflicts with the Soviet Union. Coverage of strife between 
Communist countries could not only discredit the ideological opponents of the United States, but 
also benefit it in one way or another.  
As mentioned earlier, Mao’s decision to start the Cultural Revolution was closely related 
to the developments in the Soviet Union. He disagreed with Khrushchev’s “secret speech” 
attacking Stalin’s “cult of personality” at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (CPSU) in 1956 and especially opposed his policy of “peaceful coexistence” with the 
West. Sino-Soviet conflict turned public after the Soviet Union signed the test-ban treaty in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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August 1963. Between September 1963 and July 1964, the People’s Daily published a series of 
nine “polemics” spelling out the causes of Beijing’s breaking with the CPSU. The ninth polemic 
entitled “On Khrushchev’s Phony Communism and Historical Lessons for the World” published 
on July 14, 1964, stipulated that “successors of the proletarian revolutionary cause can only be 
born in the mass struggle and grow up in the great winds and waves of revolution.” This 
document contained the essence of what would become the Cultural Revolution.89  
After Khrushchev was forced to resign in October 1964, Zhou Enlai went to Moscow 
trying to express Beijing’s goodwill to the new Soviet leadership. However, new Soviet leader 
Leonard Brezhnev disappointed him by publicly reiterating the “peaceful coexistence” policy 
with the West and his endorsement of the test-ban treaty. Worse still, a personal dimension was 
added when Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Malinovskii allegedly told Marshal He Long, “We 
have already gotten rid of Khrushchev, you ought to follow our example and get rid of Mao 
Zedong.”90 Concluding that Moscow would not abandon its “revisionist” policy, the People’s 
Daily and Red Flag ran a joint editorial “How Khrushchev Lost His Power,” attacking the new 
Soviet leadership as practicing “Krushchevism without Khrushchev.”91  
After the Cultural Revolution started, Mao was not hesitant to use anti-Soviet slogans to 
advance his domestic cause when he targeted the “Khrushchev sleeping by our side.” In the 
communiqué of the Eleventh Plenum that passed the “Sixteen Points Decision” about the 
Cultural Revolution, “struggle against the Soviet Union” was adopted as an official policy.92 
Under the strong anti-revisionist propaganda in China, the Red Guards targeted the Soviet !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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embassy for mass rallies and demonstrations in August 1966. They also renamed the street in 
front of the Soviet embassy as the “Anti-Revisionism Street.” The Chinese government’s failure 
to rein in the Red Guards’ attack on the embassy annoyed Moscow, whose protests only served 
to add fuel to the Red Guards’ frenzy.  
Sino-Soviet quarrels reached its peak with the “Moscow Incident” in January 1967. On 
January 24, sixty-nine Chinese students studying in Europe arrived in Moscow on their way back 
to Beijing to take part in the Cultural Revolution. When they requested to present a wreath to 
Stalin’s grave, they were rejected by the Soviet authority but allowed instead to pay tribute to the 
Lenin Mausoleum, which was also at Red Square. After laying the wreath, the students refused 
to leave and together they read aloud Mao’s quotations that included anti-Soviet slogans. Clashes 
broke out when the Soviet police tried to stop the Chinese students. In protest, the Red Guards 
laid siege to the Soviet embassy in Beijing for several weeks. In retaliation, the Soviets besieged 
the Chinese embassy in Moscow for several days. When tensions in Beijing caused the Soviets to 
evacuate Russian women and children, as mentioned earlier, many of them were harassed by the 
Red Guards on their way to the airport. In Moscow, Soviet citizens broken into the Chinese 
embassy complex, grabbed the display articles inside, and beat up Chinese diplomats. These “tit-
for-tat” struggles intensified the Sino-Soviet tension and sent it on a no-return track.93 
What complicated the Sino-Soviet “war of words” was the tension along their disputed 
frontiers. Since the Cultural Revolution started, violence against Soviet diplomats and the anti-
Soviet hysteria in China further aroused Moscow’s fear of war with China. In a CPSU plenum in 
December 1966, several key party leaders complained that Chinese leaders had put struggle 
against the Soviet Union in the first place. As a result, Moscow accelerated its military buildup !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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along the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borders in 1967 and 1968. From 1965 to 1969, the 
number of Soviet divisions reportedly increased from seventeen to twenty-seven. Brezhnev’s 
assumption was that more troops would reduce the danger of military confrontations.94 
In Xinjiang, an autonomous region in central Asia, the chaos caused by the Red Guard 
movement and their hunt for Soviet sympathizers triggered large numbers of Uyghurs and 
Kazakhs to flee to the Soviet Union, which the Soviet press reported as several hundred thousand 
in January 1967. In response, Mao ordered all border forces on the Soviet frontier to be alerted 
on February 11. In February, Moscow reported a withdrawal of Chinese troops one hundred 
miles from the Soviet and Mongolian borders.95 In late 1966, the Reference News had started to 
reprint Western media stories about increasing Soviet troop deployment, frequent military drills 
and Soviet leaders’ anti-China indoctrination during their visit to the Sino-Soviet border.96 All 
news of Sino-Soviet border tensions was censored in the People’s Daily though. It shows that 
Mao was not expecting a real war against the Soviet Union when the Cultural Revolution was 
raging. He was mainly interested in using the ideological differences with Moscow to serve his 
domestic struggle against “revisionists.”  
American journalists covered the Sino-Soviet polemics with prominence and not without 
drama. They published vivid stories of the “war of words” emanating from Moscow and Beijing 
in early 1967. Under the headline “Moscow and Peking in Loudspeaker War,” the Times 
described a scene where large Soviet loudspeakers mounted on two trucks blared against two 
smaller ones installed by the Chinese embassy.97 The Post, Time and Newsweek placed pictures !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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of demonstrators burning effigies of Soviet leaders in Beijing side by side with the Russians 
shouting “shame on Mao” in Moscow. In an article entitled “Mao Baits the Russian Bear,” 
Newsweek reported the clashes at the Red Square with an amusing effect. As it went, when the 
Chinese embassy in Moscow produced two of the “allegedly injured students at a press 
conference, one of them spoiled the whole effect by becoming so excited that he unwittingly 
ripped off his bandages to reveal an unblemished face.”98  
While U.S. media admitted that Beijing was more provocative than Moscow, they did not 
appreciate the “quiet self-congratulation” of the Soviets.99 For example, the Times claimed that 
the Soviet press was “more graphic about unrest and violence in China than many Western 
papers.” James Reston noticed that U.S. officials talked about the Cultural Revolution far less 
than the top leaders of the Soviet Union. In an editorial entitled “Moscow Fishes in Peking,” the 
Post argued that the Russians were conducting an extensive campaign to “dislodge” Mao by 
putting pressure on him and making his rule as “arduous” as possible. Newsweek pointed out that 
Moscow had good reason to be worried by the fact that Beijing had accorded it the same “arch-
demon status” as Washington.100 During his visit to Great Britain in February 1967, Kosygin 
remarked in a television interview that the Soviet Union sympathized with Chinese people who 
were struggling against “the dictatorial regime of Mao Tse-tung.” The Post interpreted 
Kosygin’s unusual condemnation of Mao as a sign that Moscow was giving priority to better 
relations with the West. In the editorial “Kosygin Drops the Mask,” the Times argued that his 
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remark “in the capital of a capitalist nation” was “counterproductive” because it only served to 
inform the West of the “extreme seriousness of the Sino-Soviet crisis.”101  
U.S. media also gave prominence to the Sino-Soviet border tensions and speculated about 
a possible war between the two Communist giants. Before 1967, Time magazine had called 
attention to the border conflict, which it described as a “lesser known and potentially dangerous” 
aspect in the Sino-Soviet disputes. Citing the increase of Soviet anti-China indoctrination on the 
border, it claimed that “the war of words” might become an “Armageddon at the summit of the 
Communist world.”102 Similarly, an editorial in the Times argued that by provoking a crisis with 
Moscow, Mao might be preparing a campaign to win some of the disputed territory in Siberia. 
With regard to Kosygin’s remarks in London, it again raised the question whether it might spark 
a war between the two Communist powers.103 On February 10, 1967, journalists from the 
Japanese news agency Kyodo reported from leaflets in Beijing that Mao had given orders to alert 
all Chinese border troops. The Times, the Post, and Time quickly picked up the story even 
though they had no means to confirm it. Newsweek also talked about the “War of Nerves” on the 
Sino-Soviet border.104 By February 1967, the seriousness of the Sino-Soviet conflict had become 
so clear to newspeople that a permanent split seemed very likely to them.105 In general, their 
coverage of the Sino-Soviet conflict was more accurate than their perceptions of the Cultural 
Revolution. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
101 WP, February 11, 1967, A12; NYT, February 11, 1967, 1, 27.  
102 Time, December 2, 1966, 38, February 3, 1967, 25-6..  
103 NYT, February 6, 1967, 27; February 11, 1967, 1, 27.  
104 Ibid., February 12, 1967, 1; WP, February 12, 1967, 1; Time, February 17, 1967, 26; Newsweek, March 
6, 1967, 44. 
105 It can be seen from the following titles: “China Dares Russia to End Ties, and Warns ‘Graves Await 
You’” in the Post, February 9, 1967; “German Red Foreshadow Rift” in the Times, February 12, 1967, 2; “Close to a 
Final Split,” in Time, February 17, 1967, 26; In an article entitled “Mao Baits the Russian Bear,” Newsweek held that 
Mao was deliberately trying to “goad their former allies into a diplomatic break.” February 13, 1967, 48. 
!!
93!
As the Sino-Soviet rift developed, it provided a foundation for new thinking for those 
who were concerned about Sino-American relations. In February 1967, scholars on China 
convened a conference at University of Chicago’s Center of Policies Studies. In his speech at the 
conference, Senator Robert Kennedy (D-NY) asserted that the United States had “widely 
exaggerated” the threat of China and underestimated the significance of the Sino-Soviet split. He 
called on administration officials to distinguish between “armed attack and internal revolution,” 
between “Chinese direction of revolutionary forces and Chinese exhortation.” Kennedy’s speech 
made the front pages of both the Times and the Post.106 The next day, the Times covered ideas 
from the conference with a title “Victory for Mao held Best for U.S.: Experts See Chinese-Soviet 
Rift as an Advantage.”107  
Several Post columnists criticized Kennedy. Claiming that the senator’s proposal had 
existed inside as well outside the government for some time, Joseph Alsop complained that 
Kennedy had appeared on the front pages too often and that he was given too many credits for 
pressing a so-called “brand new” China policy. William S. White, in his column article “Who’s 
Advising Bobby?...China Proposals Shock Associates,” criticized Kennedy by reemphasizing the 
Chinese “aggression” in Korea  and Vietnam. He attacked the senator for “becoming a part-time 
dove” on Vietnam where his brother JFK had been a “resolute hawk.” He also described 
Kennedy’s academic advisers as “splendid” writers but not “wise politicians.”108 Though not 
shared by all, these criticisms of Kennedy reflected opposition to China policy reform during the 
Cultural Revolution.  
In reality, the United States had been much closer to the Soviet Union than to China since 
the early 1960s. It was especially true during the Cultural Revolution when the Soviet leadership !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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was truly alarmed by the Chinese anti-Soviet hysteria. In January 1967, the Soviet Politburo 
approved a policy to maintain Soviet-American relations on a certain cordial level to help the 
Soviet Union avoid fighting on two fronts.109 At the Glassboro Summit in June 1967, though 
Kosygin and Johnson did not reach any concrete agreement, the intimate atmosphere at the 
meeting was interpreted by the Times and the Post as the beginning of a better Soviet-American 
relationship.110 At the fiftieth anniversary of the October Revolution in 1967, Harrison Salisbury, 
a prominent journalist on the Soviet affairs and the assistant managing editor of the Times, wrote 
a column “China Tops Soviet List of Potential Dangers,” arguing that the United States had 
dropped to the third place on the list of potential threats to the Soviet Union with China and West 
Germany on the top two.111 The Johnson team appreciated the Soviet cooperation over the Paris 
talks. They were unwilling to exploit the Sino-Soviet rift because of their fear of alienating the 
Soviets, whom they believed might help find a settlement in Vietnam.112 
U.S. Media on China’s Role in Vietnam 
U.S. media not only followed the Sino-Soviet polemics, they were also interested in the 
relations between Beijing and Hanoi because any rift between them could affect the U.S. war 
effort in Vietnam. As one of the greatest victims of the Sino-Soviet disputes, Sino-Vietnamese 
relations had started to strain after Moscow increased its role in the Vietnam War with Kosygin’s 
visit to Hanoi in January 1965. When Kosygin proposed a Sino-Soviet “joint action” to support 
Vietnam, Mao dismissed his proposal, asserting that China’s argument with the Soviet Union 
would “continue for another 9,000 years.”113 Beijing’s obstinate rejection of “joint action” !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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proposals of world Communists supporting Vietnam severely embittered Hanoi. Several years 
later, when China invaded Vietnam in 1979, Hanoi listed the “crimes” of Beijing in “sabotaging 
the united action” in its publication of the history of Sino-Vietnamese relations.114 
Beijing not only rejected the joint-action proposal, but also demanded that Hanoi should 
take sides in the Sino-Soviet quarrel and repudiate Soviet revisionism. Evidence shows the 
existence of great differences between Beijing and Hanoi in 1966. In his talks with Le Duan, the 
General Secretary of the Vietnamese Worker’s Party (VWP), in March 1966, Zhou Enlai 
emphasized that “opposing the U.S. should necessarily go hand in hand with opposing 
revisionism” and the two things could not be separated. He also complained that Vietnamese 
newspapers were carrying stories about Chinese aggression against Vietnam in the past. When he 
failed to convince the North Vietnamese to distance themselves from the Soviet Union, Zhou 
insisted that mentioning the Soviet aid together with the Chinese aid was an “insult” to China.115 
These actions only alienated the North Vietnamese and pushed them further toward Moscow.  
Beijing also disagreed with Hanoi’s military strategies, especially on the launching of the 
Tet Offensive. As an advocate of protracted people’s war or guerilla warfare in rural areas, Mao 
opposed using large units fighting conventional warfare in urban centers because he believed the 
North Vietnamese would expose themselves to the heavy bombing of the superior American air 
force. However, with more sophisticated weapons and heavy artillery provided by the Soviet 
Union and the expectation that simultaneous uprisings would emerge everywhere in South 
Vietnam, in January 1968 Hanoi launched the Tet Offensive, which consisted of simultaneous !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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conventional attacks on major cities in South Vietnam. Though the United States defeated the 
Tet Offensive, the enemies’ ability to mount such a large-scale offensive after heavy U.S. 
bombing caused a “shock” to Americans who now began to raise serious doubts about official 
reports of “progress” and the prospect of victory in Vietnam. Public support for the war and 
Johnson’s handling of it went on a big “downward spiral.”116 Since July 1965, Americans had 
been polled repeatedly about whether they thought the United States had made a mistake sending 
troops to fight in Vietnam. In February 1968, those who answered “yes” exceeded those who 
said “No” for the first time.117 In order to seek a settlement, President Johnson on March 31 
declared his de-escalation plan by offering a partial halt to U.S. bombing against North Vietnam 
unilaterally. After suffering heavy casualties, Hanoi started to negotiate with Washington in Paris 
in May.  
As the rift between Beijing and Hanoi developed, the Times had spotted sign as early as 
May 1966 when Albanian Premier Mehmet Shehu visited China. From the joint announcements 
made by Chinese and Albania leaders that there could be no “neutrality” or “the middle of the 
road” in the struggle against Soviet revisionism, it sensed “thinly veiled attacks” on Hanoi’s 
leaders. When the Cultural Revolution erupted, Newsweek speculated that Hanoi might have 
been “disillusioned” by the upheavals in China because they might affect its war effort. During 
the Glassboro Summit in June 1967, the Post featured the story “Talks Said to Cool Hanoi-
Peking Ties,” arguing that the gap between Beijing and Hanoi would widen when the Soviets’ 
increasing influence on Hanoi would facilitate its role as a “high-level broker” between the 
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United States and North Vietnam.118 In other words, a closer Soviet-American tie would alienate 
the relations between Hanoi and Beijing because of Hanoi’s closer relations with Moscow. 
When the Paris talks started in May 1968, the People’s Daily remained silent and reduced 
coverage of Vietnam, especially on its front pages. The Post interpreted Beijing’s continued 
silence as an indication of its unhappiness with Hanoi. In a front-page article “Hanoi and 
Moscow Appear to Mesh Tactics on Talks,” the Times noted that China had been excluded from 
policy formulation over negotiations. It also featured an editorial entitled “Hanoi and Peking: 
They Don’t Always See Eye to Eye.” Seeing China’s upgrading of the Viet Cong mission in its 
capital, Newsweek interpreted it as Beijing’s effort to “drive a wedge” between Hanoi and the 
Viet Cong if Paris talks went on.119 
Moreover, both the Times and the Post reported stories of Chinese demonstrations in 
front of North Vietnamese consulates in Chinese cities. The Post even obtained information from 
a Red Guard bulletin in Guangzhou (Canton), which claimed that Red Guards had stormed the 
North Vietnamese consulate and taunted its diplomats in Nanning, the capital of Guangxi 
Province adjacent to North Vietnam, on June 2, 1968.120 In July, the two newspapers reported 
that Chinese leaders including Zhou Enlai blamed the factional strife for halting the shipment of 
Soviet and Chinese aid to Vietnam. They speculated that the Red Guards might be deliberately 
blocking the transportation to show their discontent toward Hanoi.121 
The Red Guards could have learned about the Paris talks from the Reference News, which 
had followed them closely since the Vietnamese representatives arrived in Paris in May. It even 
featured a story about how Hanoi’s chief negotiator Xuan Thuy met with Kosygin en route to 
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Paris and reprinted several of his speeches at the negotiations.122 Stories of discord between 
Beijing and Hanoi reduced Beijing’s role in Vietnam, which to some extent weakened the China 
threat.  
Impact of the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia  
In the last year of the Johnson administration, the domestic and international 
environments for both the United States and China moved in a direction that favored a better 
relationship between them. As the chaos in China showed apparent signs of decline, Johnson also 
started his de-escalation plan through negotiation. Moreover, the China Lobby in the United 
States had been severely weakened with the Committee of One Million losing the endorsement 
of congressional majorities.123 Candidates of both parties no longer took it as a taboo to publicly 
talk about negotiating with China. 124  Most important of all, the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and the introduction of “the Brezhnev Doctrine,” which used the 
conception of “limited sovereignty” to justify the Soviet military intervention in another socialist 
state, greatly increased Beijing’s concern about the Soviet threat. Slowly, Beijing started to turn 
its attention away from Vietnam to the mounting danger to the north.  
In denouncing the Soviet invasion, the People’s Daily described Moscow as “having 
degenerated into a social-imperialist and social-fascist” state.125 The change from “revisionist” to 
“social-imperialist” in the Chinese official discourse symbolizes that the Soviet Union had 
shifted from an “ideological opponent” to a “strategic threat.”126 In September 1968, the official 
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organ began to publicize strategic threats from the Soviet Union. For example, the People’s 
Daily for the first time revealed tensions along the Sino-Soviet border by publishing a Foreign 
Ministry protest against Soviet intrusions into China’s air space in the past, particularly in 
August. In October, it published Zhou Enlai and PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yongsheng’s public 
speeches with reference to Soviet troop deployment and “provocations” on the Sino-Soviet and 
Sino-Mongolia borders.127  
The People’s Daily also singled out Moscow when it attacked countries that formed the 
anti-China strategic circle. In an article entitled “Warning to the ‘Heroes and Good Fellows’ in 
the Anti-China Circle” from the PLA’s point of view, it listed recent “anti-China activities” 
conducted by the Soviet Union.128 Between September and November 1968, while the People’s 
Daily ferociously attacked the “Soviet socialist imperialists” on its front pages, it only briefly 
referred to the American military “failures” in Vietnam and great civil disturbances at home in 
interior pages. It seemed that Beijing was more concerned with a threatening Soviet Union than a 
weakened United States. 
The Reference News displayed signs that Beijing regarded Moscow as its “principle 
enemy” after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. A front-page article entitled “Soviet 
Revisionists Is Playing the Leading Role in the Anti-China Circle at the Acquiescence of the 
United States” argued that the Soviet military drills between 1965 and 1967 reflected that China 
had become the “number one imaginary enemy” of the Soviet Union after Moscow had 
effectively reduced tensions with the West. As it stated, while the “anti-China circle” put 
together by the United States had collapsed due to the resistance of the Vietnamese in the initial 
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stage of the Soviet-American understanding, the Soviet Union had taken up the leading role in 
the second stage, by containing China from both sides with “the two claws of the crab.”129  
After the Paris talks began, Hanoi’s refusal to repudiate the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia further weakened Sino-North Vietnamese relations. During the National Day 
celebration of 1968, the People’s Daily placed Vietnamese representatives after guests from 
Albania, Pakistan, Burma, Indonesia and New Zealand when it reported the state reception held 
by Zhou Enlai. Lin Biao totally ignored the conflict in Vietnam in his speech at the Tiananmen 
Square celebration the next day. On the same occasion a year earlier, Vietnam had been ranked 
next only to Albania and Congo, and Lin had expressed warm support for the Vietnamese.130 The 
Post read Lin Biao’s speech as a sign that Beijing had shifted its focus away from Vietnam to the 
danger of a possible collision with the Soviet Union.131 
Beijing’s public attitude toward the Paris talks began to change in October 1968, when 
the People’s Daily for the first time ran a front-page article pointing out that the talks had 
reached its “delicate stage” after twenty-six formal negotiations since their beginning on May 13. 
As it reported, “more and more signs show that the stalemate at the Paris talks might have be 
broken” when Johnson was planning to use the “fraud” of a comprehensive halt to bombing. It 
grudgingly claimed that the stories needed to be “further confirmed as the situation develops.”132 
The Times speculated that Beijing chose to disclose the Paris talks because it needed to prepare 
its public when progress was “imminent.”133 Before that, the Reference News had featured a 
story about Washington’s intention of complete halt to bombing in order to make a breakthrough 
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in the Paris talks.134 Beijing did not want its cadres to be too surprised when progress in Paris 
became a reality. 
When Johnson declared in a television address on October 31 a complete halt to the 
bombing, the People’s Daily, to the surprise of the foreign media, published the full text of his 
address.135 It also published Hanoi’s official response declaring that it was ready to join the 
quadripartite talks that included the NLF and South Vietnam, along with Ho Chi Minh’s message 
to the Vietnamese people. On November 18, it published the statements of the U.S. State 
Department and the Foreign Ministry of the DRV on their positions on the recent Paris talks.136 
In Beijing’s strategic consideration, if Hanoi’s support for the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia 
was a sign that it had “lost out in its competition with the Soviet Union over Hanoi’s 
allegiance,”137 the beginning of the quadripartite talks in November consolidated the Soviet 
victory. By publicizing Hanoi’s negotiations with the United States, Beijing seemed to be 
discrediting Hanoi and preparing for its own disengagement from Vietnam. While in private Mao 
expressed his endorsement for the “fighting and talking” strategy before the DRV and NLF 
leaders in November 1968, China started to withdraw support troops from North Vietnam at the 
same time.138  
More importantly, in November, Beijing signaled to Washington its wish to renew 
Warsaw contacts. When the United States proposed to put off the 135th meeting to February 20 
1969, a month after the inauguration of Richard Nixon, the Chinese Foreign Ministry made a 
quick reply that was unusually longer and more detailed than any previous statements. The !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
134 RN, October 12, 2.  
135 The Reference News documented Western media’s surprise on its front page on November 7, 1968, 1. 
136 PD, November 3, 1968, 5; November 5, 1968, 5; November 18, 1968, 6.  
137 Westad, “History, Memory, and the Language of Alliance-Making,” in Westad, et al. eds., “Seventy-
seven Conservations,” 11. 
138 “Mao Zedong and Pham Van Dong” November 17, 1968, in Westad, et al. eds., “Seventy-seven 
Conversations,”141; Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 179. 
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statement, with its attack on the “typically imperialist” attitude of the United States, stated that 
China would like to talk with the United States on two principles: the U.S. withdrawal from 
Taiwan and its willingness to sign an agreement with China based on “the five principles of 
peaceful coexistence.”139 This rhetoric had disappeared from Chinese media since the Gulf of 
Tonkin Incident in August 1964. The Chinese government could have just sent the letter to the 
U.S. embassy and published a statement when the meeting was over, as it normally did. 
Publishing the response in full served as a defense of Beijing’s position before the domestic 
audience. It could also demonstrate that the government of China was not afraid of talking to the 
“imperialists” in a rational manner. 
In the United States, the Times was the most excited about the Chinese offer, granting it a 
front-page prominence. It argued that the “peaceful coexistence” clause might signify “a possible 
shift in the Chinese foreign policy from belligerency back to the flexible policy of the 1950s.” 
Considering Beijing’s “overture of coexistence” and the starting of quadripartite negotiations 
over Vietnam, its editorial pages expressed great optimism about peace prospects in Asia at the 
end of 1968.140 The Post was not too impressed by Beijing’s proposal at first when it placed the 
story on page sixteen and did not read too much meaning from the Chinese statement. In 
December, it changed to argue that it was amazing that the United States was “wooed” by both 
Beijing and Moscow.141 
Of the three TV networks, only CBS reported the Chinese story in the evening news of 
that day. It put the story at the end of a clip showing the recent activities of the president-elect 
Richard Nixon, whose foreign policy advisor Robert Murphy was reported as saying that he was 
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139 PD, November 27, 1968, 5. For previous statements, see PD, April 25, 1965, 5; July 2, 1965, 4; 
September 17, 1965, 4; December 17, 1965, 4; January 27, 1967, 5.  
140 NYT, November 27, 1968, 1; November 29, 1968, 44; December 1, 1969, E1; December 22, 1968, E10.  
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“pleased but not excited” about the Chinese offer to talk.142 ABC reported the news a week later, 
claiming that change in the Chinese attitude might be an opportunity for Nixon to make 
concessions in his China policy.143 NBC reporting came out three weeks later after it had time to 
weigh the significance of the Chinese announcement. While showing the film of Mao’s recent 
meeting with the Pakistani president, the anchor said that Mao wanted to test the temper of 
Nixon by using the “five principles of coexistence,” which could have been condemned as “rank 
revisionism” a year ago. It concluded that Nixon was the “first beneficiary of the Cultural 
Revolution.”144 
Of the two newsweeklies, Henry Luce’s Time described the signals from Beijing as 
“erratic, vague and contradictory,” but it acknowledged them as a positive sign that China’s 
relations with the world could expect to become “more rational and more flexible.” Newsweek 
did not cover the Chinese call for talks until February of the next year.145 It took U.S. media 
several weeks to gradually dwell upon the positive significance of the Chinese call for the 
renewal of the Warsaw talks. As is often the case, the evaluation of the Times may have exerted 
some impact on the others.  
The Johnson administration responded to the Chinese offer with restrained optimism. In 
his memo to National Security Advisor Walt Rostow, Alfred Jenkins argued that he did not 
believe it was much of an “invitation for rapprochement.” He thought it was probably a signal of 
Beijing’s “readiness” to listen to any interesting change in policy from the new administration. 
Rostow and Dean Rusk recommended that President Johnson approve a change in trade 
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142 CBS Evening News, November 27, 1968, Vanderbilt Television News Archive, Record #: 198589. (All 
newscasts are hereafter cited in the format network, date, record number. All are accessible at Vanderbilt Television 
News Archive in Nashville, TN). 
143 ABC Evening News, December 3, 1969, Record #: 1115. 
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regulations and permit U.S. subsidiaries abroad to sell a limited range of non-strategic goods to 
China. Rusk believed that this change was a useful move prior to the scheduled meeting with the 
Chinese in Warsaw. Rostow thought that they could set up a “modest precedent” that Nixon 
could either follow or ignore, but it would reduce the significance if Nixon initiated it.146 The 
Johnson administration ended up leaving the initiative to Nixon. 
Conclusion 
As this chapter indicates, the Cultural Revolution became a “watershed” in Sino-
American relations.147 While the U.S. escalation in Vietnam caused the Johnson administration 
to cautiously reduce tensions with China through tentative bridge-building gestures, the Cultural 
Revolution witnessed the dramatic escalation of Sino-Soviet tension and the open rift between 
Beijing and Hanoi. What came out of the chaos was an international environment that favored a 
better relationship between China and the United States. 
During the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese media promoted Beijing’s image as a fighter 
against both “American imperialists” and “Soviet revisionists” in order to inspire the struggle 
against Mao’s political enemies. The contrast between Chinese words and deeds shows that 
Beijing did not if ever want to fight either of the superpowers while China was in a state of 
turmoil. The Chinese media played an important role in provoking the Soviet Union and 
intensifying the Sino-Soviet polemics. As they continued in their ideological invectives against 
the United States, the Chinese media displayed Beijing’s slight of Washington by repeatedly 
delaying the already reduced contact in Warsaw. In order to defend China’s revolutionary 
credentials and to dispel the “rumor” of its “understanding” with Washington in Vietnam, they 
eagerly took advantage of the propaganda value of the “conflicts” between the two countries in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
146 FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XXX, China, Documents 330, 336. 
147 Lumbers, Piercing the Bamboo Curtain, 202. 
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the high seas as well as along the Chinese border. Their attacks on the “U.S. aggression” usually 
served the additional purpose of embarrassing the Soviet Union when it constantly labeled 
Moscow as the “number-one accomplice” of the United States. 
With the start of the Paris talks in May and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 
August 1968, Chinese media demonstrated Beijing’s unhappiness with Hanoi and its increasing 
concern with the Soviet Union as a strategic threat. As the importance of Vietnam declined, the 
Soviet Union first equaled, and then replaced the United States as the primary threat to China in 
the media. 
While the Johnson administration refrained from making public comments on the 
domestic politics of China, U.S. media’s penchant for drama caused them to cover the power 
struggles and Red Guard violence in China prominently. These stories unavoidably caused the 
decline of China’s image among the American audience. Due to the lack of access to China and 
their simplified reading of the Chinese propaganda, U.S. journalists tended to over-simplify the 
situation in China and to project their own wishful thinking on the Chinese reality. Their 
coverage of the resistance to the Cultural Revolution, however, suggested the weakness of Mao’s 
control and shattered the myth of a united Chinese leadership. Despite the chaos in China, some 
commentators persisted in criticizing the government’s rigidity and pushed for a more flexible 
policy. The chronic violence in China, in turn, shattered the optimism for improved Sino-
American relations.  
In comparison to their coverage of Chinese domestic politics, U.S. media were more 
accurate in assessing China’s international environment, especially the Sino-Soviet and Sino-
North Vietnamese rifts. The seriousness of the Sino-Soviet split discussed in the media 
encouraged those who were concerned with Sino-American relations to think more seriously 
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about exploiting the rift, even though the lame-duck Johnson team did not move in that direction. 
Accounts of the rift between Beijing and Hanoi described Beijing’s reduced role in Vietnam. 
Essentially, U.S. media pictured a disorganized and greatly weakened China with deep domestic 
as well as international troubles, which made it less likely to intervene in Vietnam. At the end of 
1968 when Beijing offered to renew contacts in Warsaw, U.S. media were looking for a more 
promising Sino-American relationship in the coming Nixon administration. 
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Chapter 4: The Sino-Soviet Crisis: “Danger and Opportunity” in 1969 
The year 1969 witnessed the opportunity for a thaw in Sino-American relations. When 
Richard Nixon came into office, he faced much more favorable domestic and international 
environments than Lyndon Johnson had in dealing with China. Not only had the China Lobby 
been severely weakened, but China entered into a period of stability when the Ninth Congress of 
the CCP put an end to the most radical stage of the Cultural Revolution. Moreover, Beijing had 
openly expressed its desire to renew talks through the Warsaw channel. Most important of all, 
the Sino-Soviet tensions suddenly intensified and turned into military conflicts. In the Chinese 
language, the word for “crisis”--weiji--has two characters: “danger” and “opportunity.”1 The 
crisis not only brought about the “danger” of large-scale war between the two Communist giants, 
but also provided an “opportunity” for Washington and Beijing to move closer. 
This chapter looks at how U.S. media responded to the Sino-Soviet crises and especially 
how they dealt with the prospect of Sino-American accommodation in the new context. It also 
studies the media’s role when Nixon sent clear signals to Beijing about the American intention to 
improve relations. Also, by looking at the performance of the Chinese media, this chapter 
examines how Beijing reconsidered its policy and moved slowly toward Sino-American 
reconciliation. 
Abortion of the Warsaw Talks 
On January 20, 1969, Richard Nixon was inaugurated as the 37th president of the United 
States. He was faced with an opportunity to improve Sino-American relations because the 
previous November Beijing had offered to renew talks in Warsaw. Beijing stated, “We totally 
understand your proposal because the new president is coming into office. And it would be easier !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Nixon also liked using these two characters defining “crisis,” as in his book Six Crises. See Life, April 30, 
1971, 4.  
!!
108!
for you to make decision by the time we meet next time when the new president would have 
been in office for a month.”2 This statement was seen as a gesture to the incoming Richard Nixon 
for improved Sino-American relations.3  
Chinese media did not assign too much importance to Nixon’s inauguration. For a week, 
the People’s Daily kept it off the front pages without publishing any major editorial comments 
against the American president. It reported only a few demonstrations in Washington, D.C. and a 
small one in Austria in the interior pages.4  
A week later, a campaign against Nixon suddenly started in the Chinese media when the 
People’s Daily and Red Flag published a joint editorial “A Confession in an Impasse: Comments 
on Nixon’s Inaugural Address and the Shameless Flattering of the Soviet Revisionists.” It 
depicted American “monopoly capitalism” as a “failing, yet brutal and aggressive system over 
which Nixon presided as a frightened ineffectual front man.” Mocking Nixon’s peace proposal as 
a “façade for further aggression,” it claimed that he was “beset with difficulties at home and 
abroad” and that he would “not fare any better than his predecessor.” In the following days, the 
Party organ published many stories about how Chinese workers and soldiers who, upon learning 
of the editorial, swore to repudiate Nixon and the Soviet Union. Many of these articles used titles 
with personal invectives against Nixon such as, “Let Nixon’s ‘Benevolent Rule’ Go to Hell!” 
“Dump Nixon into the Trash of History!” “Get Rid of Nixon’s Junk of Ideas.” To highlight the 
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importance of the editorial, the newspaper even reported that organizations in Japan and Africa 
had expressed their support after reading it.5 
One may wonder why Beijing waited for one week before it started the media campaign 
against Nixon. A probable reason was that Liao Heshu, the chargé d'affaires of the Chinese 
embassy in the Netherlands, had defected on January 24 before seeking asylum in the United 
States.6 Before Liao’s defection was known to the world, China might have started the campaign 
to show that it was not compelled to do so.  
Beijing remained silent on Liao’s defection until February 4, when the State Department 
announced that he had been admitted to the United States.7 In response, the People’s Daily 
published Beijing’s strong protest, attacking Washington for “deliberately engineering” the 
serious anti-China incident in collusion with its “little flunky” the Dutch government. It claimed 
that the incident showed that Nixon and his predecessor Lyndon Johnson were “jackals from the 
same den” in terms of their hostility toward China. What was notable about the statement was 
the line that the Chinese representative at Warsaw had filed a strong protest to American 
Ambassador to Poland Walter Stoessel, demanding Liao be handed back, or the United States 
would have to “bear any serious consequences” it caused.8 This was unusual because Beijing had 
never before publicly announced its protest through the Warsaw channel even when U.S. 
bombing had caused Chinese casualties. The statement threw a cloud over the coming Warsaw 
meeting. On February 18, two days before the scheduled meeting, the Chinese Foreign Ministry 
announced the decision to back out, stating that the “undeniable crime” of the United States 
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5 Ibid., January 28, 1969, 1; January 29, 1969, 5; January 31, 1969, 5; February 1, 1969, 5; February 2, 
1965, 5; February 3, 1969, 6.  
6 NYT, February 5, 1969, 1; For the statement of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, see PD, February 7, 1969, 6. 
7 NYT, February 5, 1969, 1.  
8 PD, February 7, 1969, 6. 
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against China in inciting Liao’s defection rendered the atmosphere “unsuitable” for diplomatic 
talks.9  
Washington did not expect that the defector incident could have caused Beijing to cancel 
the meeting because Chinese officials had still come to Warsaw in a similar case in 1966. 
Moreover, when Stoessel inquired of the Chinese whether the official meeting could be held in 
either the U.S. or Chinese embassies, they responded on February 5, the day after Washington 
announced the defection, and said that the meeting should be held at the usual venue. Stoessel 
described the atmosphere of their brief discussion as “relaxed and pleasant.” As for the Chinese 
protest, a State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) report claimed to have 
found a departure from its standard accusations against Lyndon Johnson because it had not 
accused Nixon of wanting to “wage war on China” or using Vietnam to threaten its security. INR 
concluded that these “significant holes in Beijing’s propaganda” suggested its willingness to give 
Nixon a chance.10 Another sign of Washington’s failure to see any indication of the Chinese 
cancellation was that National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger still sent a memo to Nixon 
making recommendations about the coming Warsaw talks as late as February 12. INR interpreted 
Beijing’s abrupt decision as the “latest and most striking evidence of disagreement and 
indecision at the highest levels of the Chinese leadership.”11  
While U.S. media were still talking about Chinese moderation signaled by its calling for 
the renewal of the Warsaw talks, their sudden cancellation was shocking. The networks reported 
the Chinese announcement that emphasized the defection. The Post blamed China for cutting the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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tie, alleging that it seemed to be “less interested in being accepted” into the international society 
than in “reasserting its traditional role as the great power, paid tribute to by countries nearby.” 
Newsweek quoted a China specialist who described Washington as an “innocent victim” of 
Beijing’s leadership problems.12 
With many first-rate China watchers, like Tillman Durdin who headed its Hong Kong 
bureau, the Times was probably the least shocked because it had sensed bad omens from the 
Chinese media in the past. When Beijing started the campaign against Nixon a week after his 
inauguration, the Times interpreted it as a “calculated blow at détente with the United States” 
because the attacks had been withheld for several weeks. It thus suggested that the outlook for 
the Warsaw meeting on February 20 would be “less favorable.” Moreover, when Washington 
announced Liao’s defection, the Times had displayed its worry that the announcement might 
become a source of “potential diplomatic embarrassment” for the two governments. On the 
Chinese cancellation, the Times not only talked about the possible leadership problems in 
Beijing, but also criticized the Nixon administration for the lack of initiatives toward China. 
Along with the Post, it argued that the U.S. government should not limit itself to the Warsaw 
channel in seeking accommodation with China.13 
Though Beijing cancelled the Warsaw meeting, there were signs of flexibility in the 
Chinese media. One noticeable thing that escaped U.S. media’s attention was that the People’s 
Daily published the full text of Nixon’s inaugural speech in the same issue as the joint editorial. 
What was more interesting was that other major newspapers all over China, following the 
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general practice during the Cultural Revolution of reprinting the editorials of the People’s Daily, 
also published Nixon’s address. This was unprecedented in the history of the PRC.14 There was 
evidence that Mao had personally ordered the publication of Nixon’s address. When editors of 
the People’s Daily and Red Flag sent their editorials to Mao for approval, his instruction was: 
“Publish the article as it is. Nixon’s [inaugural] speech should also be published.”15  
Nixon did not specifically mention China in his inaugural address, but his meaning was 
not hard to perceive when he stated, “Let all nations know that during this administration our 
lines of communication will be open. We seek an open world--open to ideas, open to the 
exchange of goods and people--a world in which no people, great or small, will live in angry 
isolation.”16 Mao’s head nurse Wu Xujun said that Mao, who had been impressed by the line, 
asked her to keep it in mind.17 The phrase “angry isolation” echoed Nixon’s 1967 Foreign 
Affairs article in which he famously stated, “We simply cannot afford to leave China forever 
outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its 
neighbors. There is no place on this small planet for a billion of its potentially most able people 
to live in angry isolation.” In that article, Nixon also predicted that China had the potential to 
become one of the five major power centers of the world.18 There is evidence that Mao not only 
had read the article, but also had shown it to Zhou Enlai. When Senate Majority leader Mike !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 238. 
See also PD, January 28, 1969, 5. 
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18 Nixon, “Asia after Viet Nam,” Foreign Affairs vol. 46, no. 1 (October 1967), 121, 119. 
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Mansfield (D-MT) visited China in 1972, Zhou told him, “It is Chairman Mao’s decision to open 
up Sino-U.S. relations. Actually, he has read an article written by Nixon before he won the 
presidential election in 1968.”19 Mao might have inferred from the article a possible change in 
U.S. China policy if Nixon were elected president. 
Nobody knows for certain Mao’s motives. Chen Jian argues that Mao might have ordered 
the publication of the address to reveal that “he had noticed Nixon’s message.”20 Mao might 
have had other considerations. While brainstorming on Sino-American relations, he might have 
wanted to keep different options open by letting the Chinese people know about Nixon’s original 
meaning. It might also be his direct message to the American president.  
Another sign of Chinese flexibility was reflected in how the People’s Daily treated 
Nixon’s first press conference on January 27. When asked about his China policy, Nixon said his 
administration would “continue to oppose Communist China’s admission to the United Nations.” 
Among the reasons, he cited the Chinese lack of interest in joining the UN, its refusing to abide 
by the U.N. Charter, and its insistence on the expulsion of Taiwan, which Nixon described as a 
“responsible member of the international community.” Though he expressed interest in what 
China had to say at the next Warsaw meeting, Nixon concluded that he saw “no immediate 
prospect of any change” in U.S. policy “until some changes occur on their side.”21  
Nixon’s remarks about China, as Newsweek commented, could have been “eagerly cited 
as proof of America’s evil intentions” a year earlier. In an editorial “Coolness to China,” the 
Times called it the “the most disappointing section” of his press conference as he chose to ignore 
the fact that the Chinese initiative in calling for the Warsaw talks was itself a change of its earlier 
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Re-examining the Cold War, 332, 465note28. 
20 Chen, Mao's China and the Cold War, 238-9. 
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stance.22 Interestingly, neither the People’s Daily nor the Reference News cited these lines in 
their coverage of the conference. Headlines of the People’s Daily gave more priority to 
criticizing the Soviet Union for “shamelessly flattering” Nixon and “colluding” with him.23 
Beijing displayed a keen interest in the relations between Washington and Moscow.  
After Nixon’s inauguration, the Chinese media sent conflicting signals. Although Beijing 
launched the media campaign against Nixon, the lack of “teeth” in those invectives showed that 
Chinese leaders might not have wanted to completely shut the door on him. At best, the media 
inconsistencies demonstrated that they were not ready for dealing with the United States. Its 
sudden lack of interest in talking also had the effect of testing the Nixon administration’s 
intentions towards China.  
Eruption of Sino-Soviet Border Clashes 
Even though the initial probing between Washington and Beijing failed, the eruption of 
Sino-Soviet military conflicts provided an opportunity for the two sides to make bolder moves 
toward each other. The fighting that broke out on March 2, 1969 was a culmination of Sino-
Soviet border tensions that had been brewing for years, especially over two small islands, 
Zhenbao and Qiliqin, on the Wusuli (Ussuri) River. According to A. Ielizavetin, a Soviet 
diplomat then in Beijing, his embassy had proposed several times that the Soviet border forces 
should “attack and repulse” the Chinese patrol units on the islands. The most serious incident 
occurred on January 5, 1968, when a group of Soviet armored vehicles attacked Chinese working 
on Qilinqin Island and killed four. The Soviets moderated their actions upon strong protests from 
Beijing. In the wake of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the CCP’s twelfth Plenum in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Newsweek, February 10, 1969, 44. The Post pointed out that Nixon’s position might let down Americans 
who longed for Washington’s flexibility, but that it might “sweeten” the Russians who were worried that he may 
immediately “play the China card.” Washington Post (hereafter as WP), January 28, 1969, A14.  
23 PD, January 21, 1969, 5; January 22, 1969, 6; January 29, 1969, 6; February 3, 1969, 6; February 8, 1969, 
5; February 18, 1969, 6. 
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the second half of 1968, tensions rose sharply in this area. Between December 1968 and 
February 1969, several incidents occurred where Soviet armored vehicles landed on Zhenbao 
Island and its soldiers beat up Chinese soldiers with sticks or caused injuries by other means. 
After careful preparations, Beijing authorized its border troops to teach the Soviets a “bitter 
lesson.” On March 2 and 15, they inflicted heavy casualties on Soviet forces in the two battles at 
Zhenbao Island. When clashes broke out, neither China nor the Soviet Union seemed to be 
considering a large-scale war. Soviet leaders did not even change their foreign visit itinerary 
upon learning of the first clash. After the second battle on March 15, Mao’s order was “We 
should stop here. Do not fight any more.”24 !
In their immediate response, the Times and the Post were both surprised not by the 
fighting but by the fact that it was promptly announced by both governments. They knew there 
had been skirmishes along the border for years, but Beijing and Moscow had either denied 
unofficial reports of border incidents or dismissed them with vague references. The Post said that 
the conflict was “important for being announced as for being fought.” The Times claimed that 
territorial issue was only a “sidelight” that can be turned on or off as the overall climate 
changed.25 Time claimed that China had put its border clash with Russia to use “in a new 
domestic campaign” similar to the Great Leap Forward.26 Giving equal coverage to the Soviet 
and Chinese versions of the battle, the diplomatic notes and domestic reaction from both sides, 
the background provided by both sides and their explanations of their motives, Newsweek left the 
readers to decide who was right.27 
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The three networks used Soviet-provided film showing the memorial service for fallen 
Soviet soldiers and Chinese border guards violently waving Mao’s Red Books and shouting in 
the face of Soviet guards. To add to the sensation, they all quoted the Soviet Foreign Ministry 
announcement that the Chinese had mutilated dead Soviet soldiers with bayonets.28 The overall 
impression was, of course, that the Chinese were more provocative than the Soviets.  
From the exchange of words between Beijing and Moscow, U.S. media found the 
atmosphere was not that intense. Even in the Soviet-provided film, some Russian civilians, 
though shouting slogans, did not look furious but relaxed and some were even smiling. ABC 
reporter Irv Chapman described the atmosphere as overall “good-humored.” The Times claimed 
that the banners and shouts of the marchers brought forth by cheerleaders in loudspeaker trucks 
in Moscow were in contrast with “the gay comportment” of many demonstrators. It described the 
crowd in Beijing, many of them women or schoolchildren, as more relaxed and less threatening 
than the protest meetings by the Red Guards during the heyday of the Cultural Revolution. The 
Post depicted the Soviet demonstrators as “restrained” when they passed the Chinese embassy in 
an “orderly fashion, six abreast.”29 By contrasting the official fury with the relaxation of the 
protestors, U.S. media seemed to be mocking the two governments for staging the 
demonstrations.  
Between April 1 and 24 in 1969, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) convened its Ninth 
National Congress. At the 12th plenum of the 8th Congress that convened the previous October, 
Mao had said that the Cultural Revolution would probably last three years and might end in the 
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summer of 1969.30 Even though Mao never officially declared the ending of the Cultural 
Revolution, with the dissolution of the Cultural Revolution Leading Group and the restoration of 
power to the Politburo, its most radical stage had ended.31 
At the Ninth Congress, leaders did not seem to show too much concern about the border 
clashes either. Though Lin Biao condemned the Soviet Union in his official report, he stated that 
the Chinese government was considering the Soviet request for negotiation. Mao talked about 
preparing for war, but mainly in a “spiritual sense,” which was not different from his position 
since the early 1960s. He did not demand special material mobilization or extra alerts to deal 
with the Sino-Soviet conflict.32 After the eruption of the Sino-Soviet conflict, Mao told his head 
nurse Wu Xujun, “Now that China is fighting against the Soviet Union, it provides an excellent 
topic for the Americans to write a good essay.”33 Mao’s words might not be sufficient evidence 
to show that he started the conflicts for Nixon to act. At least, they suggest that he was well 
aware of the opportunity for Washington and Sino-American rapprochement. 
What was noticeable was that in the March/April joint issue of Red Flag, the editorial 
“About Summing up Experience” was placed in front of another one attacking the Soviet Union 
for the border clashes. It declared that the Cultural Revolution had achieved its “great and 
decisive” victory and called on citizens to work harder in the “fronts of industry, agriculture and 
education.” 34  This editorial, along with another one entitled “Make Revolution, Promote 
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Production and Win New Victory in the Industrial Front,” both reprinted in the People’s Daily, 
reflected the shift of China’s focus from “revolution” to “production.” Its placement suggested 
that for the leadership in Beijing, reorganization of the Party and the shift of its focus were more 
important than the conflict with the Soviet Union at the time.!
As the Ninth Congress was the first major meeting of the CCP in thirteen years and it was 
announced in the 1969 New Year’s joint editorial of the People’s Daily, Red Flag and the PLA 
Daily, U.S. media were well aware of its importance. At the beginning of the year, the Times and 
the Post had managed to obtain the draft of the new Party Constitution circulating at the 
provincial level.35 When the congress started, they observed on their front pages that it would put 
an end to Mao’s Cultural Revolution. Newsweek argued the fact that “military men and career 
bureaucrats” were the majority in China’s top ruling organs was a sign of moderation in Chinese 
domestic policy. Time viewed the Ninth Congress as “China’s search for stability,” arguing “the 
fact that the congress was convened at all showed that Mao had made at least some progress 
toward domestic peace.”36 
With the general impression that the Ninth Congress would bring stability to China, some 
U.S. news agencies began to dwell on its significance for Sino-American relations. In an article 
headlined “Washington Hopes Peking Meeting Leads to Talks with U.S.,” the Times shrewdly 
referred to an ongoing China policy review headed by Henry Kissinger as “disclosed” by U.S. 
officials and Secretary of State William Rogers’ recent remark to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee that the Ninth Congress “might result in the formulation of new policies setting the 
course for China’s future developments.” NBC went even further than the Times. After reporting 
Rogers’s statement that the United States would not exploit Sino-Soviet troubles and that it !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 WP, January 2, 1969, A1; NYT, January 4, 1969, 1. 
36 WP, April 2, 1969, A1; NYT, April 2, 1969, 1; Newsweek, April 14, 1969, 60; Time, April 11, 1969, 30. 
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wanted better relations with both countries, the anchor said that the CCP’s Ninth Congress might 
result in a “softer” China policy and that “diplomatic gossip” in East Europe about US-China 
warming-up gave the Russians “sleepless nights.”37 Although Rogers’ statement gave the 
impression of American neutrality, the anchor’s comments pointed toward better relations with 
China, because of the Sino-Soviet conflict. 
The NBC story is a typical example where U.S. media tilted toward China when the 
government assumed neutrality on the Sino-Soviet conflict. In covering the fighting, U.S. media 
generally described the Soviets as more aggressive than the Chinese and many of them argued 
that the current trouble between the two Communist giants provided a good opportunity for 
Washington to improve relations with Beijing. The Post’s editorial followed the line of Stephen 
Rosenfeld, former chief of the Post’s Moscow bureau, who argued that the United States should 
avoid exploiting the Sino-Soviet trouble and develop close relations with both. Stanley Karnow, 
the Post’s main China watcher in Hong Kong, however, advocated tilting toward Beijing when 
he described the Soviets as more threatening, as seen in “Moscow is Strident: China Tones Down 
Trouble on Border” in his front-page article and “Soviet Anti-Chinese Blasts Provide Openings 
for U.S.” for his column. The Post featured a headline “Chinese Threat Obsesses Table-
Pounding Brezhnev” to refer to the Soviet leader’s performance at the Warsaw Pact countries.38 
In “Rethinking China policy,” Time pointed out that China had been involved “less 
dramatically outside its borders than the Soviet Union” and concluded that “with the passing of 
monolithic Communism, interesting possibilities open up for U.S. diplomacy and the case for 
change in U.S. policy is powerful.” Newsweek argued that if the Russians won the war against 
China, it would dramatically change the “the international balance of power” to the disadvantage !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 NYT, April 2, 1969, 16; NBC Evening News, April 7, 1969, Record #: 445420. 
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of the United States and would cause deeper suspicion and animosity in Soviet-American 
relations than those that prevailed during the worst of the Cold War.39  
On its editorial page, the Times reprinted a speech of former White House counsel 
Theodore Sorensen, who presented evidence to show that Beijing was more hostile in words but 
Moscow was more threatening in deeds.40 Sorensen made his address at the National Committee 
on United States-China Relations conference on March 20, chaired by Edwin O. Reischauer of 
Harvard, former Ambassador to Japan and A. Doak Barnett. It attracted prominent media 
coverage due to the attendance of Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA), who in his keynote address 
called for a “sweeping change” of America’s China policy in the context of Sino-Soviet 
conflicts. After reporting Kennedy’s speech on their front pages, the Times and the Post ran 
additional stories about how China specialists praised his proposal. In a NBC telecast, the anchor 
started with, “however improbable it may seem, the United States and China might have an 
understanding.” He then explained that when the New York liberals met to talk about China 
policy, Russia’s New Time condemned the meeting because it seemed to “coincide with” the 
Chinese attack. When he pointed out that the meeting had been planned a year earlier, it may 
have been a blow to the Soviet accusation.41  
As with the Fulbright Hearings three years earlier, the media appeared to be again 
working with academics and Congress to push for a reform in China policy. In covering the 
Sino-Soviet conflicts, U.S. media, unlike the U.S. government, did not have to worry about 
upsetting the Soviet Union when they openly talked about moving closer to China. They helped 
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the government educate the public by elaborating on something it might want to do, but was 
otherwise unable to state explicitly.  
The Four Marshals’ Reports 
The Ninth Congress of the CCP in April not only ended the most radical stage of the 
Cultural Revolution, but also marked a watershed in China’s foreign relations. In its wake, 
Beijing began to normalize its diplomatic activities by sending out its diplomats again.42 As early 
as January 1969, the Times had obtained information that a leading tailor shop in Beijing was 
busy making suits for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, which it interpreted as a sign that Beijing 
was “contemplating a more active role in foreign affairs.”43 In order to improve relations with 
other countries, Beijing invited several foreign envoys to join Mao and other Chinese leaders for 
the May Day celebration at the Tiananmen rostrum.44  
The most significant event after the Ninth Congress was the review of China’s foreign 
relations by four highly esteemed marshals: Chen Yi, Ye Jianying, Xu Xiangqian, and Nie 
Rongzhen, who had been sidelined because of their complaints about the Red Guard violence in 
the “February Reverse Current” incident in 1967. When Lin Biao was officially designated as 
Mao’s successor at the Ninth Congress, his followers and radicals headed by Mao’s wife Jiang 
Qing won most of the key positions in the central leadership. In order to counterbalance their 
power, however, Mao inserted several veteran civilian and military officials into the party 
leadership. Even though the four marshals had lost their power to control the military, they 
retained some sort of influence because all of them entered the Central Committee and kept their 
positions as the vice chairmen of the Central Military Committee at the Ninth Congress. Marshal !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 Ma Jisen, The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China (Hong Kong: Chinese University 
Press, 2004), 320. 
43 NYT, January 4, 1969, 4. 
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Ye Jianying even entered the Politburo.45 Ye would play an active role in the Sino-American 
talks after Kissinger’s secret visit to China in 1971.!
Under the instructions of Mao, Zhou Enlai asked the four marshals, who were “studying” 
at factories in the suburb of Beijing, to meet from time to time and discuss current international 
affairs. Zhou encouraged them not to limit themselves to conventional thinking in their analyses 
and said that he would pass on their reports to the chairman. Zhou also assigned Xiong Xianghui, 
a spy during the Chinese Civil War and the former chargé d'affaires to the United Kingdom, who 
later acted as his aide in talks with Kissinger, to assist the marshals with English materials.!
Between June 7 and July 10, the four marshals met six times and talked in total for nineteen 
hours about the international situation, especially about the triangular relations among China, the 
United States and the Soviet Union."#!$%! &'()! **+! ,-.! /0'1! 2314-3(4! 4'526,,.7! ,-.61! /614,! 1.801,9! As they argued, even 
though the United States and the Soviet Union collaborated with each other, their hostilities 
toward each other were fiercer than before. They explicitly pointed out that the Soviet Union 
posed a more serious threat to the security of China than the United States. While they 
discounted the possibility that Washington and Moscow would start a large-scale war against 
China, either jointly or separately, they recommended that China should “postpone” the conflict 
with either of them. In terms of China’s overall foreign policy, they recommended the 
enhancement of its offices abroad and the expansion of their diplomatic activities.47!:;;0176%<!,0!=60%<+!the General Office of the CCP distributed their report to leaders of the central authority !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 Xiong Xianghui, Wode waijiao yu qingbao shengya [My Career in Intelligence and Diplomacy] (Beijing: 
Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 1999), 165; Gao Wenqian, Wannian Zhou Enlai [Zhou Enlai’s Later Years] (New 
York: Mirrorbooks, 2003), 407-8. 
46 Xiong, Wode waijiao yu qingbao shengya, 165-71. 
47 “Report by Four Marshalls--Chen Yi, Ye Jianying, Xu Xiangqian, and Nie RongZhen--to the Central 
Committee, ‘a Preliminary Evaluation of the War situation’ (excerpt), (11 July 1969),” in Chen and Wilson, eds., 
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as a party document on July 20.48 The spread of their report reflected Mao’s approval of their 
evaluation of the triangular politics. !
There were some interesting developments in the Chinese media in June and July. 
According to Gao Wenqian, a researcher at CCP Central Party Literature Research Center 
involved in writing the official biographies of Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong after the Cultural 
Revolution, in late June 1969, when Chinese newspapers were about to publish their routine 
editorials attacking the American “invasion” of Taiwan nineteen years earlier, Zhou Enlai at a 
Politburo meeting proposed that the current focus was the struggle against the Soviet Union and 
that attacks on the American invasion of Taiwan should be toned down.49 
Xiong Xianghui pointed out another change in the Chinese media after the congress. As 
he said, even though the report of the congress had described the relations between Washington 
and Moscow as “competing and colluding” with each other, the Chinese official documents and 
the media dropped the Soviet-American “competition” and shifted to highlight the “collusion” 
between them, especially their collusion for anti-China purposes.50 In June and July 1969, 
besides reporting more incidents supposedly started by the Soviet Union, the People’s Daily 
carried several articles charging that the United States and the Soviet Union were collaborating 
with each other or were working with Japan in carrying out activities against China.51 In the past, 
Beijing had attacked the Soviet-American collusion in order to embarrass the Soviet Union and 
serve its domestic purpose. Now its tough rhetoric was a test to see which side the United States 
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would stand on. If Washington did want to improve relations, it had to adopt concrete measures 
to show that it did not want to “collude” with Moscow against China. 
Nixon’s Initiatives in the Summer of 1969 
In evaluating the Ninth Congress, the Nixon administration was not as optimistic as the 
media in finding signs of moderation in Beijing. On April 29, Kissinger submitted to Nixon a 
report prepared by the CIA, the Department of State, and the NSC. Referring to the signs that 
continued “power stalemate” existed in the Chinese leadership and the “denigration” of the 
United States in the party communiqué, Kissinger claimed to have seen “no indication that the 
Chinese leaders intend to become less cautious in avoiding foreign commitments.”52 
What triggered the Nixon administration to take more rigorous initiatives toward Beijing, 
according to Kissinger, was the “heavy-handed” Soviet diplomacy in handling the clashes with 
China. According to him, when he met with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin on March 11, 
1969, the latter told him “passionately” that China was “everybody’s problem.” When Kissinger 
described the encounter to Nixon that evening, the President was intrigued and talked about how 
“unexpected events could have a major effect.” Kissinger then suggested that the United States 
had a chance to “gain a great deal strategically.” In May when new border clashes broke out in 
Xinjiang where the Soviets had much better logistic lines than the Chinese, Kissinger changed 
his perception of their powers and began to think that the Russians were more aggressive. What 
intrigued Washington further was Brezhnev’s proposal of “collective security in Asia” in his 
speech to the International Conference of Communist Parties on June 8, which was obviously 
directed against China. Kissinger reported to Nixon that these signs showed that the growing 
Soviet obsession with the China problem had reached the point that it could be turned to the 
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advantage of the United States. When Nixon read the report, he wrote down the following 
comments on the margin, “This is our goal.”53 
In July and August 1969, through a series of public diplomatic activities and private 
channels, the Nixon administration sent clear signals to Beijing of its intention to improve 
relations. On July 21, 1969, the State Department announced the easing of trade restrictions and 
travel ban on China. The timing of the announcement was based on shrewd calculations. Nixon 
had made the decision in June, but he chose to announce it on the day of his trip to countries that 
included Pakistan and Romania, both of which had friendly relations with China. In so doing, 
Nixon hoped that his policy change would be viewed as a friendly gesture by the Chinese 
leadership. Another reason why the announcement was made in July before the Nixon trip was 
that a delay might force the United States to deal with “unforeseeable situations” such as the 
worsening of the Sino-Soviet border situation. It could “preclude” the announcement and thus 
cause Washington to lose the diplomatic benefits. Also, if Nixon waited to announce the decision 
until he returned from Romania, which was not on good terms with Moscow, it probably would 
be tied in with speculation regarding a “putative anti-Soviet” purpose in the “Bucharest 
stopover.” This would give his decision too much “overt anti-Soviet significance.”54 
Nixon’s decision to relax trade and travel restrictions with China received a variety of 
contradictory comments in U.S. media. ABC praised him for dismantling “the most formidable 
barriers” between the two countries, which showed that he was “really interested” in improving 
relations. An NBC anchor appeared somewhat skeptical. He said that the United States wanted to 
be “somewhat friendlier” to China and that the U.S. policy was not “a warm or loving embrace” 
as the trade restrictions were partly lifted, but not eliminated. He also doubted China would !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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respond. CBS just reported the announcement and did not make further comments on the 
significance of the Nixon policy.55 
Different from TV programs that were limited by time constraints, newspapers have 
enough space to elaborate on the background, significance, and response to a government policy. 
Calling attention to the effective date of the Nixon policy, the Times referred to the recent China 
policy review by the NSC and the endorsement of the policy by Senate majority leader Mike 
Mansfield (D-MT). It concluded that they seemed to signal an “official response to evolving 
attitudes in the United States toward the Chinese, away from the hostile rigidity.”56 While the 
Times placed the story on the front page, the Post assigned it to page twenty, arguing that the 
Nixon move had “greater symbolic meaning” than any practical application that might result 
from the changes. Recalling Nixon’s tough words about China at his first press conference and 
the recent Chinese attack on him, it expressed doubt about the possibility of an open door 
between China and the United States.57 While the Times presented a picture of favorable 
domestic environment for a change of relations, the Post seemed to emphasize the empty half of 
the glass. 
During his trip, Nixon sent public gestures of friendliness to China on several occasions. 
In his informal conversations with the press in Guam on July 25, he announced what would later 
be known as the “Nixon Doctrine,” by which the United States, despite its commitment to honor 
its commitments in Asia, would “look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary 
responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.” He also told the press that China was 
not nearly as effective in exporting revolution as it was five or ten years ago and it was playing a 
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“minimal role” in Vietnam as compared to the Soviet Union.58 Here Nixon was underplaying the 
China threat in comparison to the Soviet Union to justify his move toward Beijing. During his 
private visit to the Pacific area four years earlier, Nixon had declared in Australia that the United 
States should bomb China if it were “so rash as to introduce so-called volunteers [into 
Vietnam].”59 Now Vietnam had declined as a major issue between China and the United States in 
Nixon’s rhetoric.  
Besides public gestures, Nixon also pushed hard through private channels. During his talk 
with Pakistani President Yahya Khan, Nixon told him that the United States wished to see an 
accommodation with China and would appreciate it if Khan’s government would pass on this 
message to Zhou Enlai when the Chinese Premier visited Pakistan. Even though Nixon told 
journalists in Guam that his trip to Romania should “under no circumstances” be interpreted as 
“an affront to the Soviet Union or as a move toward China,” in his conversation with Romanian 
President Nicolae Ceausescu, Nixon said Washington would not join in a Soviet arrangement 
against China in Asia and expressed his hope that Ceausescu would play a “mediating role” 
between Washington and Beijing.60!
Due to China’s friendly relations with Pakistan and Romania, U.S. media alluded to the 
China connection in their coverage of Nixon’s trip to these countries. ABC correctly guessed that 
their leaders might serve as the middlemen between the United States and China. It even reported 
a rumor that Nixon might meet Chinese officials in Romania.61 Both the Times and the Post in 
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their editorials argued that Nixon’s visit to Romania, a dissident in the Communist movement, 
could help the United States open its door to Beijing.62 
During Nixon’s trip, Secretary of State William Rogers also went on a Pacific tour 
visiting Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Australia, and New Zealand to 
explain American policy in Asia, especially its decision to slowly withdraw from Vietnam. On 
his tour, Rogers openly reiterated the willingness of his government to talk to China. While he 
was in Hong Kong, the Post featured on its front page a photo of Rogers playing gulf at a 
countryside lodge three miles from the Chinese border. As the Times reported, Rogers cited the 
recent American effort to lift trade restrictions and criticized China for not responding to it. In 
Australia, Rogers made a major speech declaring that Beijing would “soon” be asked to reopen 
the Warsaw talks.63 !
 The People’s Daily responded to Washington’s overtures with invectives. It attacked 
Nixon’s visit to Asia as a cover for his policy of “aggression and war” and ridiculed his 
withdrawal from Asia as merely a change in tactics to serve the long-term goal to “occupy” Asia. 
It reported several demonstrations in countries Nixon visited with people shouting slogans like 
“Down with Nixon” and “Out with Nixon.” In order to justify the U.S. withdrawal from Asia, 
Nixon had proposed the idea of “collective security” by Asian countries themselves in dealing 
with aggression as part of the “Nixon Doctrine.” The official organ compared it to the Soviet 
proposal of Asian collective security and used them as evidence of Soviet-American “collusion” 
in containing China, listing both as the “worst enemies” to the Asian people.64 !
While the People’s Daily attacked the “evil designs” of the Nixon administration, the 
Reference News fed Chinese cadres at higher-levels undistorted stories of Washington’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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intentions. During the Ninth Congress in April, it reprinted articles introducing the China policy 
review in Washington along with the U.S. hope that the congress would lead to the moderation 
of China. The most notable line was the Agence France-Presse’s comment that there had never 
been such an “advantageous moment” to normalize the U.S.-China relations in the last twenty 
years.65  
When Nixon’s Asian trip was announced in late June, the Reference News carried a story 
claiming that Nixon’s acceptance of Ceausescu’s invitation to visit Romania was aimed at China. 
On its front pages, it not only featured the State Department’s announcement of relaxing trade 
and travel restrictions to China in an article entitled “The United States Put on a ‘Conciliatory’ 
Posture,” but also carried Taiwan’s complaints about Washington’s change in policy. In covering 
Nixon’s meeting with Indonesian President Suharto, it reprinted Indonesian Foreign Minister 
Adam Malik’s remark that “Nixon was not interested” in the Soviet proposal of collective 
security in Asia. It also reported Roger’s statements about Washington’s desire to renew contact 
with Beijing when he visited Hong Kong and Australia.66!>6?0%@4! 8.3;.! 6%6,63,6A.4!B.1.! '%7.14,007!B.((! 6%! C.6D6%<9!On July 16, the Chinese 
captured two American yachtsmen whose lifeboat drifted into Chinese territorial waters close to 
Hong Kong. According to Kissinger, Washington decided not to announce it immediately to see 
if Beijing would use it for anti-U.S. propaganda. When Zhou Enlai learned of the incident, he 
instructed the Foreign Ministry and the Public Safety Ministry to do a thorough investigation and 
to be cautious not to attach political meaning to the captured Americans. The Chinese media, 
under Zhou’s instruction, remained silent on the incident. Beijing released the two Americans on 
July 24 after the U.S. relaxation in trade and travel. Kissinger argued that Zhou Enlai, who had !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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understood the American gesture, also made a move that required no reciprocity from the United 
States.67!
In the Shadow of the War Scare!
As the Nixon administration was sending friendly signals to China, Sino-Soviet military 
conflict suddenly escalated. On August 13, the Soviet armed forces ambushed a unit of Chinese 
border patrol in Xinjiang with superior force consisting of helicopters, tanks and armed vehicles, 
which caused heavy Chinese casualties. After the attack, Moscow gave the impression that it was 
considering a preemptive strike against Chinese nuclear facilities. Besides deploying nuclear 
strike groups along the border, Soviet diplomats also inquired of diplomats from its Eastern 
European allies and the United States about what their response would be if the Soviet Union 
initiated a nuclear attack against China.68 In response, on August 28, the CCP Central Committee 
issued the “Order for General Mobilization in Border Province and Regions.”69  
When war fervor began to increase along the Sino-Soviet border in August 1969, the 
Nixon administration began to seriously consider how to deal with the scenario of a large-scale 
war between China and the Soviet Union. At a NSC meeting on August 14, Nixon stated that it 
was against the interests of the United States to let China be “smashed” in a Sino-Soviet war. His 
view was in line with Kissinger’s, who had pointed out that history had shown that it was better 
to align with the weaker, not the stronger of two antagonistic powers, when some Russian 
experts expressed concern that better relations with China might ruin those with the Soviet Union 
at an earlier NSC meeting in May.70 The administration ended up excluding the option of siding 
with the Soviet Union and focused on only two options: “impartiality” and “shading” toward !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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China. A NSC memo concluded that trying to be “even-handed and impartial or neutral” when 
China was attacked would be “tantamount to supporting the USSR.” However, an open partiality 
toward China might cause dramatic reaction from the Soviet Union and hurt the arms reduction 
talks. So the memo recommended Washington maintain public impartiality and at the same time 
give a strong signal that it would not encourage a Soviet nuclear attack on China.71  
In a speech at the 65th annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in 
Baltimore on September 5, Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson made what was 
considered Washington’s first official statement on the Sino-Soviet conflict. After explaining the 
U.S. position to associate with neither side against the other, he said, “We are not going to let 
Communist Chinese invective deter us from seeking agreements with the Soviet Union. 
Conversely, we are not going to let the Soviet apprehensions prevent us from attempting to bring 
China out of its angry, alienated shell.”72 The next day, the Times featured a headline “Nixon 
Aide Affirms U.S. Will Press for China Ties,” which only published the statement “we are not 
going to let the Soviet apprehensions prevent us from attempting to bring China out of its angry, 
alienated shell,” omitting his remarks about Washington seeking agreements with the Soviet 
Union. Essentially it rendered what appeared to be a neutral statement of the government into an 
official bias toward China. The Post headline in contrast, used the title “Keep Peace, U.S. 
cautions China, Soviet.” which claimed that Richardson’s statement was the “first high level 
public admonition to the Soviet Union and China not to breach the peace of the world.” 73 The 
Post gave the impression that the United States assumed the moral high ground over the Sino-
Soviet conflicts and adopted a tough policy toward both of them. The agenda of improving 
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relations with either of them was underplayed. For some reason, the newsweeklies and the 
nightly newscasts ignored Richardson’s statement. 
Kissinger argues that Richardson’s statement was a “revolutionary step” for the U.S. 
government when it publicly warned against a threat to China, a country that had been hostile to 
the United States and with which it had no communication since Nixon took office. In his memo 
to Kissinger on October 8, NSC staffer John Holdridge suggested calling the Chinese attention to 
Richardson’s statement as part of the U.S. overtures.74 Actually, the Reference News reprinted 
the full text of Richardson’s statement,75 which might have impressed leaders in Beijing.  
While fears of a full-scale war between China and the Soviet Union were increasing, 
Soviet premier Aleksei Kosygin suddenly stopped at the Beijing airport on September 11 to meet 
with Zhou Enlai on his way back from the funeral of Ho Chi Minh. After the meeting, Tass 
declared “the two sides openly explained their positions and held a conversation useful for both 
sides.” The People’s Daily published a terse statement, declaring that the two premiers had met 
and engaged in a “frank” conversation. 76  According to Gao Wenqian, in drafting the 
announcement of the Zhou-Kosygin meeting, Moscow had used several positives adjectives such 
as “comradely” and “friendly” to create the impression that the Sino-Soviet tensions had been 
relieved. However, Zhou Enlai crossed them out when he received the Soviet draft and only 
retained the word “frank.”77 Even though Zhou Enlai made an effort to reduce tensions, the cold 
atmosphere between Beijing and Moscow still left the door open for the Nixon administration to 
approach China.  
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U.S. media expressed great “astonishment” upon learning of the Zhou-Kosygin meeting. 
All three networks made the news one of their lead stories. NBC used “enigmatic” in describing 
the behavior of the Chinese and the Russians.78 Both the Times and the Post read from the 
Russian statement of “useful” and the Chinese statement of “frank” as signs that no substantial 
progress was achieved at the talk. In their editorial pages, while the Post was skeptical that the 
Sino-Soviet war had been avoided, the Times interpreted the meeting as a sign that “the tension 
had been eased” and suggested those observers who had been predicting an imminent war to 
“take another look.”79 
Even though the Kosygin-Zhou meeting relaxed the “extreme tension” between China 
and the Soviet Union, it did not relieve Beijing’s suspicion of a Soviet surprise attack.80 The 
pressure from Moscow had the potential of pushing Beijing further toward Washington. On 
September 17, the four marshals, who had read reports of Nixon’s recent initiatives and the 
minutes of the Zhou-Kosygin meeting, submitted another report. They proposed that China use 
negotiation as a tactic and wage “a tit-for-tat struggle” against Moscow and Washington since 
they were both trying to exploit the other two countries in order to gain strategic advantages. 
Besides agreeing on the Soviet requests for negotiation on border issues, they suggested 
responding “positively” to the American request for resuming the Warsaw talks when the 
“timing is proper.” Marshal Chen Yi, the Foreign Minister who had lost his actual power, 
submitted a separate report to present his “wild” thoughts about how to pursue a “breakthrough” 
in the Sino-American relations. He recommended that at Warsaw China should take the initiative 
to propose talks at the ministerial level or even higher without raising prerequisites and that the 
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Taiwan question could be gradually solved by talks at higher levels.81 Nobody can tell for certain 
whether Mao followed the suggestions of the marshals. At least they provided perspectives and 
some legitimacy for Mao if he was thinking about moving in the same direction. More 
importantly, the articulation of Sino-American rapprochement by the four marshals itself shows 
that this concept was no longer a taboo among the top leadership. When Sino-American talks 
were renewed in early 1970, things developed just as Marshal Chen had proposed. 
The Zhou-Kosygin meeting did not eliminate Beijing’s worry. Some people thought that 
Kosygin’s Beijing trip might be a smokescreen for a Soviet surprise attack. On September 17, 
the People’s Daily published twenty-nine slogans for the National Day celebration. The twenty-
second slogan called on people of the world to “oppose the invasion started by any imperialist or 
socialist imperialist powers, especially nuclear wars” and asked the people to “be prepared right 
now.” The next day, it ran an editorial pointing out that the twenty-second slogan was a “great 
order of mobilization with profound strategic significance.”82 
After the publication of the “great order of mobilization,” there were more significant 
developments in the People’s Daily. On September 21, it published Mao and Lin’s order to 
honor ten soldiers in the Zhenbao battle as “war heroes.” In an October Day joint editorial, 
Beijing expressed its desire to “use negotiation” to solve border disputes between countries. At 
the same time, it called on the Chinese people to be “highly alert” against the enemy’s “surprise 
attack” and to be prepared to defend China’s “sovereign frontier.” In an address to foreign 
dignitaries at the National Day reception, Zhou Enlai reiterated the principle that China would 
never attack any country unless attacked first and the Chinese determination to “fight to the very !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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end until victory” if anyone imposed the war of aggression on China. In order to inspire the 
morale of the Chinese people, the official organ on October 5 reported a story that China had 
been successful in exploding another H-bomb and in its first underground atomic test a week 
earlier. It claimed that these new achievements were a “severe blow to the nuclear hegemony of 
the American as well as socialist imperialists.”83 These calls for war preparation against the 
socialist imperialists--the Soviet Union--revealed the intensity of war nervousness in Beijing. 
The Reference News also emphasized the atmosphere of war preparation when it reprinted 
foreign news agencies’ response to the editorials and speeches of Chinese leaders.84 
On October 7, China took a major step to defuse tensions with the Soviet Union by 
announcing its decision to start border negotiations at the level of vice foreign minister. Beijing’s 
statement went, “the Chinese government has never covered up the fact that there exist 
irreconcilable differences of principle between China and the Soviet Union and that the struggle 
of principle between them will continue for a long period of time. But this should not prevent 
China and the Soviet Union from maintaining normal state relations on the basis of the five 
principles of peaceful coexistence.” The next day, it published Beijing’s “five-point proposal” 
calling for mutual troop withdrawal from the disputed areas. What was noticeable was that it 
even carried the letter from the Soviet Union congratulating the twentieth anniversary of the 
People’s Republic.85 It was an effort to show the reduced tensions between the two governments.  
Beijing’s decision to sit down and talk with Moscow was watched with great interest in 
Washington. In a memo to Kissinger, John H. Holdridge wrote that he found the thesis of 
“normal relations on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence” in the Chinese 
statement particularly interesting because it reminded him of the Chinese call for the renewal of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Warsaw talks a year earlier and that it could apply to the United States as well. Holdridge also 
pointed out “concrete evidence” of Beijing’s reduced hostility toward Washington. For example, 
he mentioned the Norwegian Ambassador who had talked about the “even-handed” discussions 
he had with Chinese officials about Sino-American relations. As the French ambassador related, 
Zhou Enlai did not reject resuming the talks in Warsaw, but he said that the “situation was 
complicated,” apparently referring to the situation in Beijing. He also referred to Zhou’s 
statement that the American attitude in the Sino-Soviet conflict was “ambiguous.” Based on 
these indicators along with the “apprehensive tone” he saw in the Chinese statement, Holdridge 
suggested it might be an “opportune moment” for a move toward Beijing.86  
Interestingly, Holdridge’s report was leaked in a Times story “U.S. Aides Discern Signs 
that Peking is Easing Enmity.”87 It resulted in widespread attention when reporters tried to verify 
its contents with the State Department. CBS reported that the State Department had denied the 
“rumor” through “unspecified channel” that China had become “soft” on the United States as it 
cited the Chinese cancellation of Warsaw talks as evidence.88 The Times article even attracted 
the attention of the Chinese media. The Reference News carried a front-page article in which 
State Department spokesman Carl Bartch stated that Washington had always hoped to improve 
relations with Beijing when he was asked about the article.89 
The Post noticed the “unusual display of candor” in Beijing’s statement, which it 
interpreted as a sign that China had emerged from “three years of rigidity” to a period of 
“relative realism.” However, its headline “Fear Drives China to Talk to Russia” emphasized 
Chinese fear when it claimed that Beijing’s move towards a détente with Washington suggested 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
86 FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 38.  
87 NYT, October 9, 1969, 1. 
88 CBS Evening News, October 9, 1969, Record #: 201041. 
89 RN, October 12, 1969, 1. 
!!
137!
a lesson that “nothing has a greater impact on Peking than the menace of force.” In an editorial 
on “A Momentous Sino-Soviet Breakthrough?” the Post maintained that the United States had a 
“compelling interest in cooling off of the dispute.” That is, if Moscow could get the China border 
issue in hand, the Soviet-American missile talks would “soon” begin.90 An editorial of the Times, 
in contrast, suggested a different lesson, which was, “Chinese leaders were not mad, but rational 
men able to weigh the costs and advantages of alternative policies.”91 Here, the Post editorial 
seemed to be more interested in the Soviet Union, while the Times was more interested in China. 
Beijing’s effort to relax tensions with the Soviet Union not only reduced the terror of war, 
but also meant that the Chinese need for improved relations with the United States was no longer 
especially urgent. In a way, it became a test of intentions for the Nixon administration. In order 
to obtain a diplomatic advantage, it was better for Washington to establish contact with Beijing 
before it reached any settlement with Moscow. ABC showed the eagerness of Washington when 
it reported the State Department’s statement that the United States was ready to talk with China 
“anywhere” and “as soon as possible.”92 The story appeared only one day after Beijing’s 
announcement of border talks with Moscow. 
Meeting again after the “Unusual Encounter” 
In order to contact Beijing as soon as possible, the Nixon administration tried different 
channels. On October 27 1969, U.S. Consul-General in Hong Kong Edwin W. Martin wrote Liu 
Xingyuan, chair of the Provincial Revolutionary Committee of Guangdong, inquiring about the 
whereabouts of two Americans who had been imprisoned in China since February. With Zhou 
Enlai’s personal instruction, the Foreign Ministry reported the inquiry to the Central Committee 
on November 7 with a note, “This is obviously a new act on the part of the U.S. government to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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test our response. We suggest that we take over the matter and have the two released at the right 
moment.”93 
On November 16, the Nixon administration sent another friendly signal to China by 
deceasing its naval patrol in the Taiwan Strait by two destroyers attached to the Seventh Fleet on 
account of “budget reasons.” Earlier that month Pakistani President Yahya had called the 
Chinese Ambassador to inform him of his impressions of the talk with Nixon in August and the 
U.S. intention to withdraw the destroyers.94 Interestingly, the story about the removal of 
destroyers did not show up in U.S. media until Christmas through a Japanese news agency 
claiming that the United States had informed Japan of its decision. Neither the Times nor the 
Post made a big deal about the issue, and they merely ran short stories in interior pages.95 In the 
case of naval patrol withdrawal, the U.S. government may have tried hard to keep it under the 
radar. It is also possibly due to the unwitting cooperation of U.S. media, which did not prioritize 
it, that Nixon avoided serious opposition from conservatives at home.  
As early as September during the height of war scare, Nixon and Kissinger had urged 
Ambassador Stoessel to get in touch with his Chinese counterpart as soon as possible. It was not 
until December 3 that he finally had a chance to approach a Chinese diplomat at a Yugoslavian 
fashion show at Warsaw’s Palace of Culture. Without clear instructions from Beijing, the 
Chinese diplomat did not know how to handle the situation. As a result, he tried to flee the scene 
with the U.S. ambassador running after him. Stoessel managed to catch a Chinese interpreter and 
told him that he had an important message for the Chinese government.96 
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When the American ambassador’s “unusual behavior” was reported to Zhou Enlai, he 
immediately relayed this “encounter” to Mao and said, “the opportunity is coming; we now have 
a brick in our hands to knock at the door [of the Americans.]” Zhou Enlai at once instructed the 
Chinese embassy in Warsaw to let the Americans know of Beijing’s interest in reopening 
communications. Moreover, with Mao’s approval, on December 7 Zhou Enlai ordered the 
release of the two Americans whom the U.S. consulate in Hong Kong had inquired about.97 In 
order to make sure the American side receive this signal, Zhou suggested that the release should 
be announced in the press and that the Chinese ambassador to Poland be informed of it.98 As the 
Chinese leadership hoped, the release of the two Americans duly appeared on the front pages of 
the Times and the Post.99 After the People’s Daily announced the release of the two Americans, 
the Reference News noted on its front page the “surprise” of the State Department, whose 
spokesman stated that they had learned of the news from the Xinhua News Agency.100 Beijing 
was sending signals to Washington through its media. The incident at the fashion show thus 
became a turning point, after which Beijing became much more responsive in reciprocating the 
initiatives from Washington. 
On December 11, the Chinese embassy took the initiative by calling the American 
embassy and invited U.S. representatives to have a meeting at the Chinese embassy the next 
day.101 When State Department spokesman Robert McCloskey announced the meeting the next 
day, it was placed among the lead stories of the television programs and the headlines of the two 
elite newspapers. Both the Times and the Post called it an important “breakthrough” in Sino-
American relations after two years of “diplomatic silence.” As an editorial of the Times pointed !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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out, the importance of the meeting could be shown by the speed at which China responded to 
Stoessel’s informal initiative a week earlier and from the fact that he was invited to the Chinese 
embassy. The Post, by taking into account the Soviet-American strategic arms limitation talks in 
Helsinki, the renewal of Sino-American contact in Warsaw, as well as the Sino-Soviet border 
negotiation in Beijing, concluded that the formation of the “Washington-Moscow-Peking 
triangle” by the end of 1969 had become a “historic event in international affairs.”102 
Conclusion 
The last year of the 1960s witnessed great changes in world politics. As the Ninth 
Congress of the CCP officially ended the most radical stage of the Cultural Revolution, it started 
the normalization of China’s domestic politics as well as diplomatic activities. At the same time, 
the United States began to reduce its involvement in Asia with the announcement of the “Nixon 
Doctrine.” Most important of all, the eruption of the Sino-Soviet crisis created an opportunity for 
Washington and Beijing to take concrete steps to move toward reconciliation. 
In covering the CCP’s Ninth Congress and Beijing’s handling of the Sino-Soviet border 
negotiations, U.S. media presented a rational China that was potentially more responsive to U.S. 
overtures. On the Sino-Soviet conflict, U.S. media not only pictured the Soviet Union as more 
aggressive than China, but also called attention to the Soviet fear of possible Sino-American 
“unity.” While Washington assumed a public posture of detachment, U.S. media were not 
worried about upsetting Moscow as they elaborated on the benefits of improving relations with 
Beijing. They played important roles in educating the American public and creating a favorable 
opinion environment for Nixon to take more active steps approaching China.  
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In this year, Chinese media showed aloofness as well as reception to the U.S. overtures. 
Even though the People’s Daily maintained a hostile posture toward the United States, it 
revealed signs of flexibility, especially from the treatment of Nixon’s inaugural address and his 
first press conference. In the context of Sino-Soviet crises, Chinese media’s attack on Soviet-
American “collusion” not only served to mobilize the domestic solidarity against foreign 
invasion, but also could test which side Washington stood on. What was remarkable was that the 
Reference News objectively reported Washington’s overtures that might have impressed the 
Chinese. Through these measures, Beijing effectively left open the option of reconciliation with 
Washington when it was deliberating on its foreign policy. 
The war nerves in the Chinese media from September through the Chinese National Day 
shows that Beijing was truly worried about a Soviet surprise attack. This worry was decisive in 
pushing Beijing toward Washington. As Beijing was patiently waiting for the right moment to 
reciprocate the Washington overtures, “the unusual encounter” at the Yugoslavian fashion show 
finally convinced it to drop its hesitation and became a more active player in Sino-American 
reconciliation.  
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Chapter 5: From Warsaw to Beijing: The “Intricate Minuet”: 1970-1971 
The “unusual encounter” at the Yugoslavian fashion show in December 1969 not only 
reassured Beijing of Washington’s sincere desire to improve relations, but also satisfied Chinese 
national pride. Mao and Zhou later repeatedly told other Chinese leaders, “It is the Americans 
who need something from us, not the other way around.”1  This sentiment could also be seen in 
the People’s Daily announcement, which particularly emphasized that the initial Sino-American 
meeting at the Chinese embassy was held “at the request of the American ambassador.”2 
After the encounter at the fashion show, Beijing became a much more active player in 
advancing Sino-American rapprochement. As Henry Kissinger claimed, between November 
1969 and June 1970, there were at least ten instances where U.S. officials exchanged words with 
Chinese officials at diplomatic functions and on at least four occasions the Chinese initiated the 
contact. However, twenty years of hostility without direct contact had made Sino-American 
relations so delicate that leaders of both countries had to be extremely cautious in 
communicating their intentions in order to avoid a backlash at home. Kissinger described the 
signaling between Beijing and Washington as “an intricate minuet” that was “so delicately 
arranged that both sides could always maintain that they were not in contact, so stylized that 
neither side needed to bear the onus of an initiative, so elliptical that existing relationships on 
both sides were not jeopardized.”3 
This chapter examines how the “intricate minuet” between Beijing and Washington 
played out through the media from the renewal of the Sino-American Warsaw talks in early 1970 
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to Kissinger’s secret visit to Beijing in July 1971. It also looks at how Beijing began to actively 
promote the Sino-American rapprochement, particularly by employing the media. 
The Beginning of Triangular Politics 
The Warsaw talks had a good beginning when they were officially reopened in early 
1970. Beijing took the initiative to propose that the meetings be held alternatively at the Chinese 
and U.S. embassies instead of the venue provided by the Polish government. This arrangement 
could avoid eavesdropping because Poland was a close ally of the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, 
Washington stopped the previous administrations’ “standard practice” of briefing the Russians 
with records of the Warsaw talks. These changes also signified an important change in 
Washington’s attitude toward the two communist powers. In proposing the policy shift to Nixon, 
Kissinger argued that he saw no point in giving the Russians the opportunity to “gloat” to Beijing 
that they were kept informed, which he thought would heighten Chinese suspicions from the 
start.4 
The Chinese approach to the meetings with the Americans also witnessed an obvious 
change. In contrast to its aloofness during the Cultural Revolution, Beijing gave special 
prominence to publicity. On December 11, 1969, Chinese chargé d'affaires Lei Yang called U.S. 
Ambassador to Poland Walter Stoessel Jr., inviting him to talk at the Chinese embassy. When 
Stoessel said he would be happy to arrive “discreetly at the rear door,” Lei told him that the main 
entrance was “eminently suitable.”5 Lei’s arrival at the American embassy a few days later, as 
described by both the Post and the Times, was quite an “impressive” scene. Crowds of passersby 
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reportedly watched “the largest and longest black limousine in Poland, sporting silk red-and-gold 
starred flags on its fenders and curious tail lights, shaped like Chinese lanterns” drive up to the 
American embassy.6 When the two sides decided on the date of the next formal U.S.-China 
ambassadorial talk, Lei Yang immediately proposed making the plan public. Lei Yang’s 
“flamboyant” arrival at the American embassy and his proposal to announce the meeting, as 
Kissinger correctly observed in his memo to Nixon, indicated Beijing’s intention to show the 
“appearance” of its ability to deal with the United States--primarily for “Soviet consumption.”7  
On January 8, 1970, when the United States and China announced simultaneously that 
the Warsaw talks would resume on January 20, the State Department used the term “People’s 
Republic of China” (PRC) for the first time. In their front-page articles, both the New York Times 
and the Washington Post called attention to the change.8 An editorial in the Times and a column 
by Harrison Salisbury instantly used the term. Actually, that was not the first time for the 
newspaper. It had used that term several times a year earlier, though not in prominent places.9 
The U.S. signal was instantly caught by the Reference News, which reprinted on its front page 
the full text of the U.S. announcement, where the PRC appeared several times. It also pointed out 
that Lei’s visit to the U.S. embassy was the first time by a senior Chinese diplomat and that the 
meeting signified “a progress the Nixon administration had achieved in its attempt to improve 
relations with Beijing.” In contrast to the Sino-American progress, two articles on the same page 
talked about the fruitlessness of the Sino-Soviet border negotiations and the possibility of 
increased Soviet pressure on China.10 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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On their front pages, while the Times interpreted the renewal of the Warsaw talks as the 
“fruition of a year-long effort by the Nixon administration” to engage China, the Post viewed it 
as China’s “formal entrance into a triangular relation” with its two main adversaries. In an 
editorial, the Times editorial was optimistic about a “good beginning” toward better Sino-
American relations. Even though it ruled out the possibility of a “Sino-American plot” against 
Moscow, it conceded that Beijing’s decision to talk with Washington would have a “sobering 
impact” on Moscow. In contrast to the optimism of the Times, the Post argued that Beijing only 
wanted to use Washington as a “counterweight” against the Soviet threat and it doubted there 
would be genuine progress in Sino-American relations because Mao had been believed to be the 
“most opposed to doing business with the United States.” It even claimed that Mao’s absence 
and the resumption of Warsaw talks suggested something “unusual” in China.11  
The Post’s somberness on the improvement of Sino-American relations was not 
groundless. With the Sino-Soviet conflict in the background, U.S. media could not fail to draw 
the Soviet connection in their coverage of the renewal of the Warsaw talks. The day after the 
Sino-American joint announcement, both the Times and the Post reported on their front pages the 
fierce attacks on Beijing in the Soviet media. The Post noticed that Sino-Soviet polemics had 
resumed a week earlier after several months of quietness after the Sino-Soviet border talks 
began. The Times claimed that Moscow appeared to link the scheduled resumption of talks with 
Beijing’s “military psychosis” against the Soviet Union. It mentioned Soviet officials who drew 
attention to the resumption of the talks in early December, which was at about the same time the 
Sino-Soviet talks reached a deadlock.12 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 NYT, January 9, 1970,1; January 10, 29; WP, January 9, 1970, A1, January 12, 1971, A18;  
12 NYT, January 10, 1970, 1; WP, January 10, 1970, A1.  
!!
146!
The newsmagazines also made references to the Soviet Union in their analyses of the 
Sino-American talks. Both Newsweek and Time took note of the violent attack of the Soviet 
Army newspaper krasnaya zvezda (Red Star) on Beijing. While Newsweek argued that the Soviet 
reaction would benefit Washington in its strategic arms limitation talks with Moscow, Time 
claimed to have found signs of Soviet fear of attacks from its newly released maps, which had 
modified the location of many cities close to the Chinese border.13 Though U.S. media showed 
different levels of confidence for the prospect of Sino-American relations, one thing they seemed 
to agree on was the beginning of triangular politics in early 1970.  
The Cambodia Incursion 
In early 1970, it seemed that Beijing and Washington were on the verge of a 
breakthrough. At the 135th meeting of the Warsaw talks, Lei Yang stated Beijing’s offer to talk 
through “higher-level discussions or any other channel that both sides might agree upon.” At the 
136th meeting in February, he made an unusually conciliatory statement and accepted the U.S. 
proposal to send an emissary to Beijing.14 On April 28, the Chinese side informed the U.S. 
embassy that it was ready to meet on May 20. However, what happened in Cambodia 
complicated the international situation. On March 18, 1970, when Prince Norodom Sihanouk of 
Cambodia visited Moscow seeking Soviet support in dealing with Hanoi, the National Assembly 
deposed him from power and installed the pro-U.S. general Lon Nol as the head of the 
government. With the tacit support from Lon Nol, U.S. forces moved into Cambodia to clear 
Viet Cong sanctuaries on April 30.15  
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13 Newsweek, February 2, 1970, 40; Time, February 2, 1971, 24-25. 
14 FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969-1972, Document 62. 
15 Kissinger, White House Years, 692. See also Pobzeb Vang, Five Principles of Chinese Foreign Policies 
(Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2008), 311. 
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Beijing’s response to the Cambodian incursion was mild at the beginning. On May 4, it 
issued a statement warning the United States against its “flagrant provocation.” Even though it 
declared that 700 million Chinese would be the strong backing for the three Indochinese peoples, 
what it offered was merely Mao’s quotations that the United States was just a “paper tiger” and 
that they would definitely defeat the American “imperialists” if they worked together and 
persisted in fighting. Kissinger told Nixon, “The Chinese have issued a statement, in effect 
saying they wouldn’t do anything.”16 
At that time, it seemed that Beijing still wanted to go ahead with the scheduled Warsaw 
talks on May 20. What made the situation more complicated was the Sino-Soviet polemics, 
which had resumed in late November 1969, when border talks between them made little 
progress. On April 22, the People’s Daily, Red Flag, and the PLA Daily published a joint 
editorial in memory of the centenary of Lenin’s birthday. In what was seen as the most violent 
attack on the Soviet leadership since the opening of border negotiations, the editorial condemned 
the “Soviet renegade” for having degenerated into a “dictatorship of the Hitler type” and called 
the Brezhnev doctrine a “fascist theory.” In a counterattack, Pravda ran a 5,000-word editorial 
entitled “Pseudo-Revolutionaries with their Masks Off” on May 18. It charged that the Chinese 
rejection of the Soviet call for joint action had enabled “imperialists to carry out anti-popular 
designs” in Indochina, implying the U.S. invasion of Cambodia. The Soviet attack was so intense 
that even the Post reprinted its excepts.17 
Having been the first to recognize Sihanouk’s Beijing-based government-in-exile upon its 
establishment on May 5, 1970, the Chinese government was extremely sensitive to the Soviet 
accusation of selling out in Indochina. When many Communist countries, including Albania and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 PD, May 5, 1970, 1; Kissinger, White House Years, 694. 
17 Peter Jones and Sian Kevill, China and the Soviet Union, 1949-1984 (New York: Facts on File, 1984), 
97-9; PD, April 22, 1970, 2; WP, May 19, 1970, 14. 
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North Korea, followed suit in extending recognition, Moscow was still uncommitted.18 The day 
after the Pravda editorial, which had been almost three weeks after the United States launched its 
operation, Beijing announced its decision to put off the scheduled Warsaw talks. In a terse 
statement, it declared, “In view of the increasingly grave situation caused by the United States, 
which has brazenly sent troops to invade Cambodia and expanded the war in Indochina, the 
Chinese government deemed it no longer suitable for the 137th meeting of the Sino-U.S. 
ambassadorial to be held on May 20 as originally scheduled.” However, it left the door open for 
further communication, declaring that the date of the next meeting would be “decided upon later 
through consultation by the liaison personnel of the two sides.”19  
In coordination with the cancellation of meeting with the Americans, Beijing launched a 
national campaign to display its support for Sihanouk’s Cambodia. To start the campaign, Mao 
issued a personal pronouncement entitled “People All Over the World, Unite and Defeat the 
American Aggressors and Their Running Dogs” on the scheduled day of the Warsaw meeting. In 
the pronouncement, Mao mentioned that more than twenty countries had recognized Sihanouk’s 
Cambodia within ten days of its establishment. Besides displaying to the world the Chinese 
support for the exiled leader, Beijing also used the campaign to embarrass the Soviet Union for 
failing to offer support for him. The day after his pronouncement, Mao, along with Lin Biao and 
Sihanouk, attended a rally of half a million people in Tiananmen Square. In reporting the rally, 
the People’s Daily front-page article did not focus on the statement. It instead listed the names of 
almost every one on the Tiananmen rostrum, especially representatives from Communist parties 
in India, Burma, Cambodia, Vietnam, North Korea, Romania, Albania, Pakistan, and Japan. 
Interestingly, while it placed most of the foreign dignitaries at the front of the guest list, it !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Moscow recognized to the Sihanouk government on June 23 but retained diplomatic relations with the 
Lon Nol government in Phnom Penh. See Vang, Five Principles of Chinese Foreign Policies, 314. 
19 PD, May 19, 1970, 5. English version in NYT, May 19, 1970, 1.  
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consigned the names of the Soviet representatives to the very bottom of the article to display its 
slight of Moscow.20  
U.S. media were confused by the vehemence of the Chinese response. Both the Times 
and the Post related the Chinese decision to cancel the Warsaw talks to the Vietnam War, 
especially a message to North Vietnam in the People’s Daily on the late Ho Chi-Minh’s 80th 
birthday anniversary when Beijing called on the peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos to 
continue fighting the United States “until complete victory.” The Times speculated that the 
Warsaw cancellation had been decided a week earlier when first secretary of the North 
Vietnamese Party Le Duan was in Beijing. The Post argued that the talks might be resumed 
when U.S. forces were out of Cambodia by the end of June. As to Mao’s “unusual 
pronouncement,” the Times described it as “another expression of the leadership role” in world 
revolution China had taken lately, whereas the Post saw it as a sign of “stiffening Chinese 
attitude towards the United States.”21 
In reality, when Beijing cancelled the talk on May 20, it offered to meet again on June 
20.22 However, a CCP Politburo meeting on June 16 decided that the official Warsaw Talks 
should be further postponed “in view of the current situation,” but it decided that liaisons of the 
two governments would still meet on the day.23 Even though Beijing once again postponed the 
official talks, it announced the meeting between the liaisons. The announcement in the People’s 
Daily was noticeably milder in tone than the one a month earlier. Without blaming Washington 
for the postponement, it referred to the current situation as “clearly understood by both sides” 
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20 PD, May 21, 1970, 1; May 22, 1970, 1. 
21 NYT, May 19, 1970, 1; May 21, 1970, 1; WP, May 19, 1970 1; May 21, 1970, 1. 
22 FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969-1972, Document 80. 
23 Li Ping and Ma Zhisun eds., Zhou Enlai nianpu, 1898-1976 [A Chronological Record of Zhou Enlai, 
1898-1976] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1997), 1287. 
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and stated that the date of the next meeting would be discussed “at a proper time.”24 Beijing’s 
mild announcement not only signaled to Washington its interests in continued contacts, but also 
had the effect of unsettling Moscow. 
After the U.S. withdrawal from Cambodia in late June, Beijing made a friendly move on 
July 10 by suddenly releasing James Walsh, a 79-year-old Roman Catholic bishop who had been 
detained in China for 12 years on charges of espionage.25  Different from the statement 
announcing the release of two American yachtsmen on December 8, 1969, Beijing offered 
detailed information about the prisoner’s name, age, and hometown. The justification for his 
release was that “the bishop had confessed his crime upon education from the Chinese authority. 
Considering his senior age, our authority decided to release him ahead of schedule on the 
proletarian principle of ‘leniency to those who confess and severity to those who resist.’”26 Its 
prominent position on page two and the detailed introduction of the bishop showed the 
importance Beijing attached to his release. 
As the Chinese government hoped, the bishop’s release made headlines in U.S. elite 
media. Both elite newspapers related the timing of his release to the exit of U.S. forces from 
Cambodia. The Post commented that by doing so Beijing sought to “take the edge off some of its 
recent sharp verbal attacks on the United States.” In an editorial titled “…and a Signal from 
China,” the Times argued that his release was not accidental and Beijing might be sending a 
signal to Washington, “the most important signal since the Chinese People’s Republic agreed to 
resume the Warsaw talks.”27   
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24 PD, June 21, 1970, 6. 
25 The Chinese government did not give prior notice to U.S. consulate in Hong Kong about his release. Nor 
did the bishop himself understand why he was released at that particularly time. See NYT, July 11, 1971.  
26 PD, December 8, 1969, 6; July 11, 1970, 2. 
27 WP, July11, 1970, 1; NYT, July 11, 1970, 1, 19. 
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The three networks showed vivid images of the bishop crossing the border into Hong 
Kong and his press conference afterwards. ABC and CBS rushed to interview Walsh’s sister and 
brother, both of whom said his release was a “miracle.”28 When the bishop showed up in a wheel 
chair at the press conference, he was described as “alert.” Even though he claimed that he had 
been forced to sign the confession and that he found it hard to justify the severity of the sentence 
“meted out” to him, he said that overall he received “good treatment” in prison and he “could not 
feel angry toward any Chinese” because he just “loved the Chinese people.”29 Instead of a 
condemnation of the Chinese government, the message from the press conference was more 
about the gratitude people felt about Walsh’s release. The bishop’s experience stood in sharp 
contrast to the brutal scene when the eight expelled nuns crossed the border into Hong Kong 
during the heyday of the Cultural Revolution. Through the media’s prominent coverage, Beijing 
showed to the U.S. government as well as its people that China had become much more rational 
and it was taking steps to reduce the tension between the two countries. 
Besides releasing the bishop, Beijing did not make any other gesture in the summer of 
1970. During this period, there was a power struggle going on between Mao and his heir 
apparent Lin Biao. According to Kissinger, on July 2, two Chinese Mig-19s carried on an 
“apparently premeditated attempt” to intercept a C-130 reconnaissance plane flying one hundred 
miles off the Chinese coast. He thought it very likely that someone in the power structure wanted 
to “wreck” Sino-American relations, citing that the Air Force was the most radical in the Chinese 
armed service during the Cultural Revolution.30 The power struggle in the Chinese leadership !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 ABC Evening News, July 10, 1970, Vanderbilt Television News Archive, Record #: 11052 (All 
newscasts are hereafter cited in the format network, date, record number. All are accessible at Vanderbilt Television 
News Archive in Nashville, TN); CBS Evening News, July 10, 1970, Record #: 210826. 
29 ABC Evening News, July 16, 1970, Record #: 11139; CBS Evening News, July 16, 1970, Record #: 
210944; NBC Evening News, July 16, 1970, Record #: 452085. 
30 Kissinger, White House Years, 697. In his memoir, Wu Faxian, commander of the Chinese Air Force, 
denied that either he or Lin Biao was opposed to Sino-American rapprochement and he did not show any knowledge 
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escalated into a “de facto showdown” between Mao and several of Lin’s main supporters at a 
party Central Committee plenary session held between August 23 and September 6 at Lushan, a 
mountain summer resort in mid-Southern China.31 Mao’s preoccupation with the power struggle 
might have hindered him from making further moves toward the United States. 
Signals through Edgar Snow 
As it turned out, Mao prevailed in the struggle against Lin Biao and his followers at the 
Lushan Conference. In the fall of 1970, Beijing sent signals to Washington through Edgar Snow, 
an “old friend” of the Chinese Communists since the mid-1930s when he visited their 
headquarters in Yan’an and interviewed their leaders. Snow’s greatly acclaimed book, Red Star 
over China, published in 1938, provided a favorable description of the Chinese Communist 
revolution to readers within China and without.32 The Chinese government sent the invitation to 
Snow in the name of Mao in June and he arrived on August 14, 1970.33 Snow’s first public 
appearance in China was at an exhibition match between the Chinese and North Korean ping-
pong teams. On its front page, the People’s Daily placed him among dignitaries from Communist 
parties around the world and featured a separate photo story about Zhou Enlai’s meeting with 
him.34 On the October Day for national celebration, Zhou Enlai deliberately arranged Snow and 
his wife to stand next to Mao on the Tiananmen rostrum in reviewing the parade and a picture of 
Snow with Mao and Lin Biao was taken.35  
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of the incident. He claimed that while he was away in Beijing, Lin Biao’s son Lin Liguo, who was a senior officer 
stationed in South China, had grown so powerful in the Air Force because of his family connection that few people 
could control him. See Wu Faxian, Wu Faxian huiyilu [the Memoirs of Wu Faxian] (Hong Kong: Star North Books 
Company, 2006), 845-7. 
31 Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 253. 
32 Ibid., 254.  
33 Huang Hua, Qinli yu jianwen--Huang Hua huiyilu [Personal Experience and Eyewitness Account--
Memoir of Huang Hua] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2007), 149-51. 
34 See PD, 19 August 1970, 1, 2.  
35 Edgar Snow, The Long Revolution (New York: Random House, 1972), 3,  
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Interestingly, the People’s Daily did not publish the photo immediately. On its front page 
the next day, pictures of Mao with the guests on the Tiananmen Square were mostly those taken 
from the distance and Snow could barely be recognized in them.36 Mao’s photo with Snow was 
not published in the Peoples’ Daily until Christmas 1970. Its caption stated, “The Chinese 
people’s great teacher Chairman Mao has recently met friendly American Edgar Snow and had a 
cordial and friendly talk with him.” Since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, all Chinese 
newspapers carried a quotation of Mao’s in the small box at the upper right-hand corner of every 
front page. The Mao quotation for that day was, “People of the world, including the American 
people, are our friends.” When they met in January 1965, the People’s Daily also published their 
photo, but it called Snow “an American writer, the author of Red Star over China.”37 The 
different treatments Snow received in the official organ illustrated the change in Sino-American 
relations. When the two countries were locked in hostility, he was treated as a private citizen 
without hint of friendship. In 1970 Snow had become a representative of the American people 
whom Beijing wanted to befriend.  
Scholars agree that Snow’s photo with Mao was an important message to Washington. 
Several of them, however, have neglected the three-month delay in its publication.38 Chen Jian 
refers to secondary sources claiming that Zhou Enlai had overseen its publication in late 
December for other major Chinese newspapers to follow, but he fails to explain the cause of the 
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36 PD, October 2, 1970, 1. 
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delay.39 What happened during those months might have changed Mao’s attitude to Sino-
American rapprochement.  
On October 12, Zhou Enlai wrote a note on a Foreign Ministry report to Mao, suggesting 
that he take the interview with Snow before October 15 because the American journalist would 
leave Beijing by then. Mao wrote, “All right. <I am> planning to listen to his views about 
international affairs.”40 Though Mao agreed to meet with Snow, he deferred it until mid-
December. From his note to Zhou, Mao seemed to be more interested in consulting with Snow 
than in delivering the message in October. Xia Yafeng and Yang Kuisong argue that Mao had 
been vacillating between revolution and reconciliation even in 1970 and that he might not have 
been “psychologically ready” for reconciliation at the time.41 
Xiong Xianghui, Zhou Enlai’s aide who had assisted the four marshals in their study of 
international condition in 1969, claimed that Mao’s decision to take the interview with Snow had 
to do with his earlier interview with Zhou Enlai, which had appeared in the Italian magazine 
Epoca on 13 December. The Reference Materials reprinted not only the article, but also several 
stories about how Zhou’s interview had impressed Western news agencies. Xiong thought that 
Mao must have read them. From the “minutes of the Mao-Snow conversation” later distributed 
among Chinese leaders, moreover, he found that not long after the interview started, Mao took 
the initiative to talk about the Epoca article, saying that it was “pretty good.” Finally, Snow 
wrote in The Long Revolution that he was summoned to meet with Mao without advance notice 
and that Mao had a slight cold when they met. Based on these observations, Xiong argued that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 255, 365note77. Snow claimed that it was Mao’s birthday, which 
was actually one day later. See Snow, The Long Revolution, 4.!
40 Document Research Office of the CCP Central Committee, ed., Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao 
[Manuscripts of Mao Zedong since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China] vol. 13 (Beijing: Zhongyang 
wenxian chubanshe, 1998), 150. (Hereafter as Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao). 
41 Yang Kuisong and Xia Yafeng, “Vacillating between Revolution and Détente: Mao’s Changing Psyche 
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the Epoca article must have inspired Mao, who then decided to meet with him immediately even 
though he was not feeling well.42 Xia Yafeng and Yang Kuisong claim that it was Snow’s line 
“China was building a broader anti-imperialist united front not excluding the Americans” in the 
article that had enlightened Mao.43 
In his interview with Snow, Mao “casually” said that Nixon would be welcome to visit 
China because the current problems between China and the United States had to be solved by 
him and that he would be happy to talk with Nixon “either as president or as a tourist.” This 
remark was later published and known to the outside world as Mao’s invitation to Nixon. 
Actually, Mao sent more messages. Because of the Chinese censorship, the “minutes of Snow-
Mao Talk” that later circulated among Chinese officials contained more details than Snow’s Life 
magazine article in April 1971.44 In the “minutes,” Mao said that Nixon had expressed his desire 
to talk with Chinese leaders in Beijing or Washington under extreme secrecy without even the 
knowledge of the Foreign Ministry or the State Department. Mao said, “If he really wants to 
come to Beijing, you can take a message to him. Tell him not to sneak in. He can just come in a 
plane.” When Snow asked Mao, “Since I don’t know Nixon, but if I meet him, Can I...?” Before 
he finished the sentence, Mao said, “You can just say <that I think> he is a good person, the 
world’s top good person. Brezhnev is not good. Brandt is not good either.”45 This conversation 
indicates the comfortable position in which Mao handled the accommodation and that he was 
expecting Snow to pass on the message to Nixon. Publishing the photo a week later was in line 
with his state of mind at that time. 
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Mao’s increased confidence in rapprochement in late 1970 might also have been 
influenced by the new overtures from Washington. In his interview with Time magazine 
published on October 5, 1970, Nixon said, “If there is anything I want to do before I die, it is to 
go to China. If I don’t, I want my children to.”46 Nixon’s willingness to visit China did not stand 
out in the article titled “I Did Not Want the Hot Words of TV,” which was mostly about his 
general view of the world. It was literally ignored in U.S. media at the time. The Times did not 
pay attention to the interview. The Post reported the interview, but it ignored Nixon’s remarks 
about visiting China.47 Maybe they did not want to credit their competitor with a scoop. 
In this month, when Nixon met with several countries’ leaders who were in the United 
States to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations, he sent more messages to 
Beijing. In his meeting with Pakistani President Yahya Khan on October 25, Nixon asked him to 
convey two points to the Chinese leadership: 1) the U.S. government would “make no 
condominium against China” and he wanted the Chinese leaders to know it whatever may be put 
out; 2) the U.S. government would “be glad to” send emissaries to Beijing and to establish links 
secretly. Before Mao’s interview with Snow, Beijing had received Nixon’s message and sent 
their warm reply through Yahya.48  
The day after his meeting with Yahya, in his toast to Romanian President Nicolae 
Ceausescu at a White House banquet, Nixon stated that he was in a rather unique position 
because “he heads a government which is one of the few in the world which has good relations 
with the United States, good relations with the Soviet Union and good relations with the People’s 
Republic of China.” That was the first time an American president addressed China with its 
proper name on an official occasion. Even though the Times and the Post both made references !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 Time, October 5, 1970, 25. 
47 WP, September 28, 1970, A14. 
48 FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969-1972, Document 94.  
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to China in reporting the meeting, they failed to catch the nuance in the President’s message. The 
Times quoted Nixon’s toast on the jump page without commenting on its significance. The Post 
did not pay attention to the toast, to say nothing of Nixon’s signal.49 While U.S. media missed 
the significance of Nixon’s new posture, the Reference News was quick to understand the 
nuances of the “historical” toast and reprinted its full text.50  
Moreover, Mao might have gained confidence from the elevation in China’s international 
standing when it established diplomatic relations with Canada and Italy in October and 
November. In negotiating with these two countries, Beijing became more flexible and no longer 
insisted that they recognize its sovereignty over Taiwan as a precondition for diplomatic 
recognition. When Beijing and Ottawa issued the joint communiqué on October 13, its most 
important line was, “the Canadian government recognizes the People’s Republic of China as the 
sole legal Government of China...The Chinese government reaffirms that Formosa is an 
inalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China. The Canadian government 
takes note of this position of the Chinese government.” Both the Times and the Post picked up 
the Chinese concession on Taiwan when they interpreted the phrase “taking note of” as not 
accepting.51 With the formula provided by the Canadian recognition, the Italian government 
quickly concluded the treaty with Beijing and issued the joint communiqué on November 6, 
1970. 
Beijing’s recognition by two major Western powers had a great impact on the General 
Assembly voting on China’s UN membership. On November 20, the PRC won 51 percent of the 
votes supporting its admission and the expulsion of Taiwan, a simply majority for the first time. 
Even though it was not admitted because of the American insistence on a two-thirds majority, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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50 RN, October 31, 1970, 4. 
51 NYT, October 14, 1970, 1; WP, October 14, 1970, 1. 
!!
158!
journalists viewed it as a “setback” for the United States and a sign that Beijing would enter the 
UN very soon.52 Washington had changed its rhetoric even before the voting. In his speech to the 
General Assembly on November 12, Christopher H. Philips, the deputy permanent representative 
of the United States, said, “The United States is as interested as any in this room to see the 
People’s Republic of China play a constructive role among the family of nations.” He also went 
out of his way to compliment “the industry, talents, and achievements of the great people who 
live in that ancient cradle of civilization.” Before and after the voting, the two newspapers noted 
that Washington had refrained from saying anything that might be interpreted as opposition to 
China’s entrance into the world body.53Their depictions of Washington’s change in position on 
China’s UN membership were another friendly signal to Beijing. 
Beijing’s signals to Nixon through Snow did not produce timely effects. When the Times 
and Post received a copy of Zhou’s conversation with Snow in Epoca, they only paid attention to 
his remark that “China was still threatened with war by the superpowers with some one million 
men as well as rocket troops to the north and west; and with the United States in alliance with a 
remilitarizing Japan on the east.” They interpreted this line as evidence of Beijing’s inflexibility 
and refused to buy Snow’s argument that “Zhou Enlai’s willingness to have serious 
conversations with an American writer after the Cultural Revolution was itself meaningful.54 The 
magazines and networks simply ignored the article. Even though Beijing Review, the only China-
published English magazine targeting the Western audience, published Mao’s photo with Snow 
in the first issue of 1971, American journalists did not pay much attention. C.L. Sulzberger of the 
Times did mention it in his “Foreign Affair” column entitled “The Tea Leaves Change,” but it !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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was published in late January.55 Other U.S. media were not impressed by Mao’s high-profile 
appearance with Snow probably because of their natural suspicion of leftists, especially those 
with a pro-Communist record. During the Cultural Revolution, Robert F. Williams, author of 
Negroes with Guns published in 1962 and a black power activist hounded into exile by the U.S. 
government over criminal charges, had been treated as a head of state when he joined Mao on the 
Tiananmen rostrum with the honor of making a speech to the throng for China’s National Day 
celebration.56 Williams’ experience in China had received very little coverage in U.S. media.  
Nor could Snow deliver Mao’s message at an earlier date. His interview with Mao was 
not published in Life until April 30, 1971, the same issue that called attention to Nixon’s remark 
to Time that he would like to visit China.57 By that time, they could only stand in the shadow of 
the “aftershock” caused by Ping-Pong Diplomacy. Richard Nixon claimed in his memoir that he 
learned of Mao’s statement to Snow within a few days after their conversation.58 Nixon was 
probably bragging or simply lying because nobody else could verify his claim. Nor did he 
produce any evidence about how he obtained it.59 
According to Snow, after every interview with Zhou Enlai and Mao, he had to submit to 
the Chinese for correction a long dispatch based on his notes. When the clearance came a week 
later, the official version omitted things not publishable. Huang Hua, a senior diplomat who 
would become the first Chinese Ambassador to the UN and the Foreign Minister, also said that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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when Snow’s wife left China before Christmas 1970, he had to wait for the interview draft.60 The 
Chinese arrangements made it difficult for Snow to publish the interview at an earlier date. 
Seymour Topping, foreign editor of the Times, claimed that, after he left China in 
February 1971, Snow sent to his newspaper a lengthy article based on a series of interviews with 
Zhou Enlai. Unfortunately, executive editor Abe Rosenthal, who was strongly anti-Communist 
due to his experience as a reporter in Poland, felt uneasy about giving too much space to a piece 
written by a journalist known for his strong sympathy for the Chinese Communists. He insisted 
on drastic cuts, arguing that the article was too long and “propagandistic.” When Snow refused 
to make the cut, Rosenthal “summarily” rejected his article, not knowing that it reflected Mao’s 
attitude that had been conveyed to Snow in “off-the-record remarks.”61 The Times thus missed a 
precious opportunity to pass on the important signal to the Nixon administration and also a 
scoop. The suspicion of communists in U.S. media, to some extent, had prevented Mao from 
delivering his message through Snow at an earlier date. 
Kissinger’s version was that the State Department probably could not have obtained a full 
text of Snow’s talk with Mao because a memo to him on April 1, 1971 did not mention the 
element of an invitation to Nixon. It instead reported that Snow had gained the impression from 
his meetings with Chinese leaders that “there was no immediate prospect of improving Sino-
American relations because of the war in Indochina.”62  
The Snow scenario reflects the different roles of Zhou and Mao in handling Sino-
American rapprochement. While Zhou’s job was to set up the mechanisms or to deal with details 
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such as arranging the photo shoot, Mao had the final say on when and how to deliver the 
message. According to Gao Wenqian, after the Ninth Congress, Zhou often picked noticeable 
international developments and commentaries as reference materials for Mao to read, thus to 
influence Mao’s thinking on foreign policies in a subtle way.63 Without Mao’s approval, Zhou 
Enlai was extremely cautious in the signals he sent out. It explains the mixture of restrained 
optimism and tough rhetoric in his interview with Snow in November. It is probably why the two 
U.S. elite newspapers did not read any significant change from the interview published in Epoca. 
The difference in their importance was also illustrated by the fact that Zhou Enlai’s photo with 
Snow in August as well as his interview with Snow caused much less sensation and were 
interpreted with much less symbolical meaning than Mao’s. After all, only Mao’s conversation 
with Snow was later distributed as a party document.  
Breakthrough via Secret Diplomacy 
The missing of signals between Nixon and Mao well exemplified the delicate nature of 
the “intricate minuet” between Beijing and Washington. These signals through public media had 
the danger of being delayed or even totally lost. Since the break-off of the Warsaw Talks in 
February 1970, Nixon and Kissinger tried to reestablish contact with Beijing through different 
channels. At first they tried Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters, the military attaché in Paris. 
Between July and September, Walters tried several times to tell his Chinese contact that he had 
an important message from Washington to Beijing. However, the Chinese official only said that 
he would inform his government that Walters had a message without making any further 
response.64 The Paris channel did not produce any result. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
63 Gao Wenqian, Wannian Zhou Enlai [Zhou Enlai’s Later Years] (New York: Mirrorbooks, 2003), 407. 
64 FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969-1972, Document 89. 
!!
162!
It was mainly through the Pakistani channel that Washington and Beijing achieved a 
breakthrough. As mentioned earlier, on October 25, Nixon had asked Pakistani President Yahya 
Khan to take his message to Zhou Enlai. Yahya visited China from November 10 to 15. On 
December 9, the Pakistani ambassador Agha Hilaly met with Kissinger and dictated Zhou’s 
“authoritative personal message” to Nixon. Acknowledging Washington’s past messages from 
different sources, Zhou emphasized that it was “the first time a proposal has come from a Head 
through a Head, to a Head” and that he spoke not only for himself, but also for Mao and Lin 
Biao. He also expressed wishes to receive a special envoy of Nixon in Beijing to talk about the 
Taiwan issue. Kissinger never obtained an adequate explanation why Yahya waited for three 
weeks after his return to Pakistan before transmitting the message. He speculated that Beijing 
might have deliberately wanted Yahya to postpone communicating it.65 As with what had been 
mentioned earlier, Beijing probably felt more comfortable delivering the message in December.  
On December 16, Kissinger summoned Hilaly and asked him to tell the Chinese that 
Washington was “prepared to attend a preliminary meeting at an early date” to make 
arrangements for sending a U.S. delegation to Beijing for higher-level talks, but he stated that the 
talks would not be “confined to the question of Taiwan” but all issues concerned with improving 
relations between the two governments. He also said the Chinese request for withdrawing U.S. 
forces from Taiwan was not hard to comply with because there were no military forces there 
except “advisory and training missions.”66  
Zhou Enlai’s reply came through Romanian Ambassador Corneliu Bogdan on January 
11, 1971. Even though he insisted that the U.S. “occupation” of Taiwan was the only 
“outstanding issue” between the two governments, Zhou wrote that Beijing was ready to receive !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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66 FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969-1972, Document 100. 
!!
163!
a U.S. special envoy if the United States had a “desire to settle the issue” and a “proposal for its 
solution.” More importantly, he added, since President Nixon had visited Bucharest and 
Belgrade, he would also be welcome to visit Beijing. It was the first time Zhou formally 
expressed Beijing’s willingness to receive the American President in China. Unfortunately, 
Nixon and Kissinger interpreted his message as China’s insistence on the U.S. agreement to the 
Chinese principle on Taiwan as a prerequisite for negotiations. Nixon wrote a note on 
Kissinger’s memo, “I believe we may appear too eager. Let’s cool it. Wait for them to respond to 
our initiative.”67 As the two sides were bargaining over the agenda through intermediaries, South 
Vietnamese forces invaded Laos with the air cover of the United States in February 1971. The 
incursion put the Sino-American secret negotiations on a temporary hold.  
The Laos Incursion 
The Chinese response to the Laos incursion was even milder than its response to the 
Cambodian invasion a year earlier. This time, Mao did not make any personal pronouncement 
attacking the United States. What the People’s Daily offered was his words, “So long as the 
peoples of Indochina work closely with each other and persist in a prolonged people’s war, they 
will definitely overcome whatever difficulties and win the final victory.” When it covered a half-
million-person demonstration against the United States in Beijing ten days later, it did not 
mention any Chinese leader being present.68 
According to Kissinger, on the day of the editorial attack on the Laos incursion in the 
People’s Daily, Qiao Guanhua, the Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister and an old associate of 
Zhou Enlai, told Ole Aalgard, the Norwegian Ambassador to China, that Beijing was aware of a 
new trend in American policy and he particularly expressed a desire to meet with Kissinger. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Washington noted the message and reassured Beijing of its limited purposes in Laos. In a press 
conference on February 17, Nixon declared that the operation in Laos was not directed against 
China.69  
Because part of the area invaded by the Saigon forces was close to the Chinese border, 
the response from Beijing was significant. Both the Times and the Post read from the Chinese 
statement that it would not resort to military counterattack in response. Under a Times headline, 
there was a small caption, “Peking Issues a Warning on Incursion--Ziegler Says It Is No Threat 
to China.” The juxtaposition of the two made the Chinese warning look much less threatening. 
When Xuan Thuy, the chief North Vietnamese negotiator in Paris, made the front page of the 
Times by declaring that the Laos incursion posed a threat to China, his statement was followed 
by the comments of the administration’s China specialists who expressed confidence that China 
would not intervene when the United States was withdrawing troops from the region.70 Similarly, 
when Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma reportedly claimed that Chinese volunteers might enter 
Laos, the Post run an article entitled “Peking Silent About ‘Volunteers’”71 These articles fostered 
the impression that Beijing and Washington would not fight over the Laos incursion. 
In the middle of the Laos incursion, Nixon sent another signal by addressing China with 
its official name in his State of the World Message to Congress on February 25, 1971. The most 
notable line was, “I wish to make it clear that the United States is prepared to see the People’s 
Republic of China play a constructive role in the family of nations.” On its front-page article 
entitled “Highlights of the Message,” the Times called attention to Nixon’s “subtle compliment” 
of China “the first of its kind by an American President.” Even though the Post still used 
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“Communist China” in commenting on Nixon’s desire to “establish a dialogue” with Beijing, it 
reprinted the section where he talked about the problems of Indochina and China.72  
The Post’s negligence of Nixon’s nuance might have to do with its preoccupation with 
the Vietnam War. As Kissinger stated, no matter how hard Nixon tried to make his annual State 
of the World Message a statement of the basic philosophy of American foreign policy, each year 
the press would focus on the section on Indochina. Instead of a debate over U.S. purpose in the 
world, it “invariably generated a discussion in Vietnam.”73 In reporting Nixon’s State of the 
World message, the Times headline was “Nixon Sees Risk of Isolationism if Disengagement is 
too Swift,” and the Post used “President Sees no Early End to War in Asia.” The networks also 
gave prominence to Indochina and the China policy in their coverage of Nixon’s report.74 
The Reference News was quick to catch Nixon’s signal. It carried an article that called 
attention to the fact that Nixon had used the PRC “seven times” in his foreign-policy report and 
that it was the first time an American president had done so in an official document. The next 
day, it reprinted on its front page the section of Nixon’s message about China and its source was 
not any foreign press agency, but “this newspaper.”75 This arrangement seemed to tell readers 
that Nixon’s message was not selected at random, but by the order from the central government. 
In contrast to the Reference News’ undistorted presentation of Nixon’s message, the 
People’s Daily attacked his administration for its determination to “occupy” Taiwan” and its 
“criminal trick” of creating “two Chinas.”76 By displaying China’s “firm” position on Taiwan, 
the article helped Beijing retain its public image as a revolutionary power. Nevertheless, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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secondary placement of the comments showed a reduced level of hostility to Washington. 
Sophisticated readers who read both newspapers could see the change in Beijing’s attitude 
toward the United States. 
Ping-Pong Diplomacy 
In late March 1971, the operation in Laos ended in a fiasco, eliminating an irritant 
between China and the United States. In April, Beijing made a bold initiative that greatly 
accelerated Sino-American rapprochement, a move that amazed the whole world. Between 28 
March and 7 April 1971, the thirty-first World Table Tennis Championships was held in Nagoya, 
Japan. From the beginning, Beijing regarded whether to send a team as a “political” issue 
because it would have been the first time for a Chinese sports team to appear in a major 
international event since the Cultural Revolution. According to Chen Jian, the Foreign Ministry 
and the National Commission on Sports were opposed to the idea at first because they were 
worried that Chinese players might have to deal with players from “puppet regimes” in South 
Vietnam and Cambodia. However, Mao and Zhou, who were well aware of the public relations 
value of the Chinese players in displaying the “new outlook” of the Chinese people to the world, 
decided to send their team.77  
During the championships, the People’s Daily devoted considerable space to the Chinese 
team’s activities besides reporting the game results. It repeatedly mentioned the theme of 
“friendship” in covering the interactions between Chinese players and those from other 
countries. In reporting the opening ceremony, it featured an article entitled “Transmitting 
Friendship through the Silver Ball--Chinese Ping-Pong Team in Nagoya.” In an article called 
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“Friendship first, Competition second,” the People’s Daily called on the Chinese players to “use 
politics to guide skills and friendship to direct matches.”78 
The Chinese players performed excellently in fulfilling their “political” task and showed 
extraordinary courtesy when they encountered American players on several occasions. On 27 
March, they talked with a few American players at the game’s opening reception. On 4 April, 
Glenn Cowan, a nineteen-year-old American player from Santa Monica College in California, 
boarded a bus carrying Chinese players “by accident,” as Chen Jian states. In the bus, three-time 
world champion Zhuang Zedong approached him and offered an embroidered scarf as a gift. 
When Cowan and the Chinese players got off the bus, they ran into a crowd of waiting 
journalists. The next day, Cowen returned the favor by giving Zhuang a Beatles T-shirt. Their 
exchange was again caught by journalists and cameras.79  
In reality, Cowan got into the bus not by accident, but by the invitation of Chinese 
players. According to Xiong Xianghui, the story that Reference Materials reprinted from Kyodo 
News Service went as follows: Cowan was hurriedly walking to the gym wearing a U.S. team 
jacket. When he passed by the bus for the Chinese players, they waved to him and said, “Are you 
going to the gym? Hop in.” Cowan was surprised, but he got in. 80  Without any prior 
encouragement from the government, Chinese players probably would not have been so 
forthcoming in dealing with U.S. players. 
What happened between Zhuang and Cowan might have encouraged the Chinese leaders 
to make bolder moves. According to Mao’s head nurse Wu Xujun, Mao, who was intrigued upon 
learning of the story between Zhuang and Cowan from the Reference Materials, praised Zhuang 
for his “diplomatic adroitness” and “political smartness.” During the tournament, leaders of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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American delegation had inquired repeatedly whether they could visit China when they met their 
Chinese counterparts. They became especially eager upon learning that Beijing had invited teams 
from England and Canada. When the American request was reported to Beijing, Zhou Enlai’s 
opinion was positive. Mao was undecided at the beginning. On 6 April, when the tournament 
was about to end, he suddenly made the decision to invite the American team.81 
On April 11, Beijing allowed three U.S. newsmen, John Roderick from the Associated 
Press along with John Rich and Jack Reynolds from NBC, to go with the American team. 
Roderick and Rich had reported from the mainland during the Chinese Civil War. In addition to 
them, there were two Japanese technicians working for NBC and two non-U.S. reporters working 
for Life magazine. On April 16, Tillman Durdin, head of the Times’ Hong Kong bureau and a 
prominent China watcher, was given a one-month visa, the first of this kind issued to an 
American journalist for regular news coverage since 1949.82 The selection of the New York 
Times was not an accident. Chinese leaders must have noticed its efforts in promoting better 
Sino-American relations and that it was the most influential U.S. newspaper. 
During the week in China, the American ping-pong team toured universities, factories as 
well as farms, watched a revolutionary ballet, and played exhibition matches with the Chinese 
players in front of a large audience. Besides Beijing, they toured Shanghai and Guangzhou 
(Canton). The People’s Daily devoted much space to their activities, even their departure from 
China. The matches between Chinese and American players received live coverage on Chinese 
television and radio. The Chinese television anchor’s comments that “for a long time, friendship 
has existed between the Chinese and American peoples” and that “the visit by the American !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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table-tennis team will enhance such friendship” had been examined and revised by Zhou Enlai 
carefully.83  
The high moment of the visit came on April 14, when Zhou Enlai met with the American 
team in the Hall of the People, where he said, “Your visit has opened a new page for more 
friendly relations between the two peoples.” The People’s Daily placed Zhou’s pictures with 
them in prominent places. The quotation of Mao for that day was, “People all over the world 
support each other in their just fight. Our friends are all over the world.”84  
Ping-Pong Diplomacy displayed Beijing’s use of “people-to-people” diplomacy before 
the establishment of the official relationship with Washington. Zhou Enlai’s welcoming speech 
as well as the Chinese media carefully separated the “aggressive and imperialistic” American 
government from the “heroic” American people.85 When the game in Japan was over, the 
People’s Daily featured an article entitled “Our Friends are all over the World.” It claimed that 
Chinese player Zhuang Zedong had reportedly told an American couple, “Even though the U.S. 
government is hostile to China, Chinese people and American people are friends. We 
differentiate the American government from the American people.” After the American team’s 
visit to China, the People’s Daily ran an editorial entitled “Salute to the Courageously Fighting 
American People.”86  
In order to prepare the Chinese people for a change in relations, Beijing started 
promoting the friendship between the two peoples in the media. The People’s Daily could not 
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directly comment on what the U.S. team’s visit meant to the official relations because Beijing 
had to worry about its “revolutionary” image. However, because of the media’s intensive 
coverage of the Americans’ activities in China, ordinary Chinese people could feel that 
something new was happening between the two countries. 
U.S. media were much more excited than their Chinese counterparts. When the Nixon 
administration completely lifted travel restrictions to China three weeks before the Chinese 
invitation, the Times and the Post did not attach too much meaning to the move.87 Beijing’s 
invitation to the first sizable group of Americans and its granting of visas to U.S. reporters 
thrilled American newspeople indeed. Walter Cronkite of CBS called the invitation a 
“consolation prize” for the U.S. team and “unexpected good news.” The Post headline was, 
“Surprise Served at Table Tennis Match: U.S. Team Invited to Peking.”88 Harrison Salisbury, in 
his Times column, claimed that the invitation was “not only a gesture of friendship, but also one 
of national honor” considering the importance of ping-pong as China’s “paramount international 
sport.” With a phrase “Major Policy Change” in its headline, the Times interpreted Beijing’s 
granting of visas to American newsmen as “more significant” than the invitation to the ping-
pong team in showing its discarding of the policy of “self-isolation.” It called the two moves as 
Beijing’s “first positive response” to American overtures.89 
For two weeks, John Roderick’s dispatches from Beijing made several front pages of the 
Times and the Post, and Ping-Pong Diplomacy occupied the prime time of the three networks. 
Frequently using Zhou Enlai’s remark about a “new page” in Sino-American relations, U.S. 
media presented overwhelmingly positive stories about China. The Post pictured that “the smile 
on the face of the dragon was dazzling” as the American team received “first class treatment, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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warm welcomes and speeches of friendship.” The Times reported Zhou’s meeting with the 
American team with a headline “Chou, 73, and ‘Team Hippie’ Hit It Off.”90 
The cover of Newsweek was a big cartoon depicting Mao and Nixon playing ping-pong 
with a caption “A New Game Begins.” It noticed that the Chinese ping-pong players appeared in 
Japan with “no small little red book, no chanting of quotations, no speech making and no 
singing.” Instead, they were “profusely” polite when socializing with their ping-pong rivals and 
the local people. Also, it put the “cleanness” of Guangzhou (Canton) in sharp contrast to the 
“litter-strewn shanty towns of Hong Kong” and claimed that everything, including the Chinese 
guards and officials, had been “freshly scrubbed.”91  
Time published several large pictures of the American team’s activities in China. In an 
article based on witness accounts of Life’s two reporters, it described China as “a nation that was 
unified and organized--with a level of poverty, but absolutely no misery” and the people as 
“healthy and self-confident. Moreover, it described Zhou Enlai as “smooth, very handsome, and 
quite witty.” In 1954 when Zhou Enlai led the Chinese delegation to the Geneva Convention, 
Life had called him “a political thug,” “a ruthless intriguer, a conscienceless liar and a saber-
toothed political assassin.”92 In the brand new atmosphere, newspapers and magazines also ran 
articles tracing the development of Sino-American relations. Some of them dated the “traditional 
friendship” between the two countries back to the American Revolution.93 
Television had obvious advantages in covering Ping-Pong Diplomacy. For the first time 
the networks had the chance to show films provided by the Chinese official news agency. As the 
only network with reporters in China, NBC sent over 10,000 feet of color film and 30-odd 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
90 WP, April 11, 1971, 1; NYT, April 15, 1971, 1. 
91 Newsweek, April 12, 1971, 57; May 17, 1971, 48. 
92 Time, April 26, 1971, 26-8; Life, June 28, 1954, 116, 125. 
93 NYT, April 15, 1971, 16; WP, April 12, 1971, A19; Newsweek, April 19, 1971, 62. 
!!
172!
voicecasts back to the United States through telephone relay without being censored by the 
Chinese.94 In the NBC video, there were smiling Chinese children holding Mao’s red books and 
a large crowd waving to the Americans when they toured the Summer Palace. During the 
exhibition matches between the Chinese and the American teams, 18,000 audience members 
were shown clapping for the American team. The most impressive scene of the game came at the 
closing ceremony when players of the two countries marched into the gym in pairs holding 
hands. In the end, the reporter stated, “In sports at least, the Chinese and the Americans have 
found a common meeting ground.”95  
ABC had its own way of illustrating the new relationship. While the anchor was talking 
in the studio, the background changed from the Communist “hammer and sickle” into two 
crossing ping-pong bats, each bearing the Chinese and American flags.96 Through the Canadian 
Broadcast Company, CBS ran a video of American players visiting the elite Qinghua University, 
where Chinese students produced tractors. Under the influence of the Cultural Revolution, it 
claimed, students would not be trained as an intellectual class, but workers with their own 
hands.97 
Ping-Pong Diplomacy excited Nixon so much that a few hours after Zhou Enlai’s 
meeting with the American team, he announced the plan to remove the trade embargo with China 
over non-strategic goods. White House Press Secretary Ron Ziegler deliberately linked it with 
Ping-Pong Diplomacy by telling the media that Nixon had made the decision two weeks earlier, 
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but the timing was greatly “influenced” by the Chinese decision to invite the American ping-
pong team and Zhou Enlai’s remarks about a “new page” in U.S.-China relations.98 
The Reference News well documented the positive response to Ping-Pong Diplomacy. It 
reprinted stories about how the American team was warmly received at the White House upon its 
return home, and Nixon’s hope to receive the Chinese ping-pong team as Zhou Enlai had the 
American team. It even reported that Nixon had started practicing ping-pong to prepare for the 
meeting with Chinese players. As always, it also reported the worries of Brezhnev and the 
Nationalists on Taiwan, and their concern about the possibility that Japan might follow the 
example of the United States.99  
Most observers knew that the venues visited by American players and journalists in 
China had been carefully screened and stage-managed. What matters, nonetheless, was that the 
overwhelmingly positive report on China by American journalists helped create an image of 
stability and rationality, which stood in sharp contrast to the chaos during the Cultural 
Revolution. They displayed to the world that the Chinese government felt confident enough to 
receive journalists from other countries, especially the United States. The film of Chinese and 
American players holding hands must have had a strong impact on American audiences. The 
Chinese government was well aware of the media’s role when it invited the American the ping-
pong team along with journalists. It is fair to say that the Chinese government successfully used 
American media to improve the chances for rapprochement. 
One of the few to express dissent about Ping-Pong Diplomacy in the Nixon 
administration was Vice President Spiro Agnew. While attending the spring Republican 
governor’s conference on April 19, Agnew told journalists that he had misgivings about Nixon’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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policy of easing relations with Beijing because it might undermine Taiwan’s position. He 
especially disliked the media’s overwhelming positive coverage of China, for example, their 
stories about the “contented and productive” lives of workers who lived in tiny apartments in 
Beijing. He argued that it helped the Chinese government achieve a “propaganda triumph” over 
the United States. Agnew’s remarks were so shocking that it made the headlines in newspapers 
and the networks. In order to clear up a possible policy rift within the Nixon administration, 
Ziegler summoned the media the next day and declared that there was “no disagreement” 
between the President and the Vice President and that Mr. Agnew “fully” supported Nixon’s 
initiatives to improve relations with China.100 While most media accepted Zielgler’s assertion, 
CBS speculated that Nixon might have “orchestrated” Agnew’s statement to appease 
conservatives.101 Agnew’s concern was directed at U.S. media because of their promotion of an 
overwhelmingly favorable image of China.  
U.S. media’s coverage of Ping-Pong Diplomacy most likely played an important role in 
changing public opinion about China. In its wake, a May Gallup Poll found that for the first time, 
people supporting the admission of China into the U.N. exceeded those who were against by a 
ratio of 45 percent to 37 percent. The poll also indicated that for the first time, Republican 
respondents who favored China’s U.N. membership exceeded those of their Democratic 
counterparts.102 It should be noted that this change happened before Washington announced in 
July Kissinger’s secret trip to China and Nixon’s coming visit to China. In reporting the poll 
results, while the Times used an article entitled “Gallup Poll Reports a Plurality Favors Entry of 
Peking in U.N,” which suggested favorable public opinion, the Post used a title “Peking U.N. 
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Seat Favored by 45%.”103 Whether the Post editor was deliberate in choosing such a headline or 
not, readers with no knowledge about past poll results could hardly read from it any significant 
progress or any sign of promising change in public opinion because it was below 50 percent. 
Kissinger’s Secret Trip to Beijing 
Ping-Pong Diplomacy, which turned out to be a great success, greatly encouraged leaders 
of the two governments to move toward a common ground. Soon after the U.S. ping-pong team 
left China, Zhou Enlai sent a message through Yahya to Nixon explaining that it had not been 
possible to reply earlier to his message “owing to the situation of the time.” Zhou changed the 
wording carefully, “As the relations between China and the U.S.A. are to be restored 
fundamentally, a solution to this crucial question can be found only through direct discussions 
between high-level responsible persons of the two countries.” Changing the negotiation focus 
from solving the Taiwan issue to restoring Sino-American relations, Zhou again included Nixon 
on the list of people invited to visit China.104  
Beijing’s concession cleared the last obstacle for the American president to accept the 
invitation. In his reply to Zhou Enlai on May 10, Nixon said that Kissinger was to visit Beijing in 
advance to discuss arrangements for a presidential visit and that he hoped the first meeting 
between Kissinger and Chinese officials be kept “strictly secret.” At first, Zhou was not too 
pleased with the suggestion about secrecy. After Yahya explained that Nixon wanted to handle 
these negotiations entirely by himself to prevent any politicians from disrupting his efforts until a 
“government-to-government channel” was established, Zhou Enlai accepted the American 
suggestion. When Washington and Moscow were about to reach an agreement on arms 
limitation, Nixon sent a special message to Zhou Enlai on May 20, reassuring him that the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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agreement was not “directed against the People’s Republic of China.” Finally on June 4, Nixon 
informed Zhou Enlai that in order to make arrangements for the presidential visit to China, 
Kissinger was to visit Beijing between July 9 and 11, 1971.105 
On June 10, the Nixon administration announced the relaxation of China trade, which 
went much further from the previous step announced during Ping-Pong Diplomacy. He 
authorized the export of a wide range of “nonstrategic items” and lifted all controls on imports 
from China. Though trade with China was still limited to “nonstrategic items,” the Times and the 
Post both regarded the policy as a move to “end the 21-year trade embargo against trade with 
China.” The Times regarded this announcement as “the most important milestone” in a two-year 
series of diplomatic efforts by Nixon to improve relations with China--the White House turned 
into a “major political occasion” when it issued the list of items that could be exported to China 
without special licensing. The Post viewed the Nixon measure as a “prelude” to an ending of 
U.S. opposition to China’s U.N. seat later in the year.106 Among the three networks, ABC 
commented that the biggest reaction to the U.S.-China trade announcement might occur in the 
Soviet Union. NBC interpreted it as a “resumption of direct trade” with China without 
considering the response of the Chinese government.107 Considering the insubstantial volume of 
trade between China and the United States at the time, the resumption of “direct trade” had more 
symbolic meaning than substance. While the Chinese media were not impressed by this gesture, 
U.S. media treated it with great prominence. Therefore, it had a larger impact on American 
audiences.  
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Three days before Kissinger set out on his disguised trip to Asia, the Times worried him 
by speculating that he might go to China in a story about possible new ambassadorial 
assignments in the Far East. As the article stated, the White House had “refused to confirm--and 
pointedly declined to deny--repeated reports” that Nixon had asked some months earlier that he 
or his representative Henry Kissinger be invited to China in early 1972. While William Rogers 
thought it was “funny,” Kissinger regarded it as a possible State Department leak to get him 
away from Washington.108 The context of that article was its claim that there was “a race to be 
the first prominent American official” to visit Beijing between Nixon and his Democratic 
competitors Senators George McGovern (D-SD) and Edward Kennedy (D-MA).109 Ping-Pong 
Diplomacy had brought about a favorable change in American opinions. After that celebrated 
event, Beijing invited several non-official U.S. delegations to visit China, which made American 
officials jealous. Politicians of both parties were anxious to gain benefits by visiting China, 
especially those interested in their party’s presidential nomination.  
On July 1, Kissinger started his visit to South Vietnam, Thailand, India, and Pakistan. At 
the beginning of the trip, he made it look as “boring” as possible to reduce media interest. Upon 
his arrival in Pakistan, the last leg of his tour, Kissinger started complaining about an upset 
stomach. As a result, all his appointments were cancelled and word was put out that he would 
recuperate at Pakistani President Yahya Khan’s rest house in Murree, a hill station not far from 
Islamabad. At 3:30 in the morning of July 9, Kissinger boarded a Pakistan International Boeing 
707, a civil flight with regular service to Beijing, and set on his adventure into China.110  
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The talks between Kissinger and Zhou Enlai went well. Before the trip, Nixon had told 
Kissinger to secure reassurances from Beijing that no other American political figure would be 
invited before his visit. Zhou said that he had a great pile of letters from American politicians 
asking for invitations, but he had not answered them. Zhou also told Kissinger that he had placed 
James Reston, vice president of the Times, on a slow train so that he would not arrive in Beijing 
until Kissinger had left.111 
Before the meeting was over, one last thing they could not agree upon was how to 
announce Kissinger’s secret trip and Nixon’s forthcoming visit to China. The Chinese wanted to 
make it appear that the U.S. president asked for the invitation. Kissinger, who did not want to 
give the impression that the United States was playing the role of supplicant, reminded Beijing 
that it was the Chinese who had proposed such a visit. Finally, under Mao’s instructions, the 
Chinese side agreed to the wording that suggested the initiative came from both sides. The final 
version was, “Knowing of President Nixon’s expressed desire to visit the People’s Republic of 
China, Premier Zhou Enlai on behalf of the People’s Republic of China has extended an 
invitation to President Nixon to visit China at an appropriate time before May 1972. President 
Nixon had accepted the invitation with pleasure”112 With their final agreement on the agenda of 
Nixon’s trip, the next step for Beijing and Washington was to make the announcement that 
shocked the world. 
While Beijing and Washington were reaching agreements on Nixon’s visit to China, he 
dropped hints in this direction on several public occasions. Unfortunately, these hints impressed 
the Chinese more than U.S. media. Besides his interview with Time published in October 1970, 
Nixon explicitly talked about his intention to visit China on at least two occasions in April 1971. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The first was on April 16, when he spoke to the convention of the American Society of 
Newspaper Editors, two days after Zhou Enlai’s meeting with the American ping-pong team. 
Nixon said he had suggested his two daughters consider visiting China for their honeymoon. He 
also said, “I hope they do, as a matter of fact, I hope sometime I do. I am not sure that it is going 
to happen while I am in office.” Neither the Times nor the Post was impressed by his remark in 
their front-page stories the next day. The second occasion occurred at the end of a news 
conference on April 29, the day before Life published Snow’s article containing Mao’s signal to 
him. Nixon said, “I would finally suggest--I know this question may come up if I don’t answer it 
now--I hope, and as a matter of fact, I expect to visit mainland China sometime in some 
capacity--I don’t know what capacity. But that indicates what I hope for the long run.” Nixon 
gloated in his memoir that “even the most rigorous monitors and analysts of Nixon rhetoric” 
could not pick up his hints.113 In both cases, “tricky Dick” deliberately left the date of the China 
trip open, which made him look not so serious about it. However, the Reference News faithfully 
reprinted his remarks at prominent places.114 The Chinese newspaper understood well his signals. 
On another occasion, when addressing a large group of Midwestern media executives in 
Kansas City on July 6, 1971, Nixon spent considerable time talking about the potential of China 
and the importance of improving relations with it. Again it attracted more attention in Beijing 
than in the United States.115 Actually, when Zhou Enlai mentioned Nixon’s speech in Kansas 
City to Kissinger during their talk in Beijing, Kissinger was embarrassed that he knew nothing 
about it. Later, he had to borrow a copy of the speech from Zhou Enlai.116 Having known about 
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the secret from the top, the official Chinese media were probably more alert to Nixon’s signals 
than independent U.S. papers. 
Another reason for the failure of American newspeople to take seriously Nixon’s remarks 
about visiting China was because they had seen such comments before. As early as 1960 when 
he campaigned against John F. Kennedy, the Post carried articles that speculated on the 
possibility of Nixon’s use of a China trip as a “gimmick” to promote his own reputation. They 
thought he might want to repeat the personal triumph he had achieved while confronting Soviet 
Premier Nikita Khrushchev in the famous “Kitchen Debate” a year earlier.117 None of those 
stories turned into reality eventually.  
Moreover, Nixon and Kissinger had been very successful keeping their communications 
with Beijing secret. Even Secretary of State Rogers did not learn of Kissinger’s secret trip to 
Beijing until July 8, when Nixon told him that it was a “last-minute decision” in response to an 
invitation received while Kissinger was in Pakistan.118 Before the two countries established 
diplomatic relations, no one could image Nixon meeting Mao, regardless of what he said.119 By 
comparing U.S. media with the Reference News, it seemed that more Chinese picked Nixon’s 
hints about visiting China than Americans before Kissinger’s secret trip to China was announced. 
Conclusion  
The period between the renewal of the Warsaw contact in December 1969 and 
Kissinger’s secret trip to Beijing in July 1971 witnessed the most important breakthrough in 
Sino-American reconciliation. During this period, Beijing became a much more active 
participant in the “intricate minuet” in which leaders of the two governments communicated their 
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desire to improve relations through sophisticated means. When there was no direct contact 
between them, the media in both countries functioned as the message carriers.  
As U.S. media correctly pointed out, Beijing’s entrance into talks with Washington 
marked the beginning of the triangular politics with the Soviet Union as the third player. The 
Chinese eagerness to publicize the meetings with the Americans was mainly used to increase the 
Soviet concern. Besides displaying to the world Beijing’s support for the Indochinese people, the 
anti-U.S. campaign in the Chinese media was also aimed to embarrass Moscow. Though Beijing 
broke off the Warsaw talks in response to the U.S. invasion of Cambodia, it was tough on words 
but flexible in deeds, leaving the door open for further contacts with Washington.  
A key feature of the “intricate minuet” was that many of the signals emanating from the 
two capitals were unilateral steps that did not require reciprocity and several of these signals did 
not reach the intended audience. While Beijing’s release of the bishop was well received in U.S. 
media, Mao’s signals through Edgar Snow were too nuanced for U.S. media and the government 
to comprehend. Similarly, Nixon’s signals by addressing China with its proper name at the 
reception for Ceausescu and his remarks about visiting China did not attract enough attention in 
U.S. media. The Chinese media were more impressed with these signals because they showed 
that the U.S. government had accorded China its “rightful” place in the world. 
Another difference was that U.S. media seemed to be more interested than their Chinese 
counterparts in Nixon’s initiatives of releasing trade and travel restrictions. Between 1969 and 
1971, the Nixon administration shrewdly coordinated the timing of these announcements with 
important political events, such as Nixon’s Asia trip in July 1969, the renewal of Warsaw 
contacts in December 1969, and Ping-Pong Diplomacy in April 1971.The prominent coverage 
and positive response from U.S. media helped reinforce the effect of these initiatives. Though 
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U.S. media were free from government control, they acted as the unwitting “cooperative partner” 
of the government in promoting Sino-American rapprochement.120 
By inviting American ping-pong players to China and allowing U.S. reporters to cover 
their activities, Beijing achieved a great public-relations success. As a landmark in Sino-
American relations, Ping-Pong Diplomacy made great contributions to preparing the two peoples 
for a change in relations. For the audiences in both countries, it was the first time to see friendly 
exchanges between the two peoples since the establishment of the PRC. The headlines, pictures, 
and videos had a profound impact on their perception of the relations. More importantly, U.S. 
media’s overwhelmingly positive coverage of China changed its image from a militant, irrational 
revolutionary power into a more stable country that was rational and possible to deal with. In this 
sense, the media functioned as not only observers, but also as crucial participants in U.S.-China 
rapprochement.  
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Chapter 6: Preparing for the Show in Beijing: 1971-1972 
After the announcement of Kissinger’s secret trip to Beijing in July 1971, both 
Washington and Beijing faced problems at home. Nixon needed to deal with the formidable 
challenges from conservatives who stood up for Taiwan. He could counter their opposition with 
a well-calculated public-relations project to maximize media coverage of his China trip, 
especially through television. In an election year, this would appeal to the majority of 
Americans, who could understand the benefits to be gained through the dramatic diplomatic 
breakthrough. 
On the other hand, Beijing used different channels, especially its media, to accustom its 
people to the fact that their government had forged a new relationship with the United States, 
formerly its archenemy. Nixon’s trip turned out to be a great success for both his own 
administration and China. Massive media coverage contributed to and became part of this 
success story. This chapter studies how the two governments prepared for the Beijing summit 
through their respective media and then how the media covered the visit itself.  
Impact of the Announcement 
At 7:30 on the evening of July 15, 1971, in the NBC studio in Burbank, California, 
President Nixon announced that Henry Kissinger had paid a secret visit to Beijing and met with 
Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai during his recent Asian tour, and that he had accepted Zhou’s 
invitation to visit China sometime before May 1972.1 Eager to be part of the “historic moment,” 
Nixon had requested airtime so that his “major policy statement” would receive live broadcasting 
on national radio and television. 
As Nixon hoped, his photo as well as the “surprising” news became the main headlines in 
the two elite newspapers as well as the cover story of the newsmagazines. The Times described !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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his acceptance of the visit as “simply astounding” and a “dizzying performance.” The Post 
compared the China trip to a “moon landing” and called the news “mind-blowing.” It went as far 
as predicting a “possible end of the Cold War.” Time was amazed by the “extraordinary Nixon-
Kissinger diplomatic adventure.” Calling Nixon’s move a “political masterstroke,” Newsweek 
argued that his “awesome power” in conducting foreign affairs had “shattered two decades of 
hallowed American policy” in just three and half minutes.2 In the case of Kissinger’s secret trip, 
the media seemed to support Nixon’s use of the executive power for the sake of good ends.  
In response to the Nixon announcement, congressional leaders including Senate Majority 
Leader Mike Mansfield (D-MT), House Republican Leader Gerald Ford (R-MI), and Senate 
Republican Leader Hugh Scott (R-PA), in addition to Senator George McGovern (D-SD), who 
was the only announced Democratic Presidential candidate, responded favorably. Two 
conservative Republicans, Senators James Buckley (R-NY) and John Tower (R-TX), expressed 
their opposition. In evaluating the overall response, the Times claimed that Nixon had won 
“bipartisan support” and the conservative Republicans constituted only “a handful.” The Post 
described it as “universally favorable.” Time mentioned conservatives who compared Nixon’s 
move to going to Berlin to “wine and dine with Adolf Hitler.” Noting the irony that Nixon’s 
announcement came during the “Free China Week” designed by supporters of Taiwan, it 
admitted that Nixon’s anti-Communist credentials made him far less vulnerable than a liberal 
Democratic President. In an article “A Setback for the Democrats,” Newsweek similarly noted 
how Nixon could easily get away with such a bold move when the conservative outcry was 
“surprisingly slight.”3 
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Though Nixon said in the announcement that his decision was not made “at the expense 
of old friends,” journalists noted its ramifications for Taiwan. The front pages of the Times and 
the Post not only published photos of Nixon, Zhou Enlai, and Kissinger, but also those of 
Nationalist Ambassador to the United States James Shen and Premier C.K. Yen. They predicted 
that Nixon’s visit to China would increase the chance of China’s entrance into the U.N. and 
Taiwan’s expulsion.4 A cartoon in Time featured Uncle Sam leading Mao to the door of the UN 
with a subtitle “Tell’em Sam sent you.” Newsweek ran a picture of the Nationalist leader Jiang 
Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) looking afar with a telescope. The subtitle was “Chiang: A Bleak 
Prospect.”5 Though journalists offered generally favorable reviews of the Nixon visit, their 
expressed worry about Taiwan served as a restraint on Nixon’s approach to Taiwan. 
In contrast to Nixon’s dramatic announcement of his trip, the Chinese media handled the 
news with a much lower profile. The People’s Daily placed the joint announcement on the front 
page, but in the lower right corner. While other articles were arranged horizontally and easier to 
read, the font of the announcement was smaller and the text was arranged vertically, which made 
it harder to read.6 This arrangement shows the complex mentality of the Chinese leadership. On 
one hand, they knew that the visit to China by the head of a former enemy was important news. 
On the other, its secondary position on the front-page displayed the detachment of the Chinese 
government, which did not want to appear too excited about Nixon’s visit.  
After the announcement, the People’s Daily refrained from making any commentaries on 
the Nixon trip. The only one it published was an editorial entitled “The Tide of History is 
Irresistible” reprinted from North Korea’s Rodong Sinmun (Newspaper of the Workers). Buried 
on the last page, this editorial claimed that Nixon’s planned visit to China signified the failure of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the United States in “isolating and containing China” and that it was “a great victory of the 
Chinese people as well as the revolutionary people of the world.”7 Beijing apparently suggested 
that the North Korean article represented the position of all “revolutionary” people of the world. 
While the People’s Daily refrained from making comments on Nixon’s visit, the 
Reference News devoted considerable space to the shock and positive response of the 
international community. For example, it reprinted Agence France Presse (AFP)’s claim that 
Nixon had exploded the “most shocking bomb of diplomacy” and Reuters’s comments that the 
“warming between Washington and Beijing will have incalculable impact on the world situation, 
especially the Vietnam War and the general election the next year.” It even included a story 
about how Nixon had spent “the happiest night” by having a dinner of “crab leg and wine” 
before making the historic announcement. For a diplomatic payoff, it reported how the Greek 
government declared that Nixon’s move would accelerate its negotiations with China over 
normalization of relations.8 The positive world response in the Reference News vindicated to the 
Chinese people the correctness of the government decision to host Nixon. 
The articles selected by the Reference News also highlighted a theme that the Chinese 
government had been consistent in its position on Sino-American relations while the United 
States had changed its policy. It reprinted a comment from an Egyptian newspaper that claimed, 
“The American Giant had been beaten by the Asian Giant” and Zbigniew Brzezinski’s 
Newsweek article that argued Nixon’s action symbolized a “kowtow” to Beijing.9 In an article 
“Why did Mao agreed to let Nixon Come to Beijing,” Zhou Enlai told several foreign visitors 
that it was the United States, not China, that had taken the initiative, and that he did not think of 
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the new contact between the two governments as something of a “miracle.” By comparing a 
growing China with a declining United States plagued with all kinds of problems, Beijing 
wanted to show the world it was the United States that was anxious to seek reconciliation. These 
commentaries also reduced the threat of the United States before the Chinese audience and made 
their own country appear superior. 
Nixon’s Media Campaign 
In order to guarantee the success of his trip, Nixon started his own media campaign. First, 
he had to deal with unrealistic illusions about it. In briefing Congressional leaders on July 19, he 
cautioned against tying it to the solution in Vietnam. Press Secretary Ron Ziegler made similar 
comments in his news briefing afterward.10 
Moreover, Nixon asked Kissinger to explain the rationale of the new development in 
communicating with the media. After his return from Asia, Kissinger held several news briefings 
hosted by the White House or in the presidential jet from California to Washington. In those 
briefings, he made very positive comments about his China experience and Zhou Enlai in 
particular.11 In a memo, Nixon asked Kissinger to tell the press how he himself was “uniquely 
prepared” for the meeting and how “ironically” he was similar to Zhou Enlai in terms of 
personality and background in coming up through “adversity.”12  
Nixon also changed his discourse on China. In a press conference on August 4, 1971, he 
claimed that China could potentially become the “most powerful nation in the world” and that 
there could be no world peace without communication between the “two great superpowers, the 
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People’s Republic of China and the United States.”13 By elevating China to the status of a “super 
power,” Nixon wanted to magnify the impact of his trip. Granting China such an equal status 
could also unsettle the Soviet Union in the triangular relationship. 
Nixon’s dramatic announcement of his China trip encouraged other countries to seek 
diplomatic relations with Beijing, which directly affected the balance in the UN vote on China’s 
membership. In fact, since the UN vote a year earlier when China’s entry won a simple majority 
for the first time, the Nixon administration had envisioned that it would not be able to stop the 
inevitable. The State Department proposed “dual representation,” which meant a shift from 
stopping the entry of Beijing to fighting against Taiwan’s expulsion. Due to his concern for the 
conservatives, Nixon still felt leery about announcing the policy shift. According to Kissinger, 
Nixon prevented Rogers from announcing the policy in January, April, and June 1971.When 
Kissinger met with Zhou Enlai in July, he got the impression that the UN seat was not Beijing’s 
utmost concern and that it could continue to wait if conditions to enter was not favorable. Seeing 
the positive response to his announcement of the China trip, Nixon became convinced that “the 
price was manageable.” He then authorized Rogers to declare on August 2 that in the coming fall 
at the General Assembly the United States would support the seating of China, but it would 
oppose the expulsion of Taiwan.14 In a conversation on September 30, 1971, Nixon and 
Kissinger told U.S. Ambassador George Bush to “fight hard” to keep Taiwan in the UN. At the 
same time, Nixon told Rogers that he did not want any “personal involvement” in the UN issue, 
particularly when Washington was “working on” Beijing.15 Besides his consideration of the 
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ongoing Sino-American reconciliation, Nixon was taking steps to disassociate himself from a 
possible defeat. 
The most important part of Nixon’s preparatory work was with the media. Washington 
Post’s White House correspondent Carroll Kilpatrick said that Nixon “understood the press 
better than Johnson did and he knew how to make news.”16 Early in his political career, Nixon 
had learned about the power of the media in the Alger Hiss case, which not only brought him 
national prominence but also made him the enemy of eastern liberals and particularly the eastern 
media.17 Though Nixon despised most journalists and he believed that they hated him in return, 
as a shrewd politician, he was well aware of the importance of their favorable coverage of his 
trip, which he knew would place him in a unique position in history and would help him in his 
re-election.18 Among different forms of the media, Nixon was particularly suspicious of the print 
press. Living in an era when television had become widely available to ordinary Americans, he 
knew well that television could help him reach a large number of people with far less physical 
effort.19 In his “farewell” to the journalists in 1962, he declared, “Thank God for television and 
radio for keeping the newspapers a little more honest.”20 After he became president, Nixon chose 
to deliver his key messages through television speeches. As he told the press, “I think the 
American people are entitled to see the President and to hear his views directly and not to see 
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him through the press.”21 Kissinger said, “Television in front of the President is like alcohol in 
front of an alcoholic.”22  
John Ehrlichman, Nixon’s Assistant for Domestic Affairs, described him as “usually 
capable of a passionless and penetrating analysis of his press opportunities” and that he thought 
“like an editor.”23 With his China trip, Nixon believed that “people” contact was more important 
than meetings in terms of public relations. Before Kissinger’s interim trip in October, Nixon 
asked him to raise the question of Pat Nixon’s going since he wanted her to act as a “prop” for 
“good people pictures.” He also thought it was a good opportunity to convey to the American 
audience the “human side of the Chinese.” He told his chief of staff Robert Haldeman, “On TV 
the American President received by a million Chinese is worth a hundred times the effect of a 
communiqué.”24 
As a successful advertising man in Los Angeles and a tireless worker, Haldeman was not 
only Nixon’s chief of staff, but also his chief “stage manager.” He shared Nixon’s suspicions of 
the media and his consciousness of their role in public relations. Knowing well how to sell an 
image, Haldeman wanted to make sure that Nixon “shone” as a great leader and statesman in 
China.25 According to Kissinger, in the cabinet meeting upon his return from the secret trip to 
China, what concerned Haldeman most was the “size of the press contingent.” He was 
“disdainful” upon learning that Kissinger had not settled the issue with Zhou Enlai, especially 
when Kissinger said that forty was enough, which was even less than the number of secret 
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service people. As he said, “Haldeman saw no sense in making history if television was not there 
to broadcast.”26  
In order to guarantee the success of TV coverage, the White House worked, in the words 
of the Post columnist Don Oberdorfer, “hand-in-glove” for several months to bring it about. 
According to him, four days after Nixon’s announcement of his China trip on TV, the 
Washington bureau chiefs of the three networks met with Press Secretary Ron Ziegler to talk 
about coverage. The networks put forward three plans: film cameras only with footage to be 
flown out of China and transmitted to the American audience via satellite from Tokyo, Seoul or 
Hong Kong; film cameras only with footage transmitted directly from China via satellite through 
a ground station in China; and live coverage with electronic cameras transmitting images directly 
from a Chinese ground station. They pushed hard without hopes of success for the third choice--
live coverage.27  
During Kissinger’s trip to Beijing in October, he secured from Zhou Enlai the permission 
to build ground stations in China. Zhou said he understood the equipment would be used to 
“manage the whole show.”28 In early January when Kissinger’s deputy General Alexander Haig 
and Ziegler led the advance team of eighteen into China, seven network executives and engineers 
went along. Their job was to install the ground stations to be used for communication and live 
transmission through satellites. During his talks with the Chinese, Haig emphasized the 
importance of making Nixon’s trip a “visible success.” Travelling to Beijing, Shanghai, and 
Hangzhou, the advance group literally traced every place Nixon planned to visit, paced every 
step he might take, and worked on every camera angle.29 
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The White House also gave extraordinary privileges to networks in allocating the seats of 
correspondents who would travel to China. In the list of eighty-seven newsmen Ziegler 
announced on February 7, 1972, only fifteen independent newspapers were invited and six went 
to the two wire services. Three went to columnists Richard Wilson, William Buckley whom 
Ziegler described as a “conservative,” and Joseph Kraft whom he depicted as a 
“nonconservative.”30 Six slots went to magazines including Reader’s Digest, which did not 
normally cover the White House but was friendly to Nixon.31 Each of the three networks could 
send four correspondents. In addition to the eight seats for cameramen and seventeen for 
television technicians, they received thirty-seven in total. This did not include the sixty television 
technicians who had arrived in China earlier in the month. In the end, the networks each had 
twenty-one seats while newspapers, magazines, and non-network broadcast organizations had 
only one seat each--if they were lucky. In order to attend the festivities, many TV executives and 
producers disguised themselves as “television technicians” bumping real engineers.32 
Max Frankel, the only Times correspondent lucky to be on the press plane, talked about 
the “massive competition” he faced when he arrived in China. As he wrote, “From the moment 
we landed, I saw myself outgunned by cameras, so I labored to paint verbal pictures into 
interpretive commentaries in ways that television could not match.”33 Frankel won a Pulitzer 
Prize in 1973 for his reporting of Nixon’s epochal trip. The three networks also “scooped” the 
print media when TV Guide reported a week in advance many details of Nixon’s plans, which the 
newspapers were jealous of but had to employ in their own reports.34  
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To deal with conservative fears of the betrayal of Taiwan, on February 9, a week before 
his departure for China, Nixon reiterated in his State of the World message that the United States 
would maintain its “friendship, diplomatic ties, and defense commitment” with Taiwan.35 Three 
days before his departure, he ordered a further ease in Chinese trade restrictions whose effect, as 
Ziegler told the media, would place China on an equal footing with the Soviet Union and East 
European countries. Though Ziegler denied that the timing of the new trade action was 
connected to Nixon’s forthcoming trip, his words that “we would hope that the People’s 
Republic of China will be receptive to this step” was interpreted by both the Times and the Post 
on their front pages as a move to “improve the political atmosphere” for the visit. In the press 
briefing, Ziegler also referred to Nixon’s recent meeting with André Malraux, the celebrated 
French author who had known Mao and Zhou since the 1930s 3%7! -37! E.8,! 6%,.126,,.%,!;0%,3;,!B6,-! ,-.2! ,-10'<-! ,-.!).314. Nixon had recommended his book “Anti-Memoirs” to 
the journalists in his press conference on February 10, 1972. When he honored Malraux with a 
small working dinner with many officials, Nixon invited ABC commentator Howard Smith to be 
present.36 By showing the media how “diligently” he was preparing for the China trip, Nixon 
was building the crescendo of his “show.” 
Preparing the Chinese People for the New Relations 
When Beijing made the decision to reconcile with its former number-one enemy, it took 
great efforts to educate the Chinese people, who had been taught to hate the American 
“imperialists,” about a new relationship. Beijing’s education was done at three different levels: 
the internal channel of the Party institution, the semi-internal channel through the Reference 
News, and its main propaganda machine--the People’s Daily. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 NYT, February 10, 1972, 20. 
36 WP, February 15, 1972, 1; NYT, February 15, 1972, 1, February 11, 1972, 16. See also Nixon, The 
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In order to reduce the shock to the Chinese people before the announcement of 
Kissinger’s secret trip and Nixon’s visit, Beijing first informed the top leadership in the Party, 
the government, and the military. On May 26, 1971, under Mao’s instructions, Zhou Enlai 
explained to the CCP Politburo the rationale of Sino-American rapprochement. Stressing that the 
decline of the United States and its desire to leave Vietnam had caused it to seek reconciliation 
with China and that an improvement in Sino-American relations would be beneficial to the 
struggle against “imperialist expansion and hegemonism,” to peace in Asia as well as in the 
world, and to China’s security and the solution to its “unification problem” in a peaceful way, 
Zhou pointed out that a successful opening might accelerate the “competition between the two 
superpowers” and benefit China.37 
Between May 27 and 31, the central government convened a national conference on 
foreign affairs, where Zhou Enlai suggested that the attendees should adapt to the new situation 
when China would renew its contact with the world and receive people from “the left, the center, 
and the right.”38  On May 31, the Central Committee, with Mao’s approval, ordered the 
distribution of the minutes of Mao’s interview with Edgar Snow to the party’s bottom branches 
and that it be “verbally related to every party member.” It also ordered, “the study of the 
interview should be carefully organized so that the spirit of the chairman’s words will be 
correctly comprehended.”39 On June 4, Zhou Enlai read the “Report of the CCP’s Politburo on 
Sino-American Talks” at a working conference attended by two hundred and twenty–five 
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officials from different levels.40 After the joint announcement of Nixon’s visit, the CCP on July 
21 issued a confidential document to local party branches, explaining that the chairman himself 
had invited Nixon and that it was “another tactic in the struggle against imperialism.”41 These 
measures aimed to make sure that rank-and-file party members understood Mao’s decision.  
On August 17, 1971, the People’s Daily published a front-page article entitled “A 
Powerful Weapon to Unite the People and Defeat the Enemy--On Policy.” The article called for 
a study of Mao’s 1940 article “On Policy,” which argued for cooperating with the Nationalists in 
fighting the Japanese. By referring to this “united-front” policy, the editorial implied that 
reconciliation with the United States was a tactic to deal with the more threatening Soviet Union. 
The second level of education was through the internal newspaper--the Reference News, 
which was the only source for most Chinese cadres and intellectuals to learn about foreign 
affairs, especially the status of the Sino-American reconciliation. In July 1970, before Snow 
started visiting China, Mao had ordered the most dramatic expansion in the circulation of the 
Reference News so that it could be read by all local party branches in factory workshops, village 
production teams, PLA companies, and among college students. He even suggested putting the 
Reference News on public bulletin boards so that everyone could read it. As a result, its 
circulation increased from 400,000 in 1964 to around five million in 1970.42 At the working 
conference on foreign affairs in May 1971, Zhou Enlai said, “After his meeting with Chairman 
Mao, Snow published articles, which had been read all over the world. We should reprint their 
excepts in the Reference News. If the current circulation of four to five million is not enough, we 
can add a million more copies.” His point was that every local party branch should have 
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Reference News, from which the cadres could learn about the chairman’s assessment of the 
international situation.43 The arrangement greatly enlarged the impact of the Reference News. By 
educating more people about the international situation, Beijing made it easier for them to 
understand its ongoing rapprochement with the United States.  
Between May and June 1971, the Reference News published on its front pages six articles 
written by Snow. On June 19, it ran a special notice that read, “From June 17, this newspaper 
publishes American friend Edgar Snow’s articles about his China trip one piece every other day. 
Readers, please pay attention.” It also reprinted an article from Life magazine carrying Nixon’s 
remark to Time that he would like to visit China.44 The publication of these inside stories in the 
Reference News attracted so much attention in China that the readers’ demand could still not be 
met even though many of its local offices printed copies far above the quota. As it turned out, 
instead of one million more copies required by Zhou, two and a half million more copies were 
printed.45 Before Kissinger’s secret visit in July 1971, millions of Chinese had learned that Nixon 
wanted to visit China and that Mao was willing to meet with him. 
To educate the largest number of Chinese about the new relations with the United States, 
Beijing conducted “people-to-people” diplomacy, which was based on a separation of the 
“heroic” or “revolutionary” American people from the “imperialistic” or “oppressive” American 
government.46 By displaying American visitors to the Chinese people through public ceremonies, 
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banquets, and the intensive coverage of the Chinese media, especially the People’s Daily, the 
Chinese government promoted the friendship between the two peoples. 
Beijing’s “people-to-people” diplomacy started with Edgar Snow. During his stay in 
China, Snow felt like a “symbol to be paraded” by the Chinese who arranged him to attend so 
many banquets and ceremonies that he had no real chance to talk to people long enough to learn 
anything.47 During his interview with Snow on December 18, 1970, Mao questioned the policy 
of not allowing Americans to visit China and said that the Foreign Ministry should study the 
issue of inviting Americans from the “left, middle, and right.” On 17 February 1971, when the 
Foreign Ministry’s report reached his desk, Mao approved it.48  
After the celebrated Ping-Pong Diplomacy, Beijing invited several American delegations 
to China. Though the People’s Daily claimed that the Chinese People’s Association for 
Friendship with Foreign Countries, a non-governmental organization, made these invitations, its 
official nature was not hard to discern. Its head Wang Guoquan was the former Chinese 
Ambassador to Poland, who had been involved in talking with the Americans in Warsaw during 
the Johnson Administration.49 
The People’s Daily provided no information on the identity or occupation of these 
visitors and simply addressed them as “American friends” or “American visitors of goodwill.” A 
closer look, however, reveals that many of these people were either leftists who had been victims 
during the McCarthy era or activists of the Civil Rights movement. For example, there was John 
Service and Koji Ariyoshi, both of whom were members of the Dixon Mission, a group of State 
Department officials who had worked with the Communists at their headquarter in Yan’an in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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1940s. William Hinton, a Marxist journalist and vocal China sympathizer who lost his job during 
the McCarthy Era, stayed in China for seven months with his wife. During their stay, Zhou 
Enalai met with them five times and all meetings were placed on the front pages of the People’s 
Daily. There were also members of the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars and radical 
students who supported the Chinese Cultural Revolution. Beijing invited as well African 
American delegations whose “revolutionary struggle” had been applauded in the Chinese media. 
They included the Black Worker’s Congress, the Black Panthers, and prominent communist 
activists like Bill Epton. The Hintons and the three leaders of the Black Panthers were treated as 
state leaders when they were invited to attend the National Day reception hosted by Zhou Enlai 
in 1971.50 Admitting Americans that had been “friendly” to China was good for Beijing because 
these people were more likely to write positively about China when they returned home. 
The People’s Daily’s coverage of these delegations had a common pattern. Neither 
revealing the contents of the meetings nor elaborating on their significance, it focused on 
apolitical news such as their tour itineraries. For every American delegation, there were separate 
news entries covering its arrival or departure when the visitor(s) were received or seen off at the 
airport or train station by Chinese officials. Though these delegations were non-governmental in 
nature, Zhou Enlai actually met with almost every one of them irrespective of their numbers. 
Stories of Zhou’s meeting with the American visitors, usually with photos taken, were placed on 
prominent places in the People’s Daily. The frequency of coverage was also increased by the fact 
that Zhou Enlai met with several Americans together after receiving them individually. As a 
result of this intensive coverage, there was news about American visitors in China in the 
People’s Daily every few days, especially during the second half of 1971. At one time during !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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September and October, there were three or four such stories on a single day. The intensive 
coverage of so many American visitors in the official newspaper cultivated among the Chinese a 
friendly atmosphere between the two peoples. 
Beijing’s people-to-people diplomacy also included its working on U.S. media when it 
allowed U.S. journalists into China after Ping-Pong Diplomacy. According to Seymour Topping, 
managing editor of the Times, when he, along with William Attwood of Newsday and Robert 
Keatley of the Wall Street Journal, attended a dinner hosted by Zhou Enlai in June 1971, the 
Chinese Premier expressed his belief that American journalists could help to “mobilize their 
fellow countrymen to bring about the withdrawal of American forces from Taiwan and 
Indochina.” Topping perceived Beijing’s effort to “court” American public opinion to realize its 
foreign-policy aims.51 
After Beijing opened the door to American journalists in April 1971, it treated the New 
York Times with special privileges. As stated in the last chapter, chief of the Hong Kong Bureau 
Tillman Durbin had been the first American newsman to receive a visa to report in China. Both 
Durdin and Topping were old China hands who had reported extensively from the country before 
the Communist victory in 1949.52 Max Frankel claimed that the reputation of the Times had been 
established because Topping had married Audrey Ronning, whose father Chester Ronning had 
been the chargé d'affaires of the Canadian embassy in China between 1949 and 1951 and an “old 
friend” of Zhou Enlai.53 When talking about foreign-news coverage of China, the Reference 
News especially noted that the number of China stories in the Times increased to five times since 
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Ping-Pong Diplomacy.54 Beijing must have been impressed by the influence of the Times and 
especially its generally favorable coverage of China. 
In May 1971, James Reston became the third Times journalist to receive a visa to enter 
China. Upon his entrance from Hong Kong, the Reference News ran a special entry introducing 
him as “an influential figure in the American journalistic as well as the political circles” with 
“close connections” to the U.S. government.55 When he got in Beijing, Reston developed an 
acute appendicitis and underwent surgery in the Anti-Imperialist Hospital. As soon as he 
recovered, Reston published on the front page of the Times an article elaborating on how well he 
was treated as Zhou Enlai had sent eleven leading medical experts to work on his case, which 
was not a major surgery. Reston also catered to the imagination of Americans by writing in 
length about how the Chinese doctor treated his pain with acupuncture, a traditional Chinese 
therapy that many Americans considered mysterious.56  
Reston also received the honor of an official interview with Zhou Enlai on August 9, 
1971. In the interview, Zhou expressed his admiration for the Times because it criticized Nixon’s 
invasion of Cambodia a year earlier. Reston was proud of the position of his newspaper. When 
Zhou Enlai praised Nixon’s courage to visit China, Reston did not give him much 
acknowledgement. While admitting that Nixon’s trend of thought on Vietnam and China was 
“bold and even right,” Reston criticized his lack of “clarity and definition and boldness” to cut 
the killing in Indochina and to normalize relations with China. When Zhou expressed his desire 
to see the solution of the Indochina conflict before the Taiwan issue, Reston’s position was, “We 
cannot resolve the problems in the world without China… but we can resolve the problems of the 
world without Taiwan.” Reston also commented on Nixon’s personality as a Californian and his !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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ambition to get reelected so that he could “preside over the 200th anniversary of the Declaration 
of Independence.” He described the “Nixon turnaround” as simply a “personal redemption” by 
which he attempted to repair the damage he had done to Sino-American relations as the alleged 
chief “red-baiter.” After publishing the interview transcripts, the Times optimistically ran an 
article entitled “Chou’s Views Encouraged U.S. Aides.”57 Haldeman, however, claimed in his 
diaries that Nixon viewed the interview as evidence that the Times was attempting to “sabotage” 
his trip. According to him, Nixon became so furious that he wanted every White House official 
to enforce his rule that no one should talk to the Times people and even threatened not to take 
them on his China trip.58 Reston’s case demonstrated the uneasy relationship between Nixon and 
the influential Times. It also revealed that despite its approval of the president’s tactics, the Times 
did not completely support his foreign policy.  
During his three-week stay in China, Reston wrote several columns and commentaries 
that presented favorable impressions of China. In one of his “Letters from China” series, Reston 
vividly described the atmosphere after Ping-Pong Diplomacy. As he wrote, “The routine of life 
for an American visitor in China these days is full of paradox. For example, you live in an 
atmosphere of vicious and persistent anti-American propaganda, but are treated with unfailing 
personal courtesy and are free to cable your impressions without censorship from the lobby of 
your hotel.”59 Reston’s stories of China were so positive that the Reference News reprinted many 
of them.60 Zhou Enlai’s effort in winning over prominent U.S. opinion shapers like James Reston 
and his newspaper seemed to have paid off. 
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The Lin Biao Incident and Kissinger’s Interim Trip  
While the two countries were preparing for Nixon’s China trip, a political drama--the Lin 
Biao Incident--occurred and at one time it seemed to call into question the Beijing summit. What 
happened on the night of September 13,1971, whether Lin Biao had plotted Mao’s assassination 
and fled or he was ignorant of the plot and had been forced away by his wife and son, remains a 
mystery. One certain thing was that after their plane took off, it crashed in Mongolia with no 
survivors. The death of Lin Biao caused an earthquake in Chinese politics. That very night, Zhou 
Enlai ordered the grounding of all planes in China for three days. Lin Biao’s closest four 
generals Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, Qiu Huizuo--who occupied the most 
important posts in the Chinese military and were members of the Politburo--were all arrested. Ye 
Jiangying, one of the four respected marshals who had studied the international situation during 
the Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969, became the new head of the Chinese military. Lin Biao’s 
death also dealt a severe psychological and physical blow to Mao, who was bedridden for a long 
time thereafter. As a result, Beijing decided to cancel the National Day parade at Tiananmen 
Square for that year.61 
The unusual military movements, the disappearance of so many top members of the 
Politburo from public view, and particularly Beijing’s unprecedented cancellation of the National 
Day parade caused wide speculation around the world that a major political crisis might be 
occurring in China.62 As the closest ally of Mongolia, Moscow knew more about the incident. On 
the eve of the Chinese National Day, Tass embarrassed Beijing by publishing the story of nine 
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people killed in a Chinese jet crash well inside Mongolia on the night of September 12-13 
without releasing their identities.63 The Soviet story added further to the mystery. 
Without knowing exactly what happened, U.S. media offered all sorts of speculation. 
There were rumors that Mao might have been dead or dying and that a power struggle over his 
succession was going on in Beijing. There was also the possibility that China and Moscow were 
on the verge of war and even the story that State Chairman Liu Shaoqi might have escaped.64  
The upheavals in China raised the concern about the stability of China and Nixon’s China 
trip thus came under question. The Post argued that the “mysterious events” had shattered 
China’s image of stability displayed in Ping-Pong Diplomacy. Its concern for Nixon’s visit could 
be shown in Joseph Kraft’s column “Portents from China,” and headlines like “China 
Uncertainty Clouds Nixon Visit Plans” and “China Events Raise U.S. Concern.”65 A Times 
editorial speculated that the political crisis in Beijing could have been precipitated by the 
invitation to Nixon and it worried whether the moderate forces led by Zhou Enlai could prevail 
over the radical forces if there was indeed a power struggle.66 On October 2, Secretary of State 
Rogers told the media that he hoped what occurred in China did not “signal any change in the 
possibility of the President’s visit.” His use of the word  “possibility” raised further uncertainties. 
Both the Times and the Post regarded his statement as Washington’s first official expression of 
concern. The Times interpreted it as an indication that “political changes in Peking could make it 
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impossible for President Nixon to carry out his planned visit.” U.S. officials later explained that 
Rogers’ use of the word “possibility” had no special significance.67  
Despite the concern of American newspeople, communications between Beijing and 
Washington on Nixon’s visit continued. Kissinger also thought that the political crisis might 
have been caused by the sharp turn in China’s policy toward the United States, but he pointed out 
that Chinese officials never mentioned Lin Biao and U.S. officials never asked.68  
During Kissinger’s secret visit to Beijing, the two sides had agreed to set up direct 
communications in Paris through U.S. military attaché Lieutenant-General Vernon Walters and 
Ambassador Huang Chen. On important matters, he would personally go to Paris to meet with 
Huang under the cover of negotiating with representatives from Hanoi. Kissinger met with 
Huang three times between July and September. In their meeting on September 13, Kissinger 
said he preferred to announce the date of his interim trip on September 21 because it was before 
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko’s planned visit to Washington, during which they 
would probably decide on a date for Nixon’s visit to Moscow. He did not want the 
announcement of his trip to China to look like a reaction to Gromyko’s visit.69  
On September 23, Huang informed Walters that his government could not agree on the 
date because of Bush’s submission of a “two-China” proposal to the UN one day earlier. 
However, Huang agreed to announce the trip on October 5. What was remarkable, as Walters 
pointed out, was that Huang put his arm around his shoulder when saying goodbye.70 The rapport 
between officials of the two governments in Paris showed that the Lin Biao Incident did not 
change Beijing’s decision for rapprochement. To some extent, the incident intensified Beijing’s 
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feeling of vulnerability. It did not want other powers, particularly the Soviet Union, to take 
advantage of it. Therefore, the continuation of the Sino-American accommodation served 
Beijing’s interests. 
On October 5, Kissinger personally showed up with Press Secretary Ron Ziegler when 
the latter announced his interim trip. His appearance not only added weight to the announcement, 
but also reassured worried newspeople. Both the Times and the Post ran headlines and editorials 
to elaborate on the steady relationship between Beijing and Washington. The Times was so 
relieved that “the party line now is that there was never any uncertainty.” Stanley Karnow, the 
Post’s chief China watcher, wrote a column entitled “Kissinger Trip Reflects Accord.71 
When Kissinger went to Beijing in late October, he was deeply impressed by Beijing’s 
commitment to improving relations. On his arrival, he noticed several anti-American slogans on 
the city walls. When he asked Zhou Enlai about those slogans, Zhou said that was just “firing 
empty cannon.” On the day when he left Beijing, Kissinger noticed that many of the anti-
American slogans had gone or had been freshly painted over.72  
The other thing that impressed Kissinger was Beijing’s effort to get its people 
“accustomed to” the idea that their government was dealing with a senior U.S. official in a 
friendly manner. He noticed that about 500 officials were present when his party watched a 
“revolutionary” performance of the Beijing Opera and that crowds of Chinese spectators looked 
on when he toured the historical sites in Beijing. His impression was that Marshall Ye and acting 
Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei “saw to it” that they could be “properly displayed together” before 
the Chinese people. One of the most remarkable scenarios happened when they were having tea 
together aboard a boat in the lake of the Summer Palace “in plain view of literally hundreds of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Chinese spectators.” As Kissinger wrote, “The fact that a strong, cold wind was blowing (on an 
otherwise perfect day) did not deter our hosts; they clearly wanted this boatride to take place and 
only a hurricane could have prevented it. When I waved to the crowds of people on the shore, 
they clapped loudly.”73 
Kissinger’s second trip to Beijing was indeed given much publicity in the Chinese media. 
Besides prominent coverage of his arrival and departure, the People’s Daily also published large 
photos of his meetings with Chinese officials. In reporting Kissinger’s departure, it even 
mentioned that he had visited tourist sites and watched theatrical shows amid the negotiations. 
Upon his departure, the two governments issued a joint communiqué, which especially 
emphasized that preparations for Nixon’s trip have been “proceeding exceedingly well.”74 
Beijing wanted to show the world how its normal diplomatic activities, especially the Sino-
American rapprochement, had not been disrupted despite worldwide speculation about its 
internal politics. 
Another thing worth noting was how Marshal Ye Jiangying figured prominently in the 
People’s Daily’s coverage of Kissinger’s trip. Ye not only led the party that received and saw off 
Kissinger at the airport, but also attended all meetings between Kissinger and Zhou Enlai. In the 
published group photo, Ye stood on one side of Kissinger while Zhou Enlai stood on the other.75 
As Snow pointed out, “Nothing the Chinese leaders publicly do is without purpose.”76 John 
Holdridge, Kissinger’s aide who accompanied him on both his China trips in 1971, argued that 
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the public appearance of Marshal Ye with Kissinger informed the Chinese audience that the PLA 
supported Sino-American rapprochement.77 
The publication of Kissinger’s photos with Chinese officials in the People’s Daily 
attracted the attention of U.S. media. Both NBC and the Times displayed the photos in their news 
stories. As the Post claimed, even though the Chinese audience had grown “accustomed in recent 
months seeing their leaders pose with groups of visiting Americans,” it was the first time the 
Chinese official press published photos of American officials with the Chinese. The Times 
pointed out that their publication in the People’s Daily meant they would also appear in 
newspapers all over China, which showed that Beijing wanted its people to know about the 
positive developments in Sino-American relations.78 
China’s Admission into the UN 
Before Kissinger’s return from China, the United States had suffered what the Times 
called a “crushing defeat” in the United Nations on October 25. After the American proposal to 
make Taiwan’s expulsion an “important matter” was defeated by 59 to 55, an Albanian 
resolution that called for China’s admission and Taiwan’s expulsion won by the large margin of 
76 to 35. All NATO members except Greece, Portugal and Luxembourg, voted against the 
United States.79  
U.S. media sympathized with Taiwan. In the ABC story, Nationalist representatives 
received applause of sympathy when they walked out of the General Assembly before the vote 
on their expulsion. NBC played the last speech of the Nationalist ambassador to the UN. All 
three networks featured the wild reception from representatives from countries that supported !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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China. In a nice touch, they also showed pictures of vacant seats and the flag post waiting for 
Chinese representatives.80 On the front page of the Times, a picture of China supporters clapping 
hands over their victory was contrasted with a picture of Nationalist representatives walking out 
of the General Assembly. The Post had a picture of Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Chou Shu-kai 
listening to the debate with a stern face. Both newspapers also reported that Senator James L. 
Buckley (R-NY), who reacted sharply, proposed in Congress for “a major reduction” in the 
American financial contribution to the UN. Both of them deplored the “injustice” to Taiwan and 
the dangerous precedent of expelling a “member state” in their editorials. The two newsweeklies 
featured Zhou Enlai on their covers with “The Chinese are Coming” as the headlines of their 
accounts.81 
Though the Nixon administration felt obliged to address the domestic sentiment over 
Taiwan’s expulsion, it did not want to create an anti-China impression. In their public 
statements, administration officials reiterated how the government had tried hard to keep Taiwan 
in the UN, but their condemnation mainly focused on the expulsion and the behavior of small 
states, instead of the vote. In an official response, William Rogers appearing on TV, accepted 
“the will of majority” and welcomed the admission of China, but he emphasized that Washington 
and its co-sponsors had made “an all-out effort” to keep Taiwan in the UN. In order to appeal to 
conservatives, he said that the administration was not opposed to a reduction in UN allocations 
because it might be spending too much and “living beyond its sources.”82 In a press briefings two 
days after the UN vote, Ron Ziegler told reporters that the President condemned the joyful 
response of the delegates after the UN vote as a “shocking demonstration” and “undisguised !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
80 ABC Evening News, Oct 26, 1971, Record #: 13037; NBC Evening News, Oct 26, 1971, Record #: 
454479; CBS Evening News, Oct 26, 1971, Record #: 213485.  
81 NYT, October 26, 1971, 1; October 27, 1971, 46; WP, October 26, 1971, 1; October 27, 1971, A20; Time, 
November 8, 1971; Newsweek, November 8, 1971, 22. 
82 NYT, October 27, 1971, 16. 
!!
209!
glee” and “personal animosity” toward American policy. Calling it “offensive and undignified,” 
he said the President felt that it “could very seriously impair support for the United Nations in 
the country and in Congress.” Nixon’s condemnation of the “glee” successfully made headlines 
in the Times and the Post.83 
In their editorials, both the Times and the Post criticized the Nixon administration for 
playing to the irrationality of conservatives and called on the country to move ahead with the 
Beijing dialogues. The Post called retaliation against the U.N. “petty and vindictive” and 
criticized Rogers for “hardly discouraging” those in Congress who were bent on reducing the 
U.S. contribution. It argued that the consensus should be “that it was past time to begin pursuing 
a policy of realistic accommodation with Peking--a policy whose most intense advocate these 
days is the U.S.” Similarly, the Times argued that since the issue had been finally settled, it was a 
“height of folly” to retaliate against the U.N. and that the solution of China’s UN membership 
problem might “not be unhealthy in the long run” because it might give Washington a chance to 
improve its relations with its friends and allies. James Reston claimed that Nixon had “more 
flexibility” on the world stage than he had before.84  
The two newspapers also understood Nixon’s approach. The Post pointed out that the 
White House had left Rogers to make explanations “in an apparent effort to keep the President’s 
personal prestige separated from the voting setback.” In an article entitled “Crushing Defeat … 
or a Blessing in Disguise,” the Times maintained that Nixon had “put on a calculated display of 
anger--however genuine his anger may have been--with the primary object of deflecting from 
himself the sense of outrage in Congress and on the right.” It also pointed out that after all Nixon 
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still had his major “political assets intact” on his road to Beijing and the 1972 election.85 When 
U.S. publications condemned the U.N. for expelling Taiwan, they never mentioned the fact that 
the Nationalists did not accept the two-China idea either, which meant the admission of 
Mainland China might have caused the departure of Taiwan, even had the UN wanted it to stay. 
Another measure the Nixon administration took to deflate criticism was to coordinate 
Kissinger’s second trip. In order to avoid the impression that his success in Beijing had caused 
the American defeat in the UN, Kissinger not only asked Bush to deliver his UN speech after his 
departure for Beijing, but also delayed his return at the request of Nixon so that he could arrive 
home after the UN vote.86 In the press briefing upon his return, Kissinger described the timing of 
the UN vote during his stay in China as a “painful experience.” Emphasizing that the visit had 
been planned during his last trip, he especially reiterated that it “did not affect the outcome of the 
U.N. decision.”87  
Nixon’s tactic of delaying Kissinger’s return from China seemed to pay off. On the same 
front page where Nixon’s denunciation of the delegates’ “glee” was reported, large photos of 
Kissinger with Zhou Enlai appeared in the two newspapers, which were thrilled because that was 
the first time when officials of the United States and China posed together for a photo shoot. In 
an article entitled “China: a Stinging Victory,” Time placed a picture of the Nationalist 
Ambassador walking out from the UN together with the one with Zhou Enlai and Kissinger.88 
The agenda quickly shifted from the UN to the Sino-American dialogue. 
After Kissinger’s October trip to Beijing, the two governments worked on a communiqué 
announcing the exact date of Nixon’s visit. On November 18, Ambassador Huang Chen told 
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Walters that his government wanted to change the announcement date from November 23 to 30 
because it was not “opportune” to make such an announcement when “the chief of government 
from a neighboring state” was visiting China. When Walters offered to guess that it was North 
Vietnam, Huang slapped him on the back and said, “You guessed right for the first time.” In his 
memo, Walters wrote, “all of the foregoing was washed down with jasmine tea and accompanied 
by the now usual friendly pats on the arm and back.”89 The rapport between officials in Paris 
suggested that the Chinese leadership no longer regarded the United States as its archenemy.  
When North Vietnamese premier Pham Von Dong visited China between November 20 
and 27, 1971, Beijing launched an enormous propaganda campaign to highlight the “solidarity” 
between the two communist “comrades and brothers.” The People’s Daily devoted extensive and 
prominent coverage to Vietnam with front-page stories, pictures, and editorials and published an 
unusually long communiqué between the two governments at the end of Pham’s visit. Three days 
after Pham left, the People’s Daily announced Nixon’s visit with only one sentence placed on the 
very bottom of the front page, “The governments of the People’s Republic and China and the 
United States of America have agreed that President Nixon’s visit to China would start on 
February 21, 1972.”90 Beijing’s public enthusiasm for the visit of the North Vietnamese and the 
“low profile” it gave to the communiqué showed its effort to hold together its ideological friends 
who were hostile to the United States. 
On February 15, 1972, a week before Nixon started his China tour, Edgar Snow died of 
cancer in Switzerland. The People’s Daily made a big deal of the death of “a friend of the 
Chinese people” by publishing on its front page official condolences from Mao and his wife 
Jiang Qing, Zhou Enlai and his wife Deng Yingchao, and Madam Sun Yat-sun who was the vice !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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state chairman. In addition to the story that Zhou Enlai and Jiang Qing had attended a memorial 
service in Beijing, Snow received the tribute paid to the head of a state. In his published 
cablegram of condolence to Mrs. Snow, Zhou called Snow a “witness” of good friendship 
between the two peoples and expressed his strong belief that “the friendship that Snow had 
dedicated his whole life to would definitely grow.”91  
American newspapers and networks also gave Snow’s death prominent attention. All 
three networks covered the story. Both the Times and the Post ran Snow’s photos with Mao on 
their front pages and called attention to the “unique tribute” Chinese leaders paid to him in their 
official media. The Times pointed out that Zhou Enlai had sent a medical team of three doctors 
and a nurse to attend to Snow when he failed to “rally from” his surgery on his spleen. Moreover, 
it posted a special editorial that praised Snow as a “first class journalist” who had played an 
important role in maintaining the “tenuous link” between the Chinese leaders and the United 
States.92 By extending special privileges to Edgar Snow, Beijing again highlighted the friendship 
between the two peoples through the media. 
The Show in Beijing 
After several months of preparation, Nixon set out for China on February 17, 1972. All 
three networks stopped their regular programming to cover live his farewell ceremony on the 
South Lawn of the White House. The front pages of the Times and the Post both featured 
pictures of Nixon and his wife waving good-bye in front of their helicopter.93 After stopping in 
Haiwai and Guam for two days, Nixon’s party set off for Shanghai, where they made a brief !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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stop, picking up Chinese navigators and flew to Beijing. On February 20, Nixon’s plane, the 
“Spirit of 76,” landed at the Beijing airport. In the middle of cameras and spotlights, Nixon 
walked down from the plane and stepped forward to shake Zhou Enlai’s waiting hand. This 
moment became the main story in the media around the world the next day. According to 
Kissinger, Nixon and Haldeman wanted to make sure the president would be alone for the 
television cameras in his first encounter with Zhou Enlai. He and Rogers had been instructed 
several times that they were to stay on the plane until the historic handshake between Nixon and 
Zhou had been accomplished. Notwithstanding the instructions, Haldeman did not want to leave 
anything to chance. A burly aide blocked the aisle of the presidential plane when the moment 
came.94 
To the dismay of U.S. reporters, only a few dozen Chinese officials and five hundred 
honor guards showed up at the airport. When CBS’s Charles Collingwood in New York asked 
Walter Cronkite whether there was an air of excitement in Beijing, Cronkite did not think so. 
NBC’s Barbara Walters found an “air of disappointment.” NBC’s Edwin Newman commented 
that Zhou Enlai’s handshake with Nixon “did seem to be a cordial” one.95 James Thomson Jr., a 
China hand in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and a Harvard professor who worked as 
ABC’s commentator on the Nixon trip, said the receiving ceremony was “low key, but very, very 
serious.” Harry Reasoner, the ABC anchor in Beijing, did not think Beijing tried to downplay its 
importance considering the presence of a number of high-level Chinese officials and the 
involvement of the PLA at the reception. The Times reported that Nixon received a “quiet 
greeting,” which was “studiously correct but minimally official.” It speculated that it was 
probably because the two governments had no diplomatic relations yet. The Post pointed out the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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“lack of fanfare” which was in sharp contrast to receptions accorded to other foreign visitors, 
such as Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, who was greeted by 300,000 Chinese citizens when 
he arrived a year earlier.96  
Despite the low profile of the reception, the images at the airport were still powerful. For 
example, when the People’s Liberation Army band played the Star-Spangled Banner, James 
Thomson noted that it had been a while since it was last played in China. Reasoner echoed 
Thomson and said that it was a “startling moment.” Talking about the Zhou-Nixon handshake, 
Thomson referred to the Geneva Conference in 1954 when John Foster Dulles refused to shake 
hands with Zhou. Interestingly, when Howard K. Smith criticized China because of its troop 
maneuvers in the capital, the rumor that China shipped luxurious cars from Hong Kong to 
prepare for Nixon’s visit, and the three Americans still imprisoned in China, Thomson brushed 
aside those negative comments and expressed high hopes for the coming summit. Thomson also 
keenly noted that the appearance of Marshal Ye Jianying behind Zhou Enlai in receiving Nixon 
showed that the military and the civilian branches were still “holding together.”97 Thomson 
shared an “Emmy” award with the ABC news team for his ten-day service as a television 
commentator during Nixon’s visit.98 
The Chinese government did not set up the exact date when Nixon would meet with Mao. 
As soon as Nixon arrived at his residence, Mao became so excited that he told Zhou that he 
wanted to meet with the president right away. Winston Lord, Kissinger’s aide who attended the 
meeting, thought the arrangement was a “typical Chinese example” where the Emperor kept 
visitors on edge. Nevertheless, Nixon was so thrilled that he rushed to the meeting with !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Kissinger and Lord without bringing William Rogers who, as the Secretary of State, should have 
been present at the summit but in whom the president had little confidence. The one-hour 
meeting happened behind closed doors. Only Xinhua News Agency was allowed in briefly for 
photo shooting. Before the Chinese media released photos of the meeting, Kissinger asked them 
to cut off the much lower ranking Lord in order not to embarrass Rogers.99 Nixon later told 
Haldeman how he was impressed during the meeting when “at one point Mao reached over, 
talking, and grabbed my hand and held it for more than a minute while he made his point.” 
Feeling that scene was significant, Nixon was especially happy that the Chinese film crew 
covered it.100 After the Nixon-Mao meeting, Ron Ziegler announced it to the journalists. Though 
he simply said that the conversation was “frank and serious” when asked for details, the photos 
and black-and-white film of Nixon with Mao became major stories in the United States. Under a 
big picture of the Mao-Nixon meeting on its front-page, the Post described it as “Mao’s apparent 
endorsement of an eventual improvement in Sino-American ties.”101 This statement would have 
pleased Nixon because it would silence conservatives who were worried that Nixon might be 
slighted in China. 
On the night of Nixon’s arrival, Zhou Enlai hosted a state banquet. On television, 
American audiences could see how Nixon clinked cups with Zhou Enlai and other Chinese 
officials with the national flags of the two countries on display together and the PLA band 
playing “Home on the Range “and” America the Beautiful” in the background. As Nixon was 
delivering his toast, the CBS camera offered a long close-up of the Chinese premier so that the 
American audience could have a better look at him.102 Nixon’s remarking “Let us start a long 
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march together” was widely quoted in the media.103 When he reviewed the news summaries with 
Haldeman before they went to bed that night, Nixon was extremely pleased with the coverage 
and especially happy because they got all the images he wanted, such as his use of chopsticks, 
his toast as well as Zhou Enlai’s, and their glass-clinking. Nixon also told Haldeman that when 
he clinked Zhou’s glass, the Chinese Premier said he had the band play “America the Beautiful” 
because it was played at Nixon’s first inaugural. Assuming that was one of his favorite songs, 
Zhou offered it to Nixon as a toast to his next inaugural.104 
 As Ron Ziegler told a UPI correspondent, Nixon’s trip was indeed a “picture story.” 
There were no regular news briefings and the correspondents had no important news to cover 
except when the Nixons went sightseeing or Pat Nixon visited Chinese citizens and their families 
at a model farm, in a kitchen, kindergarten, or factory. While Nixon’s closed-door conversations 
with Zhou Enlai were totally kept from the media, the Chinese arranged image-makers and photo 
opportunities so that they would be transmitted home via satellite and played at “prime-time 
viewing hours.”105 For an entire week from February 18, the front pages of newspapers ran 
photos following Nixon’s itinerary until his return to Washington. The magazines, though 
published after his return, both used the trip as their cover stories and similarly offered many 
photographs.106 Nixon’s trip commanded live broadcasting, often in prime time, and the lion’s 
share of the evening news during the week. 
The Chinese media expressed qualified enthusiasm for Nixon’s visit. The day after 
Nixon’s arrival, the People’s Daily on its front page featured several large photos of Nixon’s 
meeting with Mao and Zhou Enlai. Several U.S. news agencies, newspapers and networks 
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included, picked this front page as a highlight in their stories. As they reported, the People’s 
Daily had caused a “sensation” in Beijing and was sold out within a few hours when throngs of 
people crowded the newsstands.107 They were deeply impressed by Beijing’s effort to publicize 
Nixon’s visit. 
Beijing might have felt that the “unusual” coverage of Nixon’s first day in China had 
caused too much world excitement. In the days that followed, readers of the People’s Daily 
witnessed a subtle change. Photos of Nixon’s activities remained on the front pages, but they 
became smaller and were placed in less prominent places below stories of domestic matters. 
Interestingly, while U.S. media ran pictures showing the warm interpersonal relations between 
the leaders, such as the Nixon-Zhou toast, Nixon’s handshake with ordinary Chinese in 
Hangzhou, and especially his offer to help the Chinese premier with his coat,108 the People’s 
Daily coverage was more of an official and ceremonial nature, ignoring the “personal” 
dimensions in the exchanges. As Kissinger said, Beijing faced “a philosophical crisis, torn 
between the imperatives of Realpolitik and the dictates of ideology.”109  
The Reference News provided more political insights than the People’s Daily. It covered 
the world response to Nixon’s planned trip to China and the China craze it caused in the United 
States, U.S. preparatory work including advance-team activities in China and media allocation, 
how Americans watched Nixon’s tour on TV, and their response to the Shanghai Communiqué. 
It also reprinted many stories about how Nixon was “diligently” studying the history and culture 
of China. More importantly, it reprinted the full text of many of Nixon’s TV and radio 
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announcements and his interviews with the media. While the People’s Daily covered Nixon’s 
tour with pictures and brief introductions to the itinerary, the Reference News printed in detail his 
talks with the press when he visited tourist sites. It also mentioned the picture that showed Nixon 
helping Zhou with his coat.110 Beijing wanted its cadres to know more about Nixon and his 
China policy. These details in the Reference News revealed how Beijing valued the trip.   
In covering the opponents to Nixon’s visit, the Reference News seemed to be more 
objective or comprehensive than the two U.S. newspapers in some respects. In January and 
February of 1972, for example, it reported twice on Carl McIntire, a minister in the Bible 
Presbyterian Church sympathetic to the Nationalists, who announced his plan to organize 
demonstrations in eighteen American cities to protest Nixon’s toast with “murders and slave 
owners.”111 Interestingly, neither the Times nor the Post covered the activities of the reverend 
during that period, perhaps because he was an obscure critic on the right fringe. Another 
interesting thing was that when Henry Winston and Gus Hall, the Secretary and Chairman of the 
Communist Party of the United States attacked Nixon’s China trip as a “cover” for his Vietnam 
War, the Reference News branded them as “revisionists.”112 Obviously, Beijing did not regard 
the American communists’ attack on the Nixon trip as friendly actions considering that the party 
was a Soviet appendage. The newspaper seemed to be trying to find opposition to show how 
difficult the demarche was for Nixon. 
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The Shanghai Communiqué 
Nixon’s visit to China concluded with a joint communiqué announced in Shanghai on 
February 27. During Kissinger’s visit in October 1971, the two sides had decided that the 
communiqué would state their agreements to move toward normalization of relations, to reduce 
the danger of military conflict, and their commitment not to seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific 
regions and to oppose other countries who might try to establish such “hegemony,” which had 
become the new code word for “Soviet expansionism.” With regard to issues with ideological 
differences such as Indochina, Korea, Japan, and the Indian-Pakistan conflict, they agreed that 
each side would state their own positions. While Beijing would express its commitment to 
support for “revolutions and national liberation movements” around the world, Washington 
would reiterate its support for people around the world in their “pursuit of personal freedom and 
social progress free from outside interference.” However, Taiwan remained a “thorny” problem 
because it involved principles on both sides. While Washington had to deal with a strong 
domestic sentiment for the island and a commitment in the form of the mutual security treaty of 
1955, Beijing regarded Taiwan and its unification with the mainland as issues of sovereignty. 
When Nixon arrived in Beijing, the two sides still differed on the wording about Taiwan. The 
Chinese side wanted the U.S. acknowledgment that Taiwan was a “province” of China and its 
commitment to withdraw all forces from the island unconditionally. Washington could go no 
further than to describe the withdrawal as an “objective” and needed conditions attached to it.113 
When the Nixons went sightseeing, Kissinger was still bargaining with Chinese Deputy 
Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua. At one time the negotiations reached a deadlock and even Zhou 
Enlai joined in temporarily. Kissinger explained to him that Washington could not made 
“unconditional commitments” and that the communiqué had to be “explicable” or “defensible” to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the American public. His proposal was to link the “final withdrawal from Taiwan” to the 
“premise of peaceful settlement,” and to tie the “progressive reduction of forces” to the “gradual 
diminution of tension in the area,” because the United States had an interest in the peaceful 
resolution of the Taiwan issue, and the conflicts in Indochina would end in time. The Chinese 
side promised to consider his proposal but they preferred the “prospect” of a peaceful settlement 
rather than “premise,” arguing that it had a “more active and more bilateral connotation.” Finally 
on February 25, less than forty-eight hours before Nixon’s scheduled departure from China, the 
Chinese accepted the American formulations. Kissinger claims that he even managed to secure 
the Chinese consent to stating that Taiwan was a “part” rather than a “province” of China, thus 
avoiding a suggestion of subordination. Though the real American security role on Taiwan was 
defined by the mutual defense treaty, neither side mentioned it in the communiqué.114 
In the final version of the communiqué, the U.S. position on Taiwan was stated as 
follows: 
The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait 
maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States 
government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement 
of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the 
ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from 
Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on 
Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.115 
 
As the communiqué came out, U.S. media ignored all others issues and jumped on the 
U.S. pledge to “withdraw gradually from Taiwan,” terming it a “major concession.” The Post 
headline was “Nixon Pledges Pullout of Forces on Taiwan.” Under a picture where Nixon and 
Zhou Enlai stood below a giant statute of Mao, there was an article titled “China Trip: Limited 
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Results.” The Times ran a headline, “Taipei is Bitter: Paper Reflecting View of Regime Assails 
U.S. ‘Cowardice’”116  
Responses from the networks were more favorable. They presented Senators Mike 
Mansfield (D-MT), Hugh Scott (R-PA), Edward Kennedy (D-MA), George McGovern (D-SD), 
and Representative Paul McCloskey Jr. (R-CA), who praised the communiqué as a forward-
looking document, in front of Senators James Buckley (R-NY) and John Tower (R-TX), and 
Representatives John Ashbrook (R-OH) and Hubert Humphrey (D-MN), who expressed either 
concern or shock at the American position on Taiwan. The overall response, as described by 
Howard K. Smith of ABC, was “cautiously favorable for most part, although there were 
dissenters.”117 
During the flight from Shanghai to Alaska, Haldeman noted that their press reports did 
not include the networks. Even though he tried hard to convince Nixon that the general press was 
not that negative, the president was still worried about “dealing with a bad story.” He then 
instructed his aides to work in haste on the plane adding points that could clarify his position in 
the return message.118 After a long layover in Anchorage scheduled by White House television 
specialist Mark Goode, Nixon’s plane arrived in Washington during prime TV time. 119 
Surrounded by a large welcoming crowd, Nixon delivered to the cameras his triumphant return 
address in which he highlighted what he considered the “heart of the communiqué”--the 
agreement of both governments to renounce the use of force in dispute settlement and their 
commitment to prevent the domination of Asia by any power. In terms of Taiwan, he 
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emphasized that the gradual withdrawal of forces was based on the easing of tensions and that 
the United States would not relinquish its commitment to its allies.120  
The Post changed its tone after Nixon’s speech. Its headline the next day was “Nixon 
back from China Trip, 15,000 Welcome President.” Under it was an article entitled “U.S. 
Communiqué is praised by both Parties on Hill.” In its editorial “Sellout’ of Taiwan?” it argued 
that the charge of Nixon’s abandonment of Taiwan was “insupportable.” Calling the 
communiqué an “agreement to disagree,” the Times argued that it offered “no dramatic 
surprises,” but contained “no major disappointments.” It praised the “renunciation of force in 
favor of diplomacy” and highlighted the agreement on exchanges in trade, science, technology, 
culture, sports and news reporting as a “concrete achievement.”121 The communiqué did not 
change the status of Taiwan. People may ask what, if anything, Nixon had brought back from 
Beijing. The answer from Time was “the event itself, the fact that it took place.” As far as the 
gains of the Nixon’s administration, Newsweek pointed out its success in securing from the 
Chinese not to include in the communiqué its usual propaganda tirade that the American defense 
treaty with Taiwan was “null and void” and the Chinese agreement to resolve the Taiwan issue 
by “peaceful means.” Similar to Time, it argued that the China trip was not a “great leap 
forward,” but it was at least an “important first step,” which brought a much better chance of 
peace in Asia.122 Overall, the elite media supported the Shanghai Communiqué and reviewed the 
significance of Nixon’s China trip favorably.  
In China, one noticeable development was that when Zhou Enlai returned to Beijing from 
Shanghai where he saw Nixon off, he received an extraordinary warm welcome at the airport. 
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The People’s Daily headlined “Resolutely Support and Execute the Revolutionary Diplomatic 
Line of Chairman Mao: Premier Zhou was Warmly Received by Five Thousand People at the 
Airport upon his Return to Beijing from Shanghai” with three big pictures showing the 
welcoming party. Among the party, the article listed several key members of the Politburo 
including Mao’s wife, who was the head of the radicals, key leaders of the PLA and the 
government.123 As the crowd was much bigger than Zhou normally received when he returned 
from somewhere within China, the Times argued that the “triumphant welcome” Zhou received 
marked Beijing’s “satisfaction with the outcome of Nixon’s visit as contained in the joint 
communiqué.”124 Publicizing the ceremony at the Beijing airport not only showed the consensus 
among the Chinese leadership in supporting the outcome of the Nixon visit. It also sent a positive 
signal to the United States.  
The “TV Spectacle” as Part of the Story 
David Broder, a prominent columnist for the Washington Post, wrote that television, with 
its strength in images, creates a “communication loop” that makes the TV coverage “part of the 
story it is covering.”125 In covering Nixon’s China trip, television, or the “TV spectacle,” did 
become a hot topic. Largely feeling at a disadvantage in the competition or due to their envy, the 
print media pointed out many problems with their electronic rivals to critique Nixon’s overdoing 
of the TV drama. 
In its editorial entitled “Spectacle and Substance,” the Times described Nixon’s departure 
ceremony as a “genuine drama” with an “elaborately staged fanfare.” It warned of the danger 
that the spectacle Nixon had “assiduously” created might obscure the differences between the 
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two governments and foster “illusions” about Sino-American relations.126 The Post similarly 
maintained that the audience had to tell “show business” from “diplomatic business.” Stanley 
Karnow, the Post’s correspondent in Beijing, called Nixon’s visit an exercise of “TV 
Diplomacy,” arguing that TV not only helped him maximize public attention, but also helped the 
Chinese irritate Japan, Southeast Asia, and the Soviet Union. He also surmised that the Chinese 
leadership might use TV as a “lever” to build up the American expectations that Nixon might 
return home with some kind of “arrangement” by inflating his image.127 
Time described Nixon’s trip as an excellent opportunity for “a presidential candidate 
seeking re-election to make a television appearance.”128 It maintained that all was “elaborate 
scrollwork, hiding content.” In its cartoon, Nixon and Mao stood in the middle of TV cameras 
and spotlights with a row of saluting guns firing in the background. The caption read, “Just think, 
all this will have gone to waste if you’re not re-elected!”129 In an article “TV: An Eyeful of 
China, A Thimbleful of Insight,” Newsweek showed CBS journalists “huddled together” in the 
Beijing press room, “bemoaning” their isolation and the lack of “hard” news. As it indicated, 
CBS president Richard S. Salant decided to cancel live broadcasts on Thursday, saying “we’d 
had enough picture postcards” from the Great Wall one day earlier. It also mocked the lack of in-
depth reporting in television coverage because the networks all sent their most experienced 
anchors who “made up standard news teams to cover a spectacular in standard American terms,” 
while their sinologists better equipped with digging information from sources in China were 
sitting in New York studios “7000 miles from the scene.”130  
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As pointed out in a Post editorial, Nixon in his “Man of the Year” interview with Time 
had confidently said, “Where you need a lot of rhetoric, a lot of jazz, a lot of flamboyance, is 
where you don’t have much to sell.” Using Nixon’s own words, it argued that his effort to 
“embellish” his trip with “rhetoric and flamboyance and jazz” was to encourage the suspicion 
that he did not have all that much to sell.”131 When television coverage was used to this frothy 
extreme, the media themselves began to question what Nixon could bring back from Beijing.   
Conclusion 
Ever since Beijing made the decision to reconcile with Washington, it faced great tasks in 
accustoming the Chinese people to the change in relations. Beijing gradually transmitted Mao 
and Zhou’s decision from the central leadership at the top to the ordinary Chinese citizen. 
Through the internal channel of the party infrastructure on the first level, it informed leaders at 
higher levels to mobilize their support for the departure in China’s foreign policies. On the 
second level, the insightful news stories and analyses in the Reference News kept the communist 
cadres as well as ordinary party members updated about international developments. It was also 
through this internal newspaper that the Chinese audience learned about Nixon’s wish to visit 
China, Mao’s desire to meet with him, and the favorable international response to the visit. On 
another level, Beijing promoted the friendship between the two peoples through the People’s 
Daily in the form of people-to-people diplomacy. By displaying Americans, such as Edgar Snow, 
the ping-pong team, the “friendly” visitors, and Henry Kissinger, before Chinese crowds as well 
as in the official media, Beijing prepared its people for the new relationship with the United 
States.  
Though the U.S. government did not have too much work getting its people used to the 
change in relations since debates about this topic had been going on in the media increasingly !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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frequently since the early 1960s, it faced a challenge from conservatives, especially when it came 
to the Taiwan issue. On UN membership, Washington slowly changed its position from banning 
China’s entry to preventing Taiwan’s expulsion. Besides disassociating himself from a possible 
failure, Nixon asked his aides to tell the media that his administration was fighting hard to keep 
the Nationalists in the UN.  
Nixon also launched a media campaign to maximize the influence of his trip. In order to 
guarantee the success of the “show” in Beijing, the White House granted the TV networks 
extraordinary privileges. They not only received more seats in the media plane, but also joined 
the advance team in tracking every spot Nixon planned to visit so that they got the best camera 
angles. As Nixon hoped, his one-week trip turned out to be a “TV spectacle,” which not only 
helped him write history by scoring a success of public relations, but also aroused criticisms 
about the lack of “substance” under the fanfare.   
As a Post editorial pointed out, although “Nixon overdid the TV bit badly,” television 
“helped educate the American people,” showing them that China was not a monster, but a nation 
“to be dealt with as best one can.”132 Zhou Enlai must have known what it meant when he agreed 
to allow an American press corps of one hundred fifty into China, especially when he agreed to 
the proposal of live television coverage. He knew they would be volunteer promoters of China’s 
image to the world. Although Nixon’s visit did not formally normalize relations between the two 
countries, as journalists and Nixon said during several occasions during that historic week, his 
presence in China signified a new relationship between the two countries that had been separated 
for more than two decades. The start of exchanges in trade, education, culture, and news 
reporting seemed not as significant as the summit. However, the reopening of dialogue through 
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these channels provided means by which the peoples of the two countries could engage and learn 
about each other before the formal normalization of relations in 1979. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
This dissertation does not ask why the Sino-American rapprochement could happen. 
Instead, it evaluates “how” it played out in the media in both countries between 1963 and 1972 
and what role they played in the evolution of relations. In the Sino-American rapprochement, 
media in the United States and China made different contributions because of their relationships 
with their governments. Nevertheless, as means of communication, they were similar in their 
roles in message sending and preparing the people for the change in relations. 
U.S. Media 
This study addresses the issue of the relationship between American media and the 
government in terms of foreign policy. Scholars of communications have developed several 
theories on this topic. One school of thought, widely known as the “hegemony” school, claims 
that government manipulates the media when officials “stage events, leak selective information, 
cover up facts behind a wall of secrecy, overwhelm the media with barrages of press releases,” 
and of course, lie occasionally to the point that the media become “putty in the hands of the 
president and his legion of media managers.” A fundamental argument of the “hegemony” theory 
is that the media have “no independent contribution” to the foreign-policy debate. A contrary 
school portrays the media as participants in the foreign-policy process. For members of this 
school, the media play the role of the “fourth estate” of the government with unique influence on 
policy. The problem with the hegemony theory is that it perceives the media as too “subservient” 
to the government.1 The “fourth estate” school, on the other hand, tends to exaggerate the role of 
the media in the policy-making of the government. 
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In my study of the elite U.S. media’s coverage of Sino-American relations, I find that 
they did make an “independent contribution” to the reconciliation between the two countries. 
They played important roles as transmitters of diplomatic signals and active participants. They 
also educated the American people about the progress and significance of Sino-American 
reconciliation.  
As transmitters of political information, U.S. media functioned as a “diplomatic signaling 
system” between the two governments, especially when direct communications did not exist.2 
When Nixon and other U.S. officials addressed China by its proper name, or emphasized its 
importance in world affairs, they expected the media to deliver these gestures of friendliness to 
the American public as well as the leadership in Beijing. However, there were times when the 
messages did not get across. For example, Beijing’s signals through Edgar Snow were not 
delivered to Nixon at an earlier time because of the media’s suspicion of communist 
sympathizers. Moreover, when Nixon “casually” talked about his intention to visit China, his 
remarks attracted more media attention in China than in the United States. In both cases, the 
media’s intentional or unintentional underestimation of the signals’ importance caused the failure 
of their transmission. To some extent, they reflect the independence of the media in transmitting 
the political information.   
By participants, Robert M. Batscha means that the media acted as an “advocate” of policy 
and “representative of the people” in foreign relations.3 U.S. media’s advocacy of foreign-policy 
options caused them to endorse or to criticize government policies. During the Johnson 
administration, newspapers and newsmagazines acted as powerful critics of the government’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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inflexible China policy, especially after the escalation of the Vietnam War and the Chinese 
nuclear test in 1964. Besides calling on the government to make initiatives to reduce tension with 
China and incorporate it into the international community, they criticized officials who evoked 
the “China threat” as an excuse for the American involvement in Vietnam. In both the Johnson 
and Nixon administrations, journalists urged Washington to be more creative on the issue of 
China’s UN membership and to move toward a “two-China” solution sooner to prevent the 
expulsion of Taiwan before it was too late. In these cases, media ran ahead of public opinion and 
the government in pushing for policy reform.  
As the relations between the two countries began to unfreeze, especially after Ping-Pong 
Diplomacy in April 1971, Beijing admitted members of the U.S. media into China, treating them 
with extraordinary privileges and displaying them to the Chinese people. By winning over 
prominent opinion influencers such as James Reston and the New York Times, Beijing promoted 
the image of China among the American people. These journalists not only wrote generally 
favorable stories about China, but also acted as “cultural diplomats” between the two peoples 
when official contacts were scarce.  
Sometimes the media played the role of participants when they became part of the stories 
they covered. During Ping-Pong Diplomacy, Vice-President Spiro Agnew accused U.S. media of 
helping the Chinese government win a “propaganda triumph” over the United States. The use of 
live television to cover Nixon’s visit was unprecedented in history. While it helped him achieve a 
public-relations success, the media criticized Nixon for arousing unrealistic expectations because 
of his overuse of television. By talking about the distinction between “content” and “form,” they 
questioned how much the President could bring home.  
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The media educated the American people about China policy by providing forums for 
public deliberation. The best example was the Fulbright Hearings in 1966 when their prominent 
and intensive coverage magnified critical voices in the academic community and Congress. It 
contributed to the relaxation of public hostility toward China. Moreover, when Washington 
announced new initiatives to China, the media illuminated their significance with phrases such as 
“the most significant,” or “a major step.” These positive responses helped the government win 
public support. If the readiness of American people was an important cause for Nixon to make 
bolder moves toward China upon taking office, the media made a great contribution. 
Because the media did not have to worry about political restrictions as the U.S. 
government did, they had more freedom elaborating on issues that Washington could not openly 
talk about. The concept of “containment without isolation” had existed in the U.S. media long 
before the Johnson administration acknowledged it. During the Cultural Revolution, the Johnson 
team refrained from making comments on the Chinese domestic politics to avoid provoking 
China or undermining the moderate forces in China. In contrast, U.S. media reported widely the 
violence in China. Some even reported the U.S. interests in the victory of Mao’s faction. After 
the eruption of Sino-Soviet border clashes in March 1969, while the Nixon Administration 
assumed a posture of impartiality in order to avoid provoking the Soviet Union (even though in 
private it tilted toward China), U.S. media was not worried about upsetting Moscow when they 
openly wrote and spoke about the benefits of closer ties with Beijing. Similarly, while they made 
a variety of sensational speculations in response to the Lin Biao affair, Washington neither 
inquired about it with Beijing nor made comments to avoid sabotaging Nixon’s China trip. In 
these cases, the media did have independent voices when they provided policy options for the 
government to consider.  
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Despite my argument that U.S. media made independent contributions to Sino-American 
rapprochement, they were far from being completely “independent” players. They relied heavily 
on the government as the main source in reporting foreign affairs. Kissinger’s secret trip to China 
is a good example where the government totally denied the media access to the political process. 
Moreover, there were ample examples where the U.S. government turned a deaf ear to prominent 
news agencies’ call to admit China into the UN. On the other hand, even though the government 
initiated policies, media’s abilities to set the agenda of political debates and to influence public 
opinion make them a restraining force that the government could not manipulate at will or 
simply ignore. For example, whereas Nixon wanted to illustrate his comprehensive approach to 
the world situation in his annual foreign policy report, both the Times and the Post focused on 
Vietnam in their headlines. In another example, while Nixon wanted to demonstrate the historic 
significance of his China trip, several journalists focused on his “betrayal” of Taiwan in the 
Shanghai Communiqué.  
Though media comparison is not the focus of this dissertation, I would like to point out 
some observations based on comparisons among different media agencies. Between the two elite 
newspapers under study, the New York Times appeared much more forthcoming than the 
Washington Post in promoting an improvement in Sino-American relations. During the Cultural 
Revolution, the Post was more graphic in describing the chaos in China and Red Guard 
brutalities. On Sino-Soviet conflicts in 1969, while the Times editorials promoted closer ties with 
Beijing, the Post editorials appeared more detached. When Warsaw talks were renewed in 1970, 
the Times was more optimistic about the prospect of better relations than the Post, which showed 
more suspicion of Beijing’s intention. Between the two magazines, while Time was more hostile 
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to China before the death of Henry Luce, Newsweek was more balanced in presenting views from 
different perspectives.  
In comparison to the print media, the three networks devoted less space to news analysis 
and were generally more neutral in their brief “headline” reporting. As a visual medium with a 
much larger audience, television had a larger impact, especially when it provided live coverage 
of the events. They made a great contribution to the success of Ping-Pong Diplomacy in 1971 
and Nixon’s visit in 1972. The large amount of videos they provided about China and the 
friendly exchanges between the two peoples were truly refreshing to the American audience after 
two decades of alienation between the two countries. 
Chinese Media 
Different from the independent U.S. media, Chinese media are controlled by the 
Communist Party to serve its own political interests. The People’s Daily and the Reference News 
represented the two levels of information transmission in China: public and internal. During the 
period under study, the People’s Daily mainly worked to propagate China’s image as a fighter 
against “imperialists” and “revisionists.” The anti-American and anti-Soviet articles aimed not 
only to mobilize Mao’s domestic struggle against his political enemies, but also to display 
Beijing’s support for the revolutionary struggles around the world, especially those in Indochina. 
By attacking the Soviet Union as the “number-one accomplice” of the American “imperialists,” 
Beijing assumed a moral high ground in its ideological conflict with Moscow.  
The propaganda in the People’s Daily had nuances. On the conflicts in Indochina, Beijing 
was radical in words but cautious in deeds. Even though it repeatedly warned against the 
American “war provocations” and expressed the Chinese determination to support peoples in 
these areas with all means, readers could see its lack of commitment as it did not specify when 
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and how it would intervene. When Hanoi decided to negotiate with Washington in 1968, Beijing 
displayed its unhappiness by remaining silent and lowering the place of Hanoi on its list of 
“friends” in the media. During the Cultural Revolution, despite Beijing’s fierce attacks on the 
Soviet Union, the People’s Daily was silent on their conflicts on the border. The contrast showed 
that Beijing did not want to start a real war with the Soviet Union. When it started to report the 
border clashes after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Moscow had changed from an 
ideological opponent to a threat to Beijing. When Beijing had made major progress with 
Washington in improving their relations, its low key in announcing it and its continued attacks 
on the United States reflected its effort to hold together its ideological friends, particularly those 
opposed to the United States.  
Besides its propaganda function, the People’s Daily was an important channel through 
which Beijing sent diplomatic signals to Washington. It publicized Beijing’s “four points” when 
the Vietnam conflicts were dramatically escalated. When Beijing decided to move closer to 
Washington, it publicized the release of American prisoners and the photos carrying Chinese 
leaders and the “friendly American” Edgar Snow as signals of a new posture. By 1970, even its 
anti-American tirades in response to incursions into Cambodia and Laos became relatively 
toothless. 
The People’s Daily also played an important role when Beijing felt the need to reorient 
the public’s opinion toward the United States. By keeping the distinction between the American 
“government” and the American “people,” it promoted the friendship between the two peoples. 
Moreover, by giving prominent and intensive coverage to the activities of American visitors, 
Beijing tried to get its people used to the fact that their government was dealing with Americans. 
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As an internal newspaper, the Reference News targeted only a limited number of Chinese 
Communist cadres as well as intellectuals and constituted the only legal way for them to learn 
about the outside world. Being less propagandistic, it reprinted foreign news agencies’ objective 
reports about China’s diplomatic problems with North Korea, Cambodia, and even North 
Vietnam during the Cultural Revolution. More importantly, it transmitted friendly signals from 
Washington in their original forms, usually with comments about their significance for Sino-
American relations. When Beijing decided to reconcile with Washington, it reported Chinese 
signals to the United States, also with comments on their significance.  
With the dramatic expansion of its circulation in August 1970, the Reference News 
played a particularly important role in preparing Party members and intellectuals for a change in 
Sino-American relations. Its reproduction of foreign news agencies’ insightful analyses of the 
benefits of Sino-American rapprochement, especially by considering the impact on the Soviet 
Union, Japan and Taiwan, and the favorable world response, provided useful perspectives for the 
Chinese audience to consider. A comparison between the People’s Daily and the Reference News 
shows that, under its cover of anti-American invective, Beijing had started preparing its cadres 
for the reconciliation with its former number-one enemy long before it became evident. 
For all the differences between the U.S. and Chinese media in terms of their freedom of 
action and mechanisms of news reporting, they were similar in their roles as deliverers of 
diplomatic signals and educators of their respective publics for the change in Sino-American 
relations. The media in both countries were also interrelated because they used each other as the 
source of information. By reading the People’s Daily closely, the U.S. media tried to find clues 
about the domestic and foreign policies of China. Similarly, many news stories in the Reference 
News actually came from the U.S. media. The most important feature they share is their ability to 
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influence public opinion, although it is admitted that there were few dissenting opinions in 
China.  
Sino-American rapprochement remains a fascinating topic for scholars. The study of the 
media’s role offers interesting but not definitive evaluation of this historic process. Nevertheless, 
it demonstrates the importance of the media for both governments in presenting their foreign 
policies to their respective publics. In a broader sense, it provides food for thought in the 
continuing debate about the government-media relationship in the United States. By showing the 
unique way by which Beijing handled policy legitimacy within the Party and the general public 
in particular, moreover, it presents a more nuanced picture of the “propaganda state” of China 
and challenges the idea that the media in Communist countries were only used for political 
indoctrination.4  
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This dissertation aims to find out what role(s) the media in the United States and China 
played in their historic rapprochement from 1963 to 1972. In order to examine how they covered 
the major events that affected Sino-American relations, I select seven elite U.S. media and two 
Chinese official newspapers to study. These media include: the New York Times, Washington 
Post, Time, Newsweek, CBS, ABC, NBC, People’s Daily, and Reference News,  
The study is based on the assumption that media, instead of reporting the information 
“objectively,” have the ability to affect the content they deliver and set the agenda for public 
discussions. Therefore, I examine how the media in both countries dealt with the events in terms 
of selectivity, placement, images, and opinions.  
The dissertation argues that the U.S. media did make independent contributions to the 
thaw in relations and that the Chinese media were much more sophisticated than most people 
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rigid China policy in the 1960s. In the early 1970s, American journalists functioned as 
representatives of the people whom Beijing tried to befriend. The Chinese media were not 
merely propaganda tools for political indoctrination. Through them, Beijing took calculated steps 
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!!
263!
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT 
I was born in a small village in Xiangyang, Hubei province of China in 1976. From 1991 
to 1995, I studied Mechanical Engineering at Shanxi No. 1 Technical High School (now Shanxi 
Institute of Technology) in Xi’an. Between 1995 and 2000, I worked first as a reveter then as a 
lab tech at a state-owned enterprise in Xiangyang and took my undergraduate education in 
English through the Self-taught Examination System at the same time. I was admitted to the 
graduate school of Sichuan International Studies University in Chongqing in 2000 and graduated 
with an MA degree in English/American Studies in 2003. Between 2003 and 2006, I worked as a 
full-time lecturer of College English at China Youth University for Political Science in Beijing. I 
entered the doctoral program of the Department of History at Wayne State University in 2006 on 
a recruit Rumble Fellowship and studied U.S. foreign relations under the direction of Dr. Melvin 
Small.  !!!!!!
 
